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Abstract 
Abstract 
Mega Sports Event Policy in Marseille 1991-2003 the Football World 
Cup and the America's Cup: a case study of urban governance. 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a theoretically informed account of the 
decision-making process in mega sports events policy in Marseille. This is 
intended to allow an evaluation of the major theoretical frameworks developed in 
the Anglo-Saxon literature on urban governance and their applicability to the 
French local government context, and more specifically to the context of sports 
policy in Marseille. 
Following an analysis of the development of the local political culture of Marseille, 
the thesis undertakes a review of theoretical frameworks developed in the urban 
policy literature identifying three major approaches / concepts which have 
dominated Anglo-Saxon literature, namely the growth coalition (Logan and 
Molotch 1987), policy network (Rhodes 1981; 1988), and urban regime (Stone 
1989) approaches. These theoretical frameworks have been little used in French 
urban policy literature (Le Gales 1995; 2003) and feature rarely, if at all, in 
French sports policy literature. In reviewing this literature the thesis identifies a 
set of indicators, which may be used in empirical contexts to differentiate growth 
coalitions from policy networks and urban regimes. A major question for the 
research is thus to what extent Anglo-Saxon theoretical frameworks / concepts 
can be usefully employed to understand French decision-making and that of 
Marseille in particular. 
Subscribing to critical realism, the thesis aims to give an account of the mega 
sport event phenomena in Marseille, and of the actors' understanding and 
interpretation (in effect their social construction) of the phenomena. The data 
collected were documents for the period 1991 - 2003 from official sources 
(minutes and proceedings of local government and event-related bodies, reports, 
political speeches, and local government publications), local press coverage, and 
interviewees conducted with the major decision-makers. An ethnographic content 
analysis was made, partly employing a deductive approach based on the set of 
common indicators developed from the review of urban policy, and partly 
inductively from themes, which emerged in the analysis (Altheide 1996). 
The thesis concludes that while there is some evidence of the development of 
policy networks the specificity of the French context, and that of Marseille, with 
its heavily state-led approach to policy, means that the use of urban regime, and 
still less of growth coalition approaches, is not warranted by the evidence. 
Key words: growth coalition, policy network, urban regime, urban governance, Marseille, Football 
World Cup 1998, America's Cup. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the second half of the twentieth century the nature of social 
organisation in the developed economies of the Western world underwent 
significant structural change. Attempts to conceptualise such changes are 
reflected in social science literature in the introduction of a series of uses 
of the prefix "post" (post-industrial, post-modern, post-welfare) as 
descriptors of society. Such terminology seeks to characterise the nature 
of fundamental change in politics, social policy, culture, and economy, and 
such changes invariably impinge on patterns of life in such societies, 
across a range of domains and the sports domain is no exception. 
The growth of urban settlements in the industrial age was premised on 
the need to have a centrally available, trained and paid workforce, close to 
raw materials or transport networks. As industrialisation matured, the 
social reproduction of the workforce increasingly became the responsibility 
of the state and welfare provision became the norm. Responsibility for 
providing sport (sport for all) was one of the last of the areas of social 
provision to be adopted by the public sector. In recent years, however, 
welfare provision has come under pressure as national, regional and 
municipal governments have become subject to the pressures of fiscal 
stringency, neo-liberal ideology, and changing social tastes, all of which 
have undermined commitment in the public sector to welfare provision 
(Gratton and Henry 2001). 
However, the squeeze on welfare provision and delivery of sport for all 
has not meant that sports policy in the city has simply disappeared. In 
many respects sport is even more visible in the public sector as cities vie 
with each another, using sport for the purposes of city marketing, the 
promotion of city tourism, and the development of an attractive 
infrastructure by which the post-modern, post-welfare city can attract 
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service class professionals (Paddison 1993; Smyth 1994; Waitt 1999; 
Ward 2000; Chalip and Leyns 2002). Sport in the city has not declined in 
importance but its role has certainly changed. One should not exaggerate, 
however: welfare states still exist though their forms may have changed, 
and sporting services are still provided by state and state-supported 
bodies at municipal level, but this is by no means as prominent as it was. 
Major cities then have begun to seek to develop a programme of events 
and sporting spectacle, the rationale for which is related to aspects of 
economic development rather more than to community development 
(Chalip and Leyns 2002; Gratton and Henry 2001). The concern of the 
political left with providing services to local people in order to reduce 
inequality is overshadowed in some instances by this concern with 
economic development priorities (Boyle and Hugues 1994; Henry and 
Paramio-Salcines 1999). Sport events have become a focal point for cities 
that want to achieve a certain development or for cities that are looking 
for solutions to economic and social crisis. Besides, Lecoart and Sallet- 
Lavorel (2002), in their report on 'The impact of major events on 
metropolitan development', argue that three kinds of objective underpin 
the organisation of major events: 
- objectives in relation to image and to international recognition: all 
cities expect to position themselves in order to increase their 
prestige or to strengthen their situation; 
- economic and tourist objectives: cities hope to utilise events as a 
lever to renewal through economic growth and to attract inward 
investment; 
- objectives of urban development: to host a major event, a city 
must have the necessary infrastructure. New development and 
renovation of infrastructure are predominantly evident in the 
transport domain, from the level of local transport to that of 
international transport facilities. These objectives are described by 
cities as being as important as the event itself, which is considered 
2 
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as a "booster for major urban transformation projects" (Lecoart and 
Sallet-Lavorel 2002: 16). 
Thus, the real impact of events corresponds to cities' objectives. According 
to Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel (2002), impact on city image is undeniable, 
both positive, and in the case of organisation failure, negative; cities 
benefit also in terms of short, middle and long term impact on the 
economy and tourism; and city urban development projects are effectively 
boosted because ancillary works have to be undertaken, the staging of an 
event can mean a gain of between 10 and 15 years of investment. 
According to the authors, there is also an impact in terms of working 
methods. The authors refer to the side-effects of the events on ""the mode 
of governance of the metropolis" 1 (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel 2002: 27). 
But the main impact is clearly on urban development (Gratton et al. 
2005). As Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel argue: 
Some cities like Barcelona even admit that big events are 
pretexts, the aim is to improve the global attractiveness of the 
metropolis through the provision of infrastructure, the 
rehabilitation of urban land, and the creation of a new focal 
point for development (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel 2002: 18). 
This report clearly underlines the claim that major events are more than 
the organisation of a competition. They are a powerful means to achieve 
goals, which have proved difficult to attain through more traditional 
means. 
The city of Marseille is no exception to this process of using sport for 
regeneration, although it has also developed other aspects of sports 
policy. On the one hand, the city's football team, O/ympique de Marseille, 
had become a major institution by the end of the 1980s, both as an 
attraction in its own right, and as a vehicle for Marseille's image. Even 
though sports events already existed, it was from the 1980s onwards that 
the events became more media focused, and of increasing size and 
' Governance is used by these authors principally in the sense of management of human 
resources. 
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significance. Marseille, as one of the three most important cities in France 
(vying with Lyon for the position of France's second city), regularly hosted 
a stage of the Tour de France, and other major sporting events, such as 
the start of the Paris-Dakar Rally in 1989, the tennis Open 13, and a stage 
of the World Beach Volley Championship. In 1984, the city hosted some of 
the matches in the European Football Championships. At the same time, 
numerous lower level, or less well known, competitions, were hosted by 
the city. On the other hand, policy was also being developed in terms of 
sport development with increasing municipal subsidies to sports clubs, of 
greater or lesser significance depending on the political party in power in 
cities (Callede 1988; Noe 1991; Bayeux and Piau 1996; Augustin 2002). 
However the most significant expansion of major sports events in 
Marseille, as for other major French cities, took place in the 1990s, with 
the increase of media coverage for mega sports events and the outcomes 
related. During this decade, Marseille appeared to regard sport in a very 
different manner from the way in which it had done previously. The 
decision to take part in the hosting of the World Football Cup 1998 was 
taken at a time when Olympique de Marseille was achieving impressive 
results on the field, gaining a genuinely global reputation as capable of 
taking on the world's best. The city was also involved in all three Paris 
bids to host the Olympics Games, offering venues for nautical sports and 
football. Marseille also made a particular effort to promote its reputation 
and image as a base for nautical sport, organizing different competitions 
like the Yachting World Game or 'the Race'. In 2003, Marseille bid to host 
the America's Cup, perhaps the world's pre-eminent ocean-racing event. 
During this period, local sporting clubs continued their role in sport 
development, with less subsidy for operational activity, but an increase in 
resources available to support the organisation of competitions. This 
changing emphasis in sports policy began during the period of control of 
the city by the left wing governments of Deferre and Vigouroux in the 
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1980s, but was continued and indeed accelerated following the accession 
of the right to power in the city in 1995. 
The development of this policy approach is one which is not simply limited 
to the activities of the municipality or the public sector more broadly: it is 
one which, because of its economic development goals and thus its 
potential for business opportunities, may also attract private sector 
support. International sport events had taken on an importance which 
went far beyond simply the attraction of sport itself. Media investment in 
this domain grew considerably, providing opportunity not only for 
capitalising on this increasing visibility in terms of sponsorship, but also for 
other sources of profit. The building of infrastructure, the development of 
transport systems, or of tourism provision, meant that this was an area of 
increasing interest to business, and thus the private sector, as well as the 
city, had much to gain from the organisation and staging of such events. 
The competition between Candidate Cities in 2005 for the Olympic Games 
of 2012 illustrates this point admirably. Each of the bidding cities had the 
support of many of their country's major companies, of their government, 
and of their media. For London, Prime Minister Tony Blair made space in a 
busy schedule immediately before hosting the G8 summit in Scotland to 
meet IOC members in Singapore in order to promote the London bid; for 
Paris, Jacques Chirac himself made part of the presentation speech to the 
IOC. For both cities, there was a committee of national companies 
involved in the bids. In France and in the UK national television channels 
broadcast live the lead up to the decision and its announcement. There 
were large screens in place in both cities, which allowed people in the 
street to follow the final process. This hyperactive pursuit of the 
designation of Olympic host city illustrates the importance of such sport 
events. The involvement of the private sector was very evident in 
domains, which had previously been the preserve of the public sector. 
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Within the context of such changes since the 1970s, the social science 
literature has developed theories about new forms of city government / 
governance. The term governance has increasingly been used to reflect 
the changing, and indeed increasingly overlapping, interests and activities 
of the public, voluntary and private sectors (Leftwitch 1993; Rhodes 
1996). Partnerships between public and private sector bodies have 
increased, in part because cities are no longer able to realise their 
missions without the input of private and voluntary sector actors. Thus 
governance' implies partnerships and these partnerships have been 
characterised in the social science literature by the introduction of a range 
of conceptual and theoretical frameworks, the most significant of which 
are represented in the concepts of the growth coalition' (Logan and 
Molotch 1987), the 'policy network' (Rhodes 1981; 1988) and the 'urban 
regime' (Stone 1989). Authors have sought to use these concepts to 
identify the nature of the exercise of power in a whole range of policy 
domains. They identify membership of key groups, their aims and values, 
their mode of operation and so on. However, those new conceptual 
frameworks were developed in contexts very different from that of France, 
where central government has traditionally maintained a strong public 
sector with a strongly interventionist system and style and with little 
emphasis on public-private collaboration (Landrieu 2000). Thus, part of 
the aim of this thesis will be to evaluate whether the concepts of growth 
coalition, policy network and urban regime are applicable in France and 
whether they are helpful in explaining the nature of sports policy and its 
development in the city of Marseille. 
The thesis focuses on decisions to bid for and host two sporting events of 
global significance: the World Football Cup 1998 in which Marseille hosted 
a number of games including one of the semi-finals, and Marseille's 
(ultimately unsuccessful) bid for the America's Cup 2007. They are 
several reasons for choice of these sport events for study. First of all, the 
interest in studying both events lies in the period covered: between the 
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beginning of the World Football Cup 1998 project and the end of the 
designation-process for the America's Cup 2007,12 years had passed, and 
it allows an evaluation of the stability of the composition of actors and 
interests in the medium term. Moreover, both events have important 
media coverage, with similar outcomes on economic and social life on the 
host city. In terms of the competitions themselves, both represent the 
most important competitive events for their respective sports. They are 
international competitions, bringing national teams together in spectacular 
competition. The best competitors and athletes take part in the events, 
offering what sport aficionados consider to be the most beautiful and 
exciting demonstrations of skill and spectacle in their own sports. 
Nevertheless, two main differences exist between the World 
Football Cup and the America's Cup. The first arises from the level of 
government involved in the event: State support is predominantly at 
national level for the World Football Cup (since it involves a range of 
areas) but State involvement is predominantly at city level for the yachting 
competition. Secondly, the project set up diverges in its form because the 
organisation of the football competition implies a response to specific 
terms of reference laid down by FIFA, whereas bidding to host the 
America's Cup involves a more open-ended approach (essentially involving 
the response to a questionnaire). The World Football Cup is shaped by a 
very strong central organisation, FIFA, while the format of the hosting of 
the America's Cup is to a large extent the product of the wishes of the 
previous winning team. Despite these differences, both events have global 
significance and were organised, or were bid for, by the city of Marseille 
for this reason. 
Within this context, the core research questions for this study relate to the 
issue of how the sports policy process can be conceptualised in this new 
context in France, specifically in Marseille. More precisely they consist of 
the following two sets of related questions: 
7 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1) By reference to Marseille can we identify who the major players are 
in the sports policy process? Where do they come from? (Are they 
city based? Which sectors do they come from? ) How are they 
recruited into the system? How do they influence policy? What are 
their interests, goals and strategies? 
2) To what extent are the theoretical frameworks developed in the 
broader urban policy literature helpful in characterising the sports 
policy system in Marseille? Specifically can the major theoretical 
approaches of policy networks, growth coalitions, or urban regime 
theory contribute to the analysis of sports policy event in Marseille? 
The importance of these questions is in large part bound up with 
questions concerning the specificity of the local context (that of Marseille, 
and of France) within wider globalised systems of world sporting / media 
events. We seek in effect through the empirical analysis to consider 
whether theoretical accounts developed in North American (and elsewhere 
in the Anglophone academic community) provide real purchase on the 
French context. 
To address the research questions, the thesis is developed in the following 
manner: in Chapter 2, we present and evaluate the literature concerning 
governance and theoretical frameworks in urban policy. Chapter 3 
develops an account of the political, economic and social context of 
Marseille before and during the period in which both decisions were taken. 
Chapter 4 provides a defence of the methodology adopted. Chapters 5 
and 6 explore both case study policy decisions in depth, synthesising and 
analysing the empirical material developed in the study. In the concluding 
chapter we return to the issue of the appropriateness of the different 
theoretical perspectives of analysis of sports policy in this specific local 
context. The nature and the significance of the city's bidding process thus 
form the focus of our concerns in this thesis. 
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2.1. Introduction 
For the last two decades, in the Anglo-Saxon literature, but more recently 
in the French literature, the notions of urban government and ways of 
governing have been debated. In this debate, authors have begun to use 
the concept of governance in order to explain the inability of the public 
sector to respond effectively to citizens' expressions of need. While the 
concept of governance was initially at the core of the literature about 
government failures, it has been interpreted more recently as part of the 
solution to the crisis of governability'. 
At the local level, Anglo-Saxon theorists have introduced the concepts of 
'urban growth coalition', 'urban regimes' and also of 'urban policy 
networks' in explanation of the evolution of the policy process at work in 
cities over the last four decades. However, although much of the work in 
this field, generally falls under the categories of these three theoretical 
orientations, there has been relatively little use of such perspectives in 
comparative analysis of urban policy, and almost none in comparative 
analysis of urban sports policy (for an exception, see Paramio-Salcines 
2000; Denyer 2002). More recently, with the emergence of the language 
of governance' a body of work has been developed focused on the 
various manifestations of governance at the urban level, with a significant 
proportion of authors employing one or other of the theoretical 
approaches presented below. 
As Jessop (1995) and Le Gales (2003) argue, it is important to clarify the 
different ways in which governance has been conceptualised. In the 
context of such a debate, a sociological approach to this question will be 
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important to any attempt to contribute to the construction of a renewed 
theoretical framework. With this in mind, work relating to growth 
coalitions, regimes, and policy networks will be discussed in the following 
sections, not as theoretical models in their own right but rather in terms of 
providing a basis to understand what a mode of governance might be. 
This discussion will be followed by a commentary on research which 
focuses on urban sports policies. Finally there will be a discussion of how 
consideration of these literatures can contribute to a refining of the 
research questions and approach. 
2.2. Approaches to governance. 
2.2.1. Definitions of governance 
The increasing interest in governance is evidenced not only by its 
increasing presence in the Anglophone social sciences vocabulary but also 
in the proliferation of research on this topic (Lorrain and Stoker 1995; 
Jessop 1998; Merrien 1998; and for a literature review about this theme, 
see amongst others Le Gales 1995; 2003). This 'fad' has its origins partly 
in the fact that governance constitutes a response to the question of the 
crisis of economic and social governability in the contemporary context. 
The term is used in several domains to explain the increasing number and 
interdependence of actors involved in decision-making processes, because 
a characteristic feature of governance is the involvement of partners with 
appropriate resources in networked rather than hierarchical decision- 
making processes. 
In relation to governments, the main characteristic of governance is that 
of a proliferating collaboration between public, private and voluntary 
partners. In effect, decision-making power in areas previously the 
preserve of the public sector, no longer resides solely in that sector. 
According to Stoker (1998), governance involves work, which is not limited 
to a single domain or a particular sector. He emphasises collaboration 
between actors, from different sectors, who wish to achieve objectives, 
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collectively defined, that government alone cannot achieve (Le Gales 
1998). Thus, governance represents a variation from the notion of 
government which was seen to have been to an extent delegitimated. 
Elected individuals are thus no longer deemed the sole authority in 
decision-making, governing in effect becomes an interactive process 
(Stoker 1998), which will require the bringing together of people with 
appropriate resources. 
a). Scientific usage 
Le Gales (2003) claims that the use of governance in the social sciences 
usually relates to one of three disciplinary fields (29-37). In economics 
American theorists promote a conception of governance that focuses on 
development of coordination mechanisms in firms, an approach that seeks 
to decrease transaction costs and to improve efficiency. In this kind of 
analysis, which draws on classical economic models, inspired by the neo- 
liberal right, governance is treated as a set of rules intended principally to 
optimise the economic efficiency of a social entity. 
Economic sociology and political economy go beyond the major 
consideration of the firms' efficiency in order to consider more specifically 
conflicts of power, games amongst social groups and mechanisms of 
control. In these perspectives, governance refers to regulation 
mechanisms between the market, social structures (networks, 
communities, associations), political institutions (the State and its 
representative parts) and private organizations (firms). Studies from this 
perspective distinguish regulatory ideal-typical forms in relation to groups 
and actors present and their interests. Going beyond the simple logic of 
categorisation, these understandings of governance emphasize two 
specific points, first the collective, concerted nature of aims reflected in 
emerging configurations of actors, and secondly the social and political 
stability that such groups can engender. 
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In political sociology concern with governance represents a truly separate 
sphere from social regulation. Starting from this position, the notions of 
governance and government are integrally bound up. Analysis deals with 
government failures, and the lack of capacity for auto-regulation in society 
or with the resistance of certain sectors to authority, and focuses on 
government action, and the decisions which governments take. The 
government is always at the centre of debates. The problematic of 
governance has not replaced that of government but on the contrary 
represents an alternative approach which governments can take to 
alleviate governmental failure. This appeared at the beginning of the 
1990s reflected in statements that claimed that ""the style of government 
of rich countries has to evolve; these changes have to be implemented" 
(Gaudin 2002: 20). This problematic focuses on the interaction between 
the State and society, and the nature of coordination that is necessary for 
action to take place in the public sphere (Kooiman 1993). It is thus 
focused not simply on government, but on various alternative mechanisms 
of negotiation between different groups and actors who are able to make 
governmental action possible (Kooiman 1993). 
The use of governance', whatever the field, refers to a pragmatic drawing 
together of power from various sources (Gaudin 2002). For Allemand 
(2000), governance is synonymous with a change in the government or 
management mode at different levels, as well as in different sectors, of 
society. It draws attention to the plurality of actors, who employ different 
logics in intervening in different processes of collective action. It is also a 
way to understand that 
the environment is uncertain, more and more complex, 
requiring knowledge, competences, information, which a 
single actor can no longer pretend to hold on his own 
(Allemand 2000: 17). 
The interest shown in governance notably from a socio-political 
perspective is a function of the transformation of the role of the State and 
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the mode of political regulation, which has resulted from that 
transformation. This approach of treating the government as one actor 
among others leads inevitably to the rational restructuring of the State 
and its implication in terms of State monopoly and power. Governance 
provides the opportunity of conceptual advances in the social science 
domain and more particularly in political sociology. 
b). Macro governance 
Governance introduces a new way of governing society (Stoker 1998), the 
principal characteristic of which consists of the increasingly strong 
interrelationship of private and public sectors. In other words, governance 
represents a move from the redistribution of resources and the 
development of social programmes by the State to a distribution that is 
made between partners from the public and private sectors (Murdoch and 
Abram 1998; Geddes 2006). The boundaries between these two sectors 
are increasingly blurred in the new mode of government. The division in 
different sectors, even though it still exists at a formal level, is much less 
visible in relation to practical action. In effect, by the very nature of the 
complementarity of the actions of the actors from different sectors, power 
is no longer seen as being exercised in an independent fashion but is 
reflected in the interdependent relationship of the sectors, undermining 
the notion of a single hierarchy in government (Jessop 1998). Government 
has need of private sector partners that can bring to the table the financial 
resources for action, while private partners need government to provide a 
steer for policy action. The same type of relationship exists with the 
voluntary sector. The notion of governance implies that there exists the 
possibility of integrating the partners from different sectors, with different 
interests, into a single governing strategy. Once that strategy is decided, it 
then has to be defended in the outside world (Le Gales 1998). It is thus a 
matter of finding a common coherent position, internal to the group in 
power in order to act effectively in its own policy domain, but which is also 
13 
Chapter 2: Theoretical review 
strong enough for this coherence not to be limited solely to its internal 
functioning. 
Whereas studies on governance grew in the US and the UK in the 1990s, 
there were few such studies conducted by French authors (Landrieu 2000; 
Reigner 2001; Bayeux 2002). There seemed to be a reluctance to use the 
term to define French situations even though similar 'symptoms' were 
evident (Gaudin 2002). Gaudin argues that French authors might want to 
keep some distance from a notion 
too similar to neo-liberalism and to the market dynamism of 
the 1990s and so it does not give good account of regulations 
which, in France, are still, more than anywhere, characterised 
by the State organised norms of the public sector (2002: 90). 
Governance is seen as a result of a society sick of management' (De 
Gaulejac 2005), in the sense that the Welfare State has become, like the 
rest of society, economy driven. The polysemy of the word and the use 
made of the term by international organisations has further fuelled this 
reluctance on the part of French commentators (interview with Le Gales 
cited in Allemand 2000). 
Although these criticisms may be more ideology-driven then empirically 
founded, nevertheless, one cannot deny that the specificity of the French 
context means that one should be cautious when using the term 
governance'. Landrieu (2000) for example, argues that the history of 
French public administrations explains the resistance, which exists to the 
establishment of a truly governance-oriented approach. The State has 
always been very strong in France, because it is made up of a powerful 
network of public services. It is thus difficult today for the government to 
adopt the role of a mere manager of decision-making groups. The 
decentralisation laws introduced in the 1980s, enabled functions to be 
shared by central government with other levels of public administration, 
but success in the practice of sharing of responsibilities with private sector 
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bodies has, for many commentators, yet to be demonstrated (Landrieu 
2000). Others have constructed their analysis on case studies, illustrating 
the diffusion of public-private partnerships models both in Europe 
(Newman and Thornley 1996) and in France (Verpraet 1991). These case 
studies to date have consisted of large scale projects most notably those 
relating to the development and restructuring of major port cities. The 
first French author to use the term 'governance' consistently was Le Gales 
in 1995, who emphasised that the term 'governance' was helpful to 
understand what was happening in France in policy-making, with the 
emergence of new forms of partnership (Le Gales 1995). 
In summary, the classical accepted definitions of governance, illustrated in 
macro sociological analysis, are based on three theoretical, though not 
unchallenged, assumptions: 
- the existence of a crisis of governability, 
- that this crisis reflects the exhaustion of the traditional 
forms of state intervention, 
- the emergence of a tendency or of a convergence of 
political trends in economically developed' countries that 
is giving rise to a new form of governance better adapted 
to the context (Merrien, 1998: 57) 
Even if such claims can be made at the national level, it is necessary, 
however, to consider the extent to which these assumptions hold at the 
local level and in a very specific (French) national context. 
2.2.2. Urban governance 
The first case studies reported in the field of urban governance relate to 
the Anglo-Saxon context. When one applies the concept of local 
governance in France, it denotes a change in modes of functioning at the 
local level, reflecting the claim that the private sector is increasingly 
involved in the taking of decisions. It is on the level of innovation in 
relation to the system of city government that reflexion on governance is 
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most developed today (Le Gales 1995; Landrieu 2000). As Reigner (2001: 
183) argued "The local level is often where policy innovation and 
coordination now takes place". In this respect, the French city represents 
a laboratory for developing new forms of government. 
Because they are directly involved with the problems that citizens 
experience, city governments must adapt themselves as quickly as 
possible to changes in local circumstances. The operation of urban 
government must be effective because its results are directly visible to its 
citizens. In a whole range of policy domains, 
Central government produces rules, the frameworks while the 
local level is the location for specific negotiations where there 
are pragmatic government institutions and people meet face 
to face (Honta, 2001). 
The city is the location for practical policy. The first level of government to 
be contacted is always likely to be under pressure to react swiftly. The 
need for immediate action by the local authority is sometimes legitimated 
by reference to the demands of global competition and the place of the 
city in the global market (Nicholls 2005). This often diminishes 
considerations by policy actors of local political and social conditions 
(Southern 2002). In a sense, governance promotes an impetus for 
privatisation and cooperation between public and private sectors in order 
to remain competitive and to act quickly and effectively to compete 
effectively with other European cities. 
Approaches to urban governance thus focus their analysis on actors, in 
the most 'collective' sense, and also on the forms and conditions of their 
interactions. This is perhaps especially true of certain French 
commentators. Before going further with this argument, the concept of 
collective actor needs to be clarified. Pichierri (1997) reported five major 
elements of a 'collective actor': a system of collective decisions; interests 
which are common and seen as such; integration mechanisms; a collective 
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vision of the internal context and of the external environment and a 
capacity for innovation. These represent (notably in terms of the first 
three characteristics) the defining features of a collective actor. It is 
important to underline the legitimacy which some confer on it. For Bourdin 
for example: 
It is about the definition of common interest, a strategy, an 
identity, friends and enemies, or at least allies and 
competitors. If all of this exists and a spokes-person or an 
authority is clearly enabled to express it, one can effectively 
talk about an actor (2000; 317). 
The whole collection of these indicators contributes to the definition of the 
city as a collective actor, as, for example, Le Gales (2003) understands it. 
In this particular case, cities are not simply the interplay of individual 
actors but equally of social structures and institutions, which shape the 
expectations of actors, influence their interest and their understanding. 
These structures and institutions go well beyond the identity of a single 
commune. Urban governance is based upon this interactive process 
individualities-entities institutional-social structures. The city as a collective 
actor does incorporate multiple identities resulting from the grouping 
together of a plurality of potential intervening parties: local authorities, 
representatives of different segments of the State, large private 
enterprises, representatives of private companies, public and semi-public 
agencies, consultants, research organizations, and associations (Le Gales, 
1995: 60). If for certain authors urban governance is characterised above 
all by the inclusion of private actors, others develop a much more 
heterogeneous vision of those parties implicated in this process. Much 
rarer are those who place on emphasis on the dimension of citizen 
participation, in the way in which Ascher does: 
The future of 'metapoles' depends more on the possibility of 
sustaining a true urban governance, that is to say a system of 
government which articulates and associates with political 
institutions, social actors and private bodies, in these 
processes of identifying and putting into operation collective 
choices, capable of provoking an active commitment on the 
part of citizens (1995: 269). 
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Whichever of these is the dominant explanation, the different approaches 
reveal that urban governance relies more and more on non-governmental 
actors. In the French case, some authors, like Bayeux (2002), interpret 
policy-making in the sport domain as being a result of a change from 
government to governance, by reference to the multiplication of public 
partnerships. Sport policy is the result of a horizontal collaboration 
between several mayors, through inter-communal bodies (known as 
'Communaute de Communes' or Communaute Urbarne). Bayeux suggests 
that in the French context, rather than seeking private partners, local 
authorities seek to build on the networks of local bodies, which central 
government has made available to them - notably other communes, 
departements, regions and local arms of state bodies. Newman and Tual 
(2002), in their study of the development of the Stade de France, 
demonstrate that although the choice of the stadium location - in the 
Plaine Saint Denis - was made by the central government, the 
management of the project was a product of inter-communal cooperation 
and inter-government department coordination. The central government 
administration and legislation effectively left decision-making in the hands 
of the public sector. 
Local governments not only incorporate the bringing together of a certain 
number of actors but this situation also poses a question for their role in 
the process of decision making (Geddes 2006). In this conceptual 
framework, it is first and foremost the functions and actions of local 
government which are fundamentally called into question (Allemand 
2000). This new approach allows a glimpse of the transformation of 
traditional local democracy. Notably in what has been traditionally a most 
bureaucratic context, innovation in the form of horizontal and vertical 
coordination of public action implies a necessary flexibility and diversity in 
the manner in which services are organised (DiGaetano and Storm 2003). 
Urban governance is characterised as much in the variety of the actors as 
in strategic capacity or the dynamic of negotiation. However, comparative 
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studies on governance between British and French cities suggest that 
though governance exists in both contexts, it differs in its application in 
some respects, in particular in relation to the political leadership (John and 
Cole 1999) and public-private partnership (DiGaetano and Storm 2003). 
The concept of governance embodies the new forms of government in 
different countries, as cases studies demonstrate it. Beyond the USA and 
UK, the existence of governance at the local level has been demonstrated 
in several European countries: in France (Gilly and Wallet 2001; Reigner 
2001; Bayeux 2002; Nicholls 2005), in Germany (Gissendanner 2004) and 
in Portugal (Silva and Syrett 2006). 
The increasing number of studies of local governance provides some 
insights into the question of how the concept applies in such different 
contexts. Frameworks have thus been developed as a basis for 
comparative local governance with analysis focusing typically on similar 
aspects of decision-making (Gissendanner 2003; Sellers 2005; Denters 
and Mossberger 2006). However, these studies do not necessarily 
evaluate, rather they propose methodologies to operationalise the concept 
in comparative urban political researches. 
The concept of governance introduces diversity into the processes by 
which local government operates, and its activities legitimated, and by 
transforming regulation and control mechanisms in local bureaucracy, it is 
overturning the classical approach to the organisation of local government 
(Interview with Le Gales cited in Allemand 2000). One can no longer 
characterise the way policy actors will operate by reference to whether 
they are public or private sector actors. Urban governance implies that 
cross sector operations and behaviours, and inter-organisational 
cooperation and mutual adjustment constitute elements of a new frame of 
reference for policy at the urban level. 
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2.3. Growth coalitions 
2.3.1. Origins of the concept and definition 
Historically, the first work reporting coalitions dates from the 1940s, 
directly inspired by game theory. These reflexions on negotiation games 
were emblematic in the field of political theory. Initially focused on the 
reasons, which motivate the formation of coalitions, analysis rapidly 
integrated other questions most notably concerning the resources at the 
disposal of participants (Caplow 1956; 1968) or the ideological affinities 
among them (Gamson 1961). This type of approach also introduced two 
other parameters in the founding of a coalition, the benefits sought by 
coalition members and the level at which decisions would be taken. These 
four determinants still constitute in the contemporary use of the theory, 
one of the most useful ways of explaining the formation of coalitions as 
well as their maintenance, transformation and dissolution. 
The definition of a coalition given by Lemieux (1998) effectively integrates 
these descriptors, but it also introduces an essential temporal dimension, 
notably by way of differentiating coalitions from other forms of alliances: 
Coalitions are generally defined as temporary alliances, which 
are the result of consultation if not negotiation between those 
who participate in them. (... ) three dimensions of the relation 
between actors determine the formation and transformation 
of a coalition. These are first of all transactions which reflect 
the gains that actors are looking for and the contribution 
which they bring to achieve this end. There are then affinities 
between the actors which are sometimes mixed with hostility 
or neutrality. Then there are the controls which they exercise 
either among themselves or on their opponents (1998: 13- 
14). 
With a view to summarizing and reinforcing these characteristics, one 
might propose four defining indicators of a coalition: 
-the composition: identification of actors involved, 
-the nature of relations between members: understanding, 
cooperation, or conflict, 
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-resources: methods used to achieve power, 
-ends: motives and interests of coalition members. 
The raison d'etre of a coalition is expressed in the potential which it 
represents for its members in relation to the external context, and its 
potential opponents. It is effectively in the interest of the coalition 
members in so far as it confers advantages on them, which are greater 
than if they were outside of the coalition. The question which is of interest 
to us in the present case relates to the identification of these criteria at 
the level of the urban system. 
2.3.2. Coalitions at the micro level 
The use of the concept of coalition in the analysis of local configurations 
began to grow again at the beginning of the 1970s following the first' 
urban crisis in the United States. The objective was to understand who 
exerted the greatest influence in building construction and whose interests 
these property development activities served (Molotch 1976; Logan and 
Molotch 1987). Confronted by numerous difficulties such as economic 
failure, lots of cities developed programmes that were led by coalitions 
comprising elected officials and members of the business elite 
(Mollenkopth 1980). Adopting a neo-Marxist perspective, Logan and 
Molotch (1987) argued that it was those with property capital who exerted 
the major influence on city policy. These groups played a direct role in the 
setting-up of development ; programmes. A coalition is constructed around 
the idea that local government is no longer capable of responding alone to 
this crisis and that economic growth led by entrepreneurs is the solution. 
The authors refer to the 'urban growth coalition' or even the 'urban 
economic development coalition' in explaining this phenomenon. 
The logic which structures this grouping at the local level is summarised 
as a coalition of interest' of which we find the first descriptions in the case 
study of Thoden Van Velzen (1973). To begin with the aims, which were 
oriented towards transactions and appropriation of funds as resources, 
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were considered by the authors to be the most important elements. 
Members provided contributions and received benefits which enriched the 
funds available. The relationship with the wider environment was one of 
stable boundaries, defined by the leader and the other members among 
whom transaction took place. In relation to the activities, the authors note 
that they were multifaceted and largely concerned the 'structuring' or 
11 reinforcing' of coalition interests. This was like a form of a star centred 
around the core with members who were not necessarily linked one with 
another except through the hub. Following this approach, certain authors 
favoured the notion of urban entrepreneurial ism (Harvey 1987; Hall and 
Hubbard 1998; Painter 1998) in the sense that it is the entrepreneurs who 
legitimate this vision of growth, making of it a collective interest for the 
locality as a whole. They put forward the idea of growth that benefits 
everybody: providing employment; resolving problems; and generating 
resources for the city (Le Gales 1995). Their objective is to get the general 
population to accept that economic growth is the solution to local 
problems. They put up projects behind which they hide their personal 
ambitions emphasing their contribution to the future of the city. The goal 
of the members of the coalition, however, is purely individual and not 
collective, personal wealth is seen as the only motivation (Molotch 1988). 
In effect, a local group of land rentiers is at the heart of a coalition 
because these are the people who have the resources necessary for 
reviving economic growth (Logan and Molotch 1987). They add to 
financial resources, while the banks, the property developers, and a 
number of other parties grow their businesses and thus also their 
economic capital. Alongside this activity, different relationships develop 
involving both private and public sector actors who benefit directly or 
indirectly from such associations. A coalition automatically constructs a 
relatively coherent group, more or less linked to the local authorities, 
property developers, business owners, managers, bankers, union officials, 
solicitors, retail interests, lawyers, journalists and members of other liberal 
professions. To these, one can add secondary actors such as universities, 
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private cultural organisations, managers of sports facilities, and other 
business people. 
For Logan and Molotch (1996), land rentiers' associates may be divided 
into three categories: businesses that benefit directly from the 
development project; organisations which increase their sales of products 
through the project; and local organisations that benefit indirectly from 
growth. Local governments take part in the growth coalition when it gives 
them financial resources and also when they can take advantage of it to 
demonstrate to citizens their ability to govern (Harding 1996a). The 
principal benefit of a coalition to its members lies in the capacity of actors 
to make individual interests into a collective interest to legitimate their 
activities. In most instances, coalition activity centres on the setting-up of 
large scale building development operations (Harding 1995; Le Gales 
1996b; Gissendanner 2003; 2004). 
Leisure plays a great role in cities where growth coalition takes place 
because: 
(... ) whilst a good opera or ballet company may subtly 
enhance the growth potential of some cities, other cultural 
ingredients are crucial for a good business climate (Logan and 
Molotch 1996: 298). 
In that sense, Logan and Molotch argue that sport events are perceived 
by these cities and their growth coalitions as 
... ways of meeting short term goals of generating revenue as 
well as ways of meeting short term goals of attracting outside 
businesses (1996: 312). 
Thus sports, and more generally leisure, are the tools for fostering growth 
conditions, and in addition sport may be a useful means to sustain growth 
ideology (Logan and Molotch 1996). 
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At the heart of a coalition, relations are much more those of a market 
place than of true consensus. Given that its raison d'etre is personal profit, 
relationships are made through negotiation and by compromise because 
each individual tries to preserve his/her interest to the maximum (Molotch 
1988). If one of the actors is not satisfied by the benefits generated, s/he 
can retire from the coalition. The heart of the coalition is based on 
indispensable actors belonging to the 'first circle' mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. However, once the project is achieved, the coalition is 
likely to dissolve. This concept thus represents a potential tool in the 
analysis of the institutionalisation of collective action, notably in terms of 
providing an alternative economic response to political failure. The 
coalition approach, with its emphasis in certain sources, focuses analysis 
in particular on the political actors, and this serves to counter the poverty 
of explanation concerning the motivation of local government for 
participating in such groups (Harding 1994; 1995). Nevertheless, it is 
argued that the ethnocentric nature of this type of explanation makes it 
difficult to apply in countries other than the US because of the specific 
economic and social conditions and business involvement in different 
policy domains which are specific to the US context (Harding 1994). 
However, recent work has sought to extend the application of the theory 
(Wood 2004) and to use it in European contexts (Kulcsar and Domokos 
2005). Nevertheless the coalition does not represent the only form of 
institutionalisation of collective action in this type of context and we 
therefore, go on to consider other potential explanatory frameworks in the 
field of modes of governance, the concept of policy network'. 
2.4. Networks 
2.4.1. Configurations 
In the social sciences area, sociology is not the only discipline to be 
concerned with networks (Parrochia 1993), but it stands to reason that 
sociology should have as a major focus, social networks (Berkowitz 1982; 
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Lemieux 1982; Scott 1991; Degenne and Forse 1994). Conceptual 
approaches developed in this domain fall traditionally in the area of 
structural analysis but with a shift in emphasis from a concern with 
categories to one, which privileges relations. People may be ascribed to 
certain categories (e. g. to a particular social class) but they also belong to 
networks, which at a first level of analysis consist of interpersonal 
structural relations. Categories do not exist 'a priori' nor are they 
permanent. Indeed our ability to identify or construct categories emerges 
from analysis of the elements, which form a structure. Analysis involves 
identifying consistencies in behaviour, and identifying those groups in 
which such patterns are evident. This can be conducted in an inductive, 
abductive or even retroductive manner (Blaikie 1993). By retroduction we 
refer here to the process in the sense employed by Bhaskar (1975) in his 
construction of the critical realist project (see also in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis). This approach is explained by Lawson in the following terms: 
Theoretical explanations entail transforming existing cognitive 
resources into plausible theories of the mechanisms 
responsible for identified (typically less than strict) patterns of 
phenomena. These theories are then empirically assessed and 
when found to be empirically adequate, themselves explained 
in turn, in the continuous unfolding of explanatory knowledge 
(Lawson 1998; 164-165) 
Thus in the context of a network approach, one can observe interaction, 
identify or posit the existence of groups a posteriori, and subsequently go 
on to suggest how such structures enable or constrain behaviour in 
emerging interactions. 
Given this interdependency, it is clearly critical to develop methods, which 
will allow the characterisation of a network. Following the framework 
developed by Lemieux (1982) a number of characteristics of the network 
approach may be constructed with those of more traditional, hierarchical 
notions of structure. Thus, a network approach to analysis will emphasize: 
- plurality of role (rather than task specialisation); 
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- multiplex relations (rather than dyadic targeted' relations); 
- multiple and informal links (rather than solely functional links in 
an organisational chart); 
- absence of boundaries in interactions (rather than closed domains 
of action, based on roles, rights, and responsibilities); 
- coordination of action on an informal basis (rather than 
institutionally or constitutionally rule-governed coordination); 
- multi-directional interaction (rather than hierarchical, pyramidal, 
vertical interaction). 
The thrust of this type of approach, which focuses on the fluid and 
informal as much as the 'fixed' and 'formal' has led to a growing emphasis 
on two foci of analysis, communities (including communities of interest) 
and groups (including interest groups) (Degenne and Forse 1994: 37). 
The kinds of research questions associated with this focus include: how 
are such groups formed and reproduced?; how do members interact to 
achieve shared goals?; and whose interests predominate and why? 
In the 1950s, analysis of policy focused attention on aspects of the 
activities of groups in the policy process. Groups were described as being 
involved in the political process because of their importance as sources of 
ideas and leadership (see for example Floyd Hunter's (1953) classic study 
Community Power Structure). The group context and informal interaction 
allow us to understand political actors' behaviour in the formal policy 
domain. The elite theory approach of Hunter, faced challenge from Dahl 
(1961) and other pluralists, and from neo-pluralist accounts such as that 
of Lindbolm (1977). Lindblom's incrementalist account of policy-making 
emphasised not only aspects of bounded rationality (the limits to the 
numbers of options which might be considered by an actor) but also, by 
implication one might argue, bounded 'sociability' (there is a limit to how 
much social interaction, how many social linkages, might be developed). 
Every member of a group is unlikely to be able to interact with every other 
once the group exceeds a certain size. This difficulty is a critical function in 
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explaining the emergence of corporatist accounts of policy-making. 
Corporatism represents both a normative or prescriptive set of ideas (this 
is how policy ought to work through consultation via representative groups 
/ organisations), and an heuristic approach (this is how policy-making 
actually is managed). 
This shifting emphasis in social and policy analysis from a focus on 
structural antecedents and outcomes of policy to one on process, 
repetition and interaction, also represents a shift from grand theory to 
middle range theory in Robert Merton's (1957) sense. The more 
structuralist versions of elite theory, pluralism, Marxism, feminism etc. 
tend to relate policy-making and its outcomes to the structural context of 
society. However, the network approach not only represents a change in 
the source of explanation (processes of interaction rather than social 
structure) but also the scope of explanation (explanations may relate only 
to particular local policy contexts rather than being grand generalisation). 
Thus commentators explaining the move in policy studies to reject 
accounts based on the 'iron triangle' concept as too simple to embody the 
complexity of the policy process (Heclo 1978) began to seek more 
context-specific accounts. 
This is reflected in the growing number of studies in the 1980s and the 
1990s adopting an issue network approach (John 1998). In the French 
literature about the State and public policy, the concept of network has a 
considerable history. It is in an instrumental sense that it has been mostly 
used (Jouve 2003). As Jouve (2003) argues "Policy networks were 
considered as being a regulation mode of the political-administrative 
French system" (Jouve 2003: 50). 
The new approach of networks, proposed by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) 
appeared particularly useful to understand reconstruction of the French 
policy system in the context of the introduction of laws of 'dcentra/isation' 
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and 'deconcentr-atron'2. The relationship between issue networks, policy 
networks, and policy communities is addressed in the following section 
and represents the extension, or teasing out, of the network based 
analysis in the policy context. 
2.4.2. Policy networks 
In the UK literature on policy networks, the Rhodes model (1981) sees 
policy-making as involving a significant number of institutions. There is a 
resource dependency between members of the network, on which 
relationships are built (Cole and John 1995). According to Rhodes (1988), 
there are essentially two different types of network: issue networks and 
policy communities. A policy community is a group characterized by stable 
and restricted membership, shared responsibilities for delivering services 
and a high level of integration. In effect, a policy community is a small 
group of individuals that have sufficient power to enhance policy-making. 
The concept of policy community corresponds, Rhodes argues, to the 
practices of European governments. The bureaucracy and the executive 
have such supremacy that networks are more limited than in the USA. On 
the other hand, issue networks represent loose, open and shifting 
constellations of actors (John 1998). Although both networks exist, they 
do not do so in every policy domain. Policy communities are more 
formalised, coherent and thus have greater resources and greater 
influence on policy decisions (Rhodes 1988). 
In their book Policy Networks in British Government (1992), Marsh and 
Rhodes argue that policy outcomes and policy change are explained by 
2 The decentralisation laws in 1982 and 1983 introduced new structures into the French 
State. These laws created the Consells Departemental and Regional. These are 
institutions that have specific powers and missions granted by central government. They 
are independent from it and there are elections for each Council. The State votes general 
laws and policy, which are applied by the different Councils. 'Deconcentration' expresses 
the creation of structures which are directly dependent upon the State. For example, the 
Prefect is the representative of the State at the local level, as the Direction Regionale de 
la Jeunesse et des Sports (D RJ S) and the Direction Departementale de la Jeunesse et des 
Sports (DDJS) are representative bodies at the regional and departemental level of the 
Ministry of Youth and Sports. 
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the character of the network. The kind of relationships between the 
members explains the differences between the policy sectors. Rhodes 
(1988) argues that networks vary across five key dimensions: 
-a constellation of interests; 
- the membership; 
- vertical independence; 
- horizontal independence; 
- the distribution of resources. 
This gives a continuum of networks, from the policy community to the 
issue network, which enable authors to take into account almost all 
decision making groups (John 1998). According to Atkinson and Coleman 
(1992), issue networks and policy communities are different in the kinds 
of relations that link actors. In the former, they are 'in touch', in the latter, 
they communicate'. One of the criticisms levelled against network theory 
is that it focuses on the nature of relations, and not on policy content. 
Policy communities are ideology driven. Members have to follow the rules 
of the game which are largely imposed by the governmental group. Smith 
(1993) argues that networks exist because the government wants to 
create a network in a domain. The governmental body is the dominant 
group in the network. 
Issue networks are involved in areas where decisions do not appear 
important for the governing body. Government has an interest in 
developing closed policy communities, which it can then control. These 
alliances also suit groups or resource holders, because it enables them to 
gain a certain power. However, the whole group is not systematically 
integrated into the network: radical elements will tend to be excluded 
(Smith 1993). Government thus chooses its partners because it generally 
controls resources. Issue networks tend to be implicated in areas in which 
decisions do not appear important for the government. They take place 
where formal governing bodies leave a gap. Since government is 
invariably one of the main network members (especially in the case of a 
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policy community), it is anticipated that a network may change following 
an election. However, networks have to be understood in their 
environment, and not analysed as institutions (Smith 1993). They are 
forms of governance which are organised on the negotiation principle 
focused on the realisation of a common product, which can be, for 
example, "a specific technical innovation, town planning, a collective 
action strategy or the solution to a problem in a public policy" (Mayntz 
1993: 11). Table 2.1. presents the main features of policy community and 
issue network illustrating how the continuum between both can be 
developed. 
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Table 2,1 Policy community and issue network 
Dimension Policy community Issue network 
Membership 
Number of participants Very limited, some Large 
conscious exclusion 
Type of interest Economic/professional Wide range of groups 
Integration 
Frequency of interaction Frequent, high quality Contacts fluctuate 
Continuity Membership, values, Fluctuating access 
outcomes persistent 
Consensus All participants share A degree of agreement 
basic values but conflict present 
Resources 
Distribution of resources All the participants have Some participants have 
within network resources. Relationship resources, but limited 
is one of exchange. 
Distribution of resources Hierarchical leaders can Varied and variable 
within participating deliver members distribution and capacity 
organisations to regulate members 
Power There is a balance Unequal power. Power 
among members. One zero-sum 
group may be dominant 
but power is positive- 
sum 
Sources : Marsh and Rhodes (1992) 
Networks are open configuration, and, as Marsh and Rhodes (1992) 
suggest, they are affected in public policy by four factors: 
- changes in the economy and the market; 
- the ideology of the central government; 
- changes in knowledge; 
- institutional change. 
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In terms of longevity, Dudley (2003) argues that a policy community 
survives when it is able to anticipate the future to re-create itself. 
Local networks are similar to national ones, but there is often a difficulty 
in defining the territorial scope of analysis in local networks because 
networks are often not only horizontal but also vertical (Cole and John 
1995). Thus, especially in France, a local policy network will involve more 
than just local actors. Policy-making is a result of relationships between 
local, departmental, regional and national actors, simply because of the 
distribution of roles and power implied within the decentralisation and 
deconcentration legislation. Two features explain the strong relationships 
between national and sub-national spheres in France: the presence of the 
central state at the different levels of decision-making, and multiple office- 
holding (cumul des mandats) which enable politicians to be elected at 
several levels of government (Cole and John 1995: 93; Le Gales 2001). 
Thus, in France in particular 
The study of local policy networks must encompass the 
interactions of the various territorial levels appropriate to the 
study of a particular policy sector (Cole and John 1995: 92). 
Amongst the three theoretical concepts presented in this chapter, the 
concept of policy networks is perhaps the most developed in comparative 
studies between France and Britain (Le Gales and Thatcher 1995; Cole 
and John 1995; John 1998; John and Cole 1999; John and Cole 2000; Le 
Gales 2001). This is largely because the day-to-day reality of policy- 
making in the French context can be more obviously explained by 
reference to this concept (Cole and John 1995), more easily than by 
reference to the other two concepts which require a deeper form of 
investigation. The Mayor is the main actor at the local level in France, 
involved in several networks, coordinator of local interest groups, and in 
competition with other sub-national entities. But if the policy network 
approach seems to provide an interesting approach to the study of policy 
in the French case, it will also have limitations because policy networks are 
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"both everything and nothing, and they occur in all aspects of policy- 
making" (John 1998: 85). 
The metaphor of the network has been criticised as leading to description 
rather than explanation (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). Moreover, there is 
often little explanation about why a policy network has come into 
existence or why it has ceased to exist (Dowding 1995). 
Thus although a policy network approach highlights interaction between 
actors of various types, from loose policy communities to policy networks, 
and more specific issue networks, it is argued that it fails to explain policy 
change (or network change) adequately. Thus urban regime theory has 
sought to provide a more detailed heuristic line of argument, particularly 
in relation to policy development at the urban level. 
2.5. Urban regime theory. 
Urban regime theory appeared in the work of Stone (1989) who 
developed the approach in his study of the development of urban policy 
over time in Atlanta. He defines a regime as... 
an informal yet relatively stable group with access to 
institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role 
in making governing decisions (1989: 4). 
In its origins, the concept of urban regime was a tool to explain the 
relationship between the public and private sector. It has been used 
further to analyse how different interests are taken into account within 
governing coalitions (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). The complexity of the 
society and the lack of resources and power from local government imply 
interdependency between governmental and non-governmental forces. 
This dependency is based on the resources that each group can bring, 
resources needed to govern. To that end, collaborative arrangements are 
built between the different actors. Coordination within the regime is based 
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on a network of actors; there is no hierarchy or bargaining, but a 
collective action. There is a shared interest within the coalition that the 
collaboration will be beneficial for all members. However, a regime is not 
simply a coalition formed in order to achieve one specific goal, it is a 
collaboration based on a common project in a long-term perspective. 
Stone (1989) argues that such a collaboration, if it is to be termed a 
regime, should operate for more than a decade. According to Deleon 
(1992: 557): 
... if collective goals set for a regime do not change, if its 
social production performance is adequate, and if alternative 
institutional means do not exist, the regime can become self- 
entrenching and impervious to external threats. 
There seem to be two characteristics for actors to be effective regime 
partners: first, possession of strategic knowledge of social transactions 
and a capacity to act on the basis of that knowledge; and second, control 
of resources that make one an attractive coalition partner (Stoker 1995). 
According to Stone, regime analysis is concerned with conceptualising the 
regime as the 'organism' that mediates between causal variables in the 
environment and policy outcomes, and is also concerned with the way in 
which local actors mediate external pressures such as economic change. 
The focus in regime analysis is on the internal dynamics of coalition 
building, on civic cooperation' or informal modes of coordination across 
institutional boundaries (Mossberger and Stoker 2001). 
In Stone's study of Atlanta, the active mobilization of the resources of the 
business elite and the black middle class through a network of civic 
cooperation created a regime that was capable of pursuing a development 
agenda that was beneficial to both types of partners. Regimes are 
constructed around a common project or a shared vision for the city. This 
could involve a consensus about the need to act together to achieve this 
idea. Hence the structuring resources of the partners and the interaction 
between them should be the basis of the agenda. 
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A major feature of this theory is its concept of power (see the discussion 
on power in section 3.3.3). Stone's approach (1989) emphasises 'power 
to' do things rather than `power over' people. He describes four types of 
power - systemic power, command power, coalition power, and pre- 
emptive power - and argues that an urban regime reflects pre-emptive 
power insofar as an association is building between actors that have 
power to act. There is interdependency between members, because each 
of them brings resources needed to a specific agenda, around a shared 
vision of the city (Dowding 2001). Authors identify three kinds of actor: 
elected politicians, commercial firms or actors and associations or 
members of the voluntary sector. It is interesting to note that Stoker and 
Mossberger (1994) argue for the importance of a fourth group: 
professionals, i. e. civil servants or municipal employees. In regard to their 
expertise and their professional involvement in projects, it is undeniable 
that professionals have a specific role, particularly in European contexts, 
and specifically in France. In building a case for a particular policy, 
momentum is often provided by professionals or bureaucrats. Their 
professional expertise is often recruited by political actors in support of 
their case. A professional's actions may be decisive in many instances. For 
example, in French cities or communes, it would not be uncommon for the 
person charged with responsibility for promoting events to take a decision 
not to present the case for a particular event to a town council. 
Literature on urban regimes demonstrates the diversity of the concept. 
Several authors have proposed classifications of the kinds of urban 
regimes which exist (Stoker and Mossberger 1994; and Dowding 2001, for 
example list the different classifications). Although this broadening of the 
application to several types risks loosing the essence of the concept 
(Sartori 1991), these typologies nevertheless give some insight into the 
subtlety of regimes in contexts other than North America. Literature shows 
that regimes are "geographically variable phenomena" (Raco 2003: 40). 
Stoker and Mossberger's classification of regime types is particularly 
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interesting in the context of our study because it was produced with the 
goal of allowing comparison between urban regimes in different countries 
and different types of cities. Table 2.2. presents their three-fold typology. 
Table 2,2 Stoker and Mossberger's typology of urban regime. 
Organic Instrumental Symbolic 
regime regime regime 
Purpose Maintenance of Project realisation Redirection of 
status quo ideology or 
image 
Main Local Tangible results Expressive 
motivation of dependency politics 
participants 
Basis for sense Tradition and Selective Strategic use of 
of common social cohesion incentives symbols 
ur ose 
Quality of Political Political Competitive 
coalition communion partnership a reement 
Relationship 
with 
-local -Exclusive -Exclusive -Inclusive 
environment orientation orientation orientation 
-non-local -Independent -Dependent -Dependent 
environment 
Stoker and Mossberger, 1994 
Thus they distinguish the organic regime, the goal of which is to sustain 
existing conditions in the city; the instrumental regime that aims to 
promote urban development through the realisation of specific 
development projects; and the symbolic regime, which is focused on 
developing an ideology or image for the city (1994: 199). Against the 
background of this typology, Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) sought to 
demonstrate how a symbolic regime was developed in the city of 
Sheffield, based around the project of changing the dominant image of 
the city from that of 'the city of steel', to that of a 'city of sport'. A key 
vehicle for this regime was the bid to host the 1991 World Student Games. 
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In order to ensure that extension of the term regime would be linked to 
the original concept, Dowding (2001) gives eight characteristics of an 
urban regime. They are 
(1) a distinctive policy agenda, which is (2) relatively long- 
lived and (3) sustained by coalitions of interest or personnel 
not formally or fully specified in institutional structures, often 
in the form of a 'grand coalition' or large-majority coalition of 
interests, and often with (4) cross-sectoral or institutional 
boundaries. The policy agenda should also (5) survive 
personnel and leadership changes or political successions, 
reflecting a specific ideology or agreement over fundamental 
values for members of the coalition, which would allow 
continued electoral success. It should also (6) primarily 
involve the formation of public-private partnerships, often 
transcending partisan divisions, (7) be associated with strong 
or exceptional leadership, capable of entrepreneurially 
assembling an unusual coalition and linking it with a 
distinctive political vision, and (8) tend to bridge institutions 
and community interests by creating 'partnership' forms, 
especially, in European contexts, spanning the public-private 
sector (2001: 14). 
These characteristics summarize the general meaning of the concept, and 
furthermore enable us to operationalised the concept. 
Urban regime theory is potentially useful in understanding the decision- 
making process in modern cities since it embodies the different aspects of 
it: the nature of the partners; how coalitions are formed; and how 
decisions are taken (Harding 1994). It has often been used in British case 
studies to explain changes in urban governance (Harding 1990; Digaetano 
and Klemanski 1993a; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993b; Harding 1994; 
Henry and Paramio-Salcines 1999; Paramio-Salcines 2000; Denyer 2002; 
Thornley et al. 2005). In the French case, it is mostly the 'roots' of urban 
regimes which have been demonstrated (Levine 1994) rather than the 
existence of an urban regime. Where authors have claimed the presence 
of an urban regime, it is in specific French cities, which play a significant 
role at the regional, national and /or at the European level (John and Cole 
1998). 
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Perhaps the most common criticism levelled against urban regime theory, 
as with the group approach and policy networks, is that it is limited in its 
explanation of variation, maintenance or change of an urban regime. It 
examines how regimes are formed but not how and why they change or 
disappear (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). An urban regime takes place in 
a specific context, with governmental and non-governmental partners with 
more or less resources and influence. The regime is included in a dynamic 
environment that influences it. For example, DeLeon (1992), in his study 
of San Francisco argues that shifts in the patterns of funding from Federal 
Government, and the arrival of a business leadership, led from a pro- 
growth to a progressive regime. 
To address this issue, Orr and Stoker (1994) proposed a model of regime 
transition. In a first stage, the changes in the environment lead to a 
questioning of the relevance of the present regime because of the 
distance between its goals and the present context. The second stage is 
the redefinition of the scope and purpose of the regime, which involves 
debate and conflict between the elite groups in the city. A third stage 
involves the institutionalisation of the new regime. In this stage, a new 
solution-set would need to be established alongside appropriate 
institutional arrangements and selective incentives. 
A major problem that researchers have to face with urban regime theory 
(as with growth coalitions) is whether this set of concepts is appropriate to 
contexts other than that of the North America. In North America, local 
government is more dependent on cooperation with business to carry out 
projects. In Europe, cooperation with business is less needed because of 
the greater importance of public resources, and local policy is thus likely to 
be public sector-led. In such different conditions, it is questionable 
whether we can talk about the concept of urban regime as universally 
applicable. Case studies often do not fully take into account the local and 
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national context, and thus may confuse general policy groupings with an 
A urban regime' (Gibbs and Jonas 2000). 
Sartori (1991) describes four pitfalls in the misapplication of concepts, 
which Mossberger and Stoker (2001) relate to the potential misapplication 
of the term urban regime: 
- parochialism: this is a misuse of the concept; for example, refining 
to a regime where there is simply a public-private partnership. 
- misclassification: all cities are assumed to have regimes. 
- degreeism: the tendency to talk about the degree to which a 
regime is present, rather than saying whether there is a regime or 
not. 
- concept stretching: which refers to removing aspects of the 
original meaning of the concept so that it can accommodate more 
cases. 
To avoid these pitfalls in comparative research, Mossberger and Stoker 
(2001) proposed core criteria that enable researchers to use the urban 
regime concept in explaining case studies: 
- Partners drawn from government and non-governmental 
sources, requiring but not limited to business participation; 
- Collaboration based on social production - the need to bring 
together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish 
tasks; 
- Identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the 
composition of the participants coalition; 
-A longstanding pattern of cooperation rather than a 
temporary coalition (2001: 829). 
This set of criteria provides a useful checklist against which to consider the 
application of the term 'urban regime' to European contexts in general and 
the French context in particular. 
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2.6. Operationalising the differences between the three 
theories. 
On the basis of the evaluation of the literature concerning these three 
concepts, we identify below seven transversal indicators that will facilitate 
comparison of the three concepts, and which focus on governance 
characteristics. All three approaches share certain features: they are, for 
example, network rather than formal hierarchy models. Nevertheless, we 
can conclude from our preceding discussion, that they vary along several 
key dimensions. 
- the nature of their objectives; 
- the means by which they seek to achieve their ends; 
- the nature of the actors involved (both primary and secondary); 
- the motivations of actors (either explicit or inferred); 
- the nature of the resources available to the group; 
- the kinds of relations evident between actors; 
- the stability of the grouping / network, and its time frame for action. 
This set of dimensions provides us with a key means of identifying or 
operationalising differences between what one might expect to find in 
contexts conforming to one of the three types (table 2.3. summarises 
these differences). Each is considered in turn. 
a). Objectives 
As we have seen, growth coalitions' objectives can be described at 
different levels. On the one hand, Logan and Molotch (1987) argue that 
the objectives of the dominant actors relate to profit from the growth 
project. However, they also note that the public legitimation of their 
activities relates to economic growth' as a public or at least a merit 
(rather than a private) good. 
Objectives in the case of policy networks will reflect what Rhodes and 
Marsh refer to as a 'constellation of interests'. Dunleavy (1980) identifies 
goals among policy actors in the British local government context as 
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reflecting `ideological corporatism', the dominant value system in any 
given policy network (though strictly speaking Dunleavy's work pre-dates 
the policy network literature). This might also be described by reference to 
'epistemic communities' whereby a policy community may embrace a 
pertinent set of values and thus objectives which are promoted within its 
ranks (see for example Hume 2005), and may become embedded so as to 
form in effect part of the group habitus. 
Objectives in the case of an urban regime may vary from that of 
defending the status quo (in conservative, 'organic' regimes in Stoker and 
Mossberger's (1994) terms), to symbolic' change, promotion of 
development and so on. 
b). Means employed 
Growth coalitions focus activities on physical development projects which 
foster capital accumulation. Policy networks employ approaches more 
closely associated with the shaping of the policy agenda. Regimes, 
because of their multifaceted membership will seek to advance their case 
on a wide range of fronts involving actors and groups from the private, 
the public and the third sector, fostering action among like-minded 
individuals. 
c). Actors (primary and secondary) 
Here perhaps the key issue is the place of the private sector. In the case 
of growth coalitions, land ownership / property development capital leads 
the coalition, with other actors in a secondary position. In the case of 
policy networks, though non-governmental actors will play a part in the 
promotion of particular goals, local, regional and national governmental 
actors will tend to be the critical group. In urban regimes, for different 
projects, different actors may come to the fore, and sometimes these will 
be public, sometimes private, and sometimes voluntary sector actors. The 
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individuals and indeed the projects may vary but the overall goals of 
regime are consistently promoted across groups and across projects. 
d). Motivations 
Logan and Molotch (1987), in their neo-Marxist account, emphasise the 
economic self interest of the leading members of the coalition as providing 
the primary motivation. Policy networks are also described as to some 
degree reflecting self interest on the part of its members, as well as 
motivations associated with social or professional goals. Motivations in the 
case of urban regimes will vary from one regime type to another. 
e). Resources 
Key resources available to growth coalitions are capital investment funds. 
Thus coalitions are most likely to flourish in circumstances within which 
the public sector is weak politically and / or economically. Policy networks' 
major resource by contrast tends to relate to control over / influence upon 
the policy machinery - from agenda setting through resource 
prioritisation, to implementation. Thus it seeks to exert power over' others 
in the policy context. An urban regime may recruit its members from a 
broader range of sectors. Each of these actors may bring with them 
different resources - capital for investment; political influence; ideological 
influence in promoting the regime's values in wider communities and so 
on. 
f). Nature of relations within the group 
The growth coalition tends to focus on constant bargaining until its goals 
are achieved, usually with the realisation of a single, major project. Within 
policy networks, forms of hierarchy are evident with some actors more 
able to exert influence on the activities, means and goals of the network 
than others. Finally, urban regimes require continuous consensus- building 
to maintain long-term commitment to the regimes' goals. 
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M. Stability over time 
Coalitions as conceived by Logan and Molotch are relatively short term, 
project-specific groupings. Once a project is realised, therefore, it is likely 
that the coalition will dissolve. Policy networks may be rather more long 
term, but at local level, in particular, may be disrupted by electoral 
misfortunes. Regimes however are long term interest and action 
groupings with a broadly shared set of goals (e. g. regeneration, 
conservation) which are promoted over a range of projects. 
Table 2.3. below summarises these features of the three approaches. 
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Table 2,3, ; The urban governance framework 
Growth coalition Policy network Urban regime 
Objectives Economic growth of the Constellation of Depends on type of 
city and 'personal' interests. regime (growth, 
economic ain. symbolic change etc). 
Means Large scale property Shaping of policy A range of projects 
development projects. agenda, projects over an extended 
and delivery. period. 
Kind of actors: Land owners, property Local, regional, Local, regional, 
- primary developers national national governments 
governments Private firms, 
associations, all with a 
- secondary Banks, government, Actors sharing the shared vision for the 
universities, associations same ideology, city. 
(actors who indirectly representatives of 
have benefits governmental and 
participating to the non-governmental 
project) associations 
Motivations To enhance capital To maintain / To promote the shared 
values, personal wealth strengthen position vision for the city 
gain. in the policy through a variety of 
system. measures 
Resources Financial power and Influence of actors 'Power to' do things 
property ownership. in the policy 
system; 'power 
over' 
Kind of Constant bargaining, Internal hierarchy Consensus in the 
relations subordination of politics within an overall orientation and the 
between by economics network action 
actors 
Stability Low: limited to the life of Medium: often Strong: over 
the project linked to elections at least 10 years 
The section following completes the literature review, by focusing on the 
principal domain of policy concern, urban sports policy. 
2.7. Urban sport policy research. 
Whereas sport policies were traditionally concerned with a service delivery 
to citizens, they have now gained an important place in urban policy 
(Henry 2001). More than the involvement of populations in sport, sport 
facilities and sport events represent interesting challenges for city 
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development. Thus, the nature of local sports policy has significantly 
changed (Dulac and Henry 2001), with a growing role of sport in economic 
and social regeneration for cities (Gratton and Henry 2001). Research 
focusing on this new approach to sport at the local level is still, however, 
relatively underdeveloped. 
In terms of urban level theories, urban regime theory has perhaps been 
the most used in explaining the activities of cities in hosting major sport 
events (Paramio-Salcines 2000; Denyer 2002; McCarthy 2002; Bennett 
and Spirou 2006). Sheffield, for example, is described as having been 
managed by a symbolic regime, which aimed to change the image of the 
city through the hosting of the 1991 World Students Games (Paramio- 
Salcines 2000) and the development of a new leisure policy (Denyer 2002) 
though in the latter study Denyer uses urban regime theory as a prism 
through which to evaluate city policy, ultimately rejecting it. 
Beyond such studies, authors have focused their attention on sport as a 
means for achieving broader cities objectives, rather than a focus on how 
urban sport policy has developed, in European countries. Thus, Grafton, 
Shibli and Coleman (2005) argue that in the British context, sport events 
have been an opportunity to change cities' image and to create jobs. The 
hosting of major events is also aimed at attracting tourists and 
encouraging inward investment. Such events are now seen by politicians 
as a means to attract attention to the host city (Westerbeek, Turner and 
Ingerson 2002). Thus, from earlier concerns about service delivery to the 
population, sport has became a strategy of economic regeneration 
(Gratton, Shibli and Coleman 2005; Findlay 2003), with the hosting of 
major events often accompanied by the building of sport facilities (Santo 
2005; Davies 2005). 
But even if cities seek economic regeneration, a necessary condition is 
often to change the image of the host city (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel 
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2002; Smith 2005), since economic regeneration is seen as a consequence 
of the renewal of a city's image. The hosting of a major event enables 
cities to position themselves in the global world, to take part in the 'global 
game'. However, though host cities may attract global attention through 
sport events, they, nevertheless, may not change the reality of life 
conditions in impoverished neighbourhoods (Silk 2002; Friedman, Andrews 
and Silk 2004). Furthermore, the hosting of major events may only be 
made in rich or emergent countries, able to take part in the global 
dimensions of bidding process (Swart and Bob 2004). It is thus, perhaps, 
only an option for cities, which are already economically and 
infrastructurally developed. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is in the US context that most such case 
studies have been conducted (Nelson 2000; Chanayil 2002; McCarthy 
2002; Gibson, Willming and Holdnak 2003; Chapin 2004). Although few 
studies explicitly link the importance of sport to governance in the US 
context, we can argue that sport is one 'solution' identified by many cities, 
which are faced with economic, social and government crises. In a period 
when the 'market sportivisation of the world is growing' (Brohm 2006), 
sport is seen instrumentally as a good stimulus, or vehicle, in the 
development of cities. Consequences of the hosting of major sport events 
include economic outcomes following from the increase of spectators / 
consumers in the host city (Gibson, Willming, Holdnak 2003) and an 
increase in available employment during and after event with 
management of infrastructures (Lecoart and Sallet-Lavorel 2002). 
Nowadays, urban sport policy is part of the global vision of the city, and 
the hosting of an important sport competition is seen as an opportunity to 
realise this vision. It is thus urban development policy, economic policy, 
and tourist policy, which are now at play in sport rather than simply sports 
policy 'per se'. Although few comparisons have been made between sport 
policies in different contexts or periods, such comparative studies may aid 
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the understanding of our 'sport world', and an interesting typology has 
been proposed by Henry et al. (2005) to develop such approaches. 
This thesis makes, in a sense, part of this will to develop comparative 
studies on sport policy, because it focuses on a comparison between 
decision-making process in the same city, but in different time periods. 
Though a single city study, this thesis in effect forms part of this body of 
comparative analysis since it seeks to evaluate a French policy context 
employing conceptual and theoretical tools developed in non-French 
contexts. 
2.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have sought to identify the key features of the three 
approaches to urban governance. Our aim in doing this was not simply to 
identify and evaluate the kinds of explanation given by the leading 
proponents of these three positions. We were also concerned to clarify 
how these three approaches might be operationalised and differentiated. 
In essence this provided us with an 'ideal typical' description of seven key 
dimensions along which the nature of the three approaches might be 
evaluated. The specificity of the French context, and indeed of Marseille as 
a city, and the specificity of sport policies for cities, will have to be taken 
into account, but given our research aims as specified in Chapter 1, we 
wish to consider to what extent the urban sport policy system in Marseille 
reflects aspects of the three models, or whether sports policy in Marseille 
requires some other theoretical or conceptual construction to capture the 
nature of the local policy system in the cases of the two major sporting 
events on which we focus. 
Our outline of this ideal typical set of features is not intended to suggest a 
simple checklist of characteristics but rather a configuration of factors that 
will lend themselves more readily to the description of the policy actors as 
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a growth coalition, a policy network or an urban regime. This discussion 
brings us on to the discussion of methodological issues in some detail 
which is the subject matter for the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
In research, methodological concerns represent the key to understanding 
how the researcher constructs her/his research and why s/he does so. 
Doing research not only means describing or explaining a topic but it is an 
account about how an observer sees the world and thus how s/he 
analyses things s/he observes. Thus the researcher, as an individual, must 
explain her/his ontological and epistemological position. To adopt an 
ontological position means to explain what the researcher's view is in 
respect of the nature of the world: does s/he claim there is a real world or 
not? (Marsh and Furlong 2002). In political science, "One's ontological 
position is... one's answer to the question: what is the nature of the social 
and political reality to be investigated? " (Hay 2002: 61). The answer to 
this crucial question affects what is studied and how. In others words it 
leads to specific epistemological positions (Marsh and Smith 2001). 
Section 3.2 presents (a modified version of) the critical realist ontological 
and epistemological positions, upon which this research is based. From 
these ontological and epistemological assumptions the methodology 
adopted is derived. According to Hay (2002), methodology is preceded by 
epistemology, which is preceded by ontology. Figure 3.1. describes the 
relationship that exists between them. These basic philosophical concerns 
cannot be ignored. Implicitly or explicitly ontological and epistemological 
assumptions are made which are fundamental to knowledge. They are in 
this sense 'irreducible' (Hay 2002). 
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Figure 3,1; Ontology, epistemology and methodology; a 
directional dependence (Hay 2002; 64) 
Ontology Epistemology 
º 
What's out there to 
know about ? 
What can we (hope to) 
know about it ? 
ý 
Methodology 
How can we go about 
acquiring that knowledge? 
Thus, section 3.3 highlights the methodology of this research, which is 
based upon an adaptation of the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of critical realism. 
Methodology relates to the choice of analytical strategy and 
research design which underpins substantive research... Thus, 
although methodology establishes the principles which might 
guide the choice of method, it should not be confused with 
methods and techniques of research themselves (Hay 2002: 
63). 
Founded principally on critical realist assumptions, the methodology 
presented here is closely linked to the literature in local political studies. 
Theories are crucial in critical realist research, because observations are 
always mediated by concept. Indeed, theories help to raise research 
questions and to understand the results (Marsh and Furlong 2002). These 
steps imply the use of specific data and analysis, outlined in section 3.4 
and 3.5. 
We thus outline below our 'world view', that is what constitutes the world 
and what we can observe about it, before going on to specify research 
questions and how they might be answered. 
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3.2. Ontological and epistemological concerns. 
3.2.1. A critical realist position. 
The critical realist approach represents a subtle form of realism. Like 
positivists, realists argue that the world exists independently of our 
knowledge of it (Marsh and Smith 1999). Whereas interpretivists 
emphasise the view that the world is socially or discursively constructed 
(Marsh and Furlong 2002), traditional realists contend that the world `out 
there' is a reality, and that it exists independently of human activity. 
Critical realists wish to meld these views arguing that although the 
external world is socially constructed, nevertheless it exists independently 
of the individuals / groups who constructed it. Language provides one of 
the most compelling examples of the critical realist's ontological claims. 
Language has (historically) been constructed by language users / speakers 
who have developed a set of grammatical and semantic structures. 
Language exists, and its structures exist, independent of individual users, 
though users may subsequently change rules and structures in and 
through linguistic interaction. Thus language is both socially constructed, 
constitutes a set of structures, but can be reflexively changed by 
individuals' / groups' interactivity (e. g. inventing new words, establishing 
new grammatical conventions etc. ). The critical realist thus takes the 
realist notion of a 'real external world' and the interpretivist notion of an 
interpretive process in the construction of reality. 
Some critical realists, following Bhaskar (1975) argue that "social 
phenomena/structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal 
statements" (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 30). Here we depart from the 
critical realist view. To continue with our use of language as an example, 
grammatical structures do not 'cause' people to speak in particular ways, 
though grammatical rules may enable or constrain certain types of speech. 
Thus to talk about structures causing' speech is inappropriate. 
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In epistemological terms, unlike positivists, critical realists argue that not 
all phenomena can be observed directly. There are deep structures that 
are not directly observable. Nevertheless, 
positing their [structures] existence gives us the best 
explanation of social action. To use a phrase familiar to 
philosophy of science, we are involved in inference to the 
best explanation' (Hollis and Smith 1990: 207, in Marsh and 
Furlong 2002). 
Marsh and Furlong (2002) thus explain that 
... to a realist, there is often a dichotomy between reality and 
appearance... It means that realists do not accept that what 
appears to be so, or, perhaps more significantly, what actors 
say is so, is necessarily so' (2002: 30-31). 
Agents have perceptions of reality, and no direct objective observation. 
Interpretivists criticize realist claims about structures, which cannot be 
observable, by arguing that all structures are dependent on social action, 
and thus inferences of deep structures or observation are subjective 
(Marsh and Furlong 2002). Critical realists now recognise the subjectivity 
of research: our interpretation of social phenomena affects outcomes, and 
on the other hand, theories are used for a research oriented knowledge of 
the world (Marsh and Furlong 2002). In other words, structures and social 
phenomena exist independently of our knowledge of them, but reflexive 
agents are able to affect them, to have their own understanding as well as 
their own uses of such phenomena. The researcher is not totally objective, 
because any claims have to be made from a pertinent perspective. The 
'objectivity' of the researcher lies in identifying this perspective, its 
assumptions, and its position in respect of other perspectives. 
Marsh and Smith (1999: 11-14) summarise the main features of critical 
realism as follows: 
  the world exists independently of our knowledge of it; 
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  there is necessity in the world - objects / structures do have causal 
powers, so we can make causal statements (a point, which we 
critique above); 
  there are deep structures, which cannot be directly observed; social 
phenomena exist independently of our interpretation, or discursive 
construction of them, nevertheless the latter still affects outcomes; 
  structures do not determine outcomes; rather they constrain and 
facilitate; social science involves the study of reflexive agents who 
are capable of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing 
structures. 
Thus, growth coalitions, policy networks and urban regimes have to be 
defined in ontological terms: for example, are they real or simply ideal 
types (i. e. simply a useful way of conceptualising and grouping 
phenomena)? 
3.2.2. Structure and agency: the position of this research. 
In the debate about the relation between structure and agency, social 
scientists are actually concerned about the freedom that we, as actors, 
have according to the environment which surrounds us. As argued above, 
structures do not have causal power, they only constrain or facilitate 
outcomes (as suggested in the fourth bullet point of Marsh and Smith 
listed above). This leads to a specific relation between structure and 
agency: structures are linked to the agency that makes them 'live', just as 
agencies are dependent upon structures that enable and constrain them. 
This statement is consistent with the strategic-relational approach 
developed by Jessop (1990) and subsequently by Hay (1996). According 
to these authors, the distinction between structure and agency is purely 
analytical (Hay 2002). Structure and agency are interdependent, one could 
not be real without the existence of the other. Nevertheless, structures are 
the starting point for actions to take place (McAnulla 2002: 280). But 
structures are not fixed, they move in relation to actions. Structure and 
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agency thus only exist through their relational interaction. This is what 
Crozier and Friedberg (1977) emphasise when they argue: 
The actor does not exist outside the system which defines his 
freedom and the rationality that he can use in his action. But 
the system only exists through the actor who is the heart of 
it, making it alive and who alone can change it (1977: 11). 
Crozier and Fridberg (1977), like other authors, go further by arguing that 
it is the interaction between actors and their environment that is crucial: 
actors internalise the context they are in and orient their action 
accordingly. In other words, individuals are strategic actors in a strategic 
context. Actors and environment - agency and structure - are moving 
together, because the strategic context is strategically selective (Jessop 
1990). A similar strategy adopted in two different contexts would not have 
the same result, and some contexts facilitate some strategies better than 
others. 
Thus the conceptual dualism (agency and structure) becomes a 
conceptual duality (agency through structure, and structure through 
agency). Figure 3.2. shows this path and the relational and dialectical links 
between structure and agency. 
Figure 3,2, From dualism to duality; the strategic-relational 
approach (Hay 2002; 128). 
Abstract Structure Agency Conceptual 
I Structural context 
f 
4 ----------- Ill. 
dualism 
V 
Actor in 'Double 
context dualism' 
T 
Concrete Strategically 4 10 Strategic Conceptual 
selective context actor duality 
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This approach, developed by Jessop (1990) when he was working on 
theorising the state (McAnulla 2002) is particularly relevant in the analysis 
of political interaction. 
If we now come back to the concepts of 'growth coalition', 'policy network' 
and urban regime', we can describe them in ontological terms as being 
real, socially constructed, and as the context within which, or through 
which, actors are following strategies in response to the strategic selective 
context. These three concepts (growth coalition, policy network and urban 
regime) may be described as solutions to the strategic context (in 
particular the economic and social crises, which traditional government on 
its own cannot resolve). According to the context of a country (its social, 
cultural, political and economic history) agents' options will vary. In a US 
context, where the private sector has much more power at the local level, 
it may be easier to have a private-sector led urban regime, than in France 
where the public sector has traditionally been dominant. In France, an 
elected politician can hold office at different levels, it may thus be easier 
to 'grow' a policy network. In other words, 'the strategic selective 
environment' can favour a policy network rather than an urban regime as 
an emergent structure. So, the same types of policy problem can lead to 
different strategies according to the context and the internalisation of this 
context by local actors. 
It is thus within the context of strategic selectivity that this research aims 
to interpret the interrelation between structure and agency evident in the 
sport policy process in Marseille. 
3.2.3. The notion of power. 
Since this study focuses on decision-making at the urban level, it will be 
necessary to consider how power is to be defined and operationalised. 
Relations of power are invariably central in policy study, and the concepts 
of growth coalition, policy network and urban regime are related to the 
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wider conceptualisation of power. In this section we focus on the 
conceptualisation of power and consider how power can be evaluated in 
operational terms' and its relationship to ontological and epistemological 
considerations, drawing on the work of a range of (some complementary 
and some competing) traditions (Dahl 1957; Bachrach and Baratz 1970; 
Crozier and Friedberg 1977; Foucault 1977; 1981; Giddens 1979; 
Habermas 1968; Luke 1974). 
Robert Dahl (1957) in his seminal work argued that power exists when A 
gets B to do something that B would not do otherwise (Dahl 1957: 201), 
and where there is a conflict of interests. Thus, the power of A can be 
measured' in the extent to which B lacks power. In this pluralist account, 
this power is an imbalanced relation between actors (Crozier and 
Friedberg 1977), with winners' and losers', where power is understood in 
relation to its effects, with power lying in agents' ability to exert it rather 
than in social structures (Hay 2002). In the decision-making process, the 
most powerful actor is the one who has the greatest influence over other 
actors (Dahl 1961). This conception leads to a relative straightforward way 
of evaluating the power of actors in decision-making processes, by 
focusing on their success in exerting influence over others to act in 
particular ways. However, a key difficulty for Dahl's approach is that he 
focuses on the decision-making arena, without analysing the external 
context. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) added a new way of looking at power, or in 
Luke's (1974) terms a new 'face' or dimension of power. Bachrach and 
Baratz argued that there is also a need to analyse non-decision making, 
since the choice by decision-makers to put forward a decision or not 
implies a highly significant screening process even before issues reach the 
decision-making arena. Thus, Bachrach and Baratz state the importance of 
analysing policy making beyond the official spheres, since ""power is 
exerted in setting the agenda for the decision-making process" (Hay 2002: 
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174). Decisions have to pass through different barriers in the decision- 
making process, including the process of selection for consideration of an 
issue in the policy-making arena. Moreover, all decisions do not have the 
same importance, some issues are more significant than others, and 
decision-makers can decide to cede influence to certain groups on issues 
of lesser importance, while not doing so on issues of greater significance 
(Hay 2002). Thus, the major contributions of Bachrach and Baratz relate 
to their consideration of the informal process of agenda-setting, and the 
need to consider the weight of decision-making to assess the real 
distribution of power. 
However, the major problem of this conception of power and Dahl's 
account is that their conceptions are based on the assumption that an 
overt conflict of preferences between individuals is an essential condition 
of a situation where power is exerted, and thus, there are differences 
between interests and 'formal' preferences, which both conceptions do not 
examine. 
Making this point, Luke (1974) argues that power is tr-dimensional. One 
dimension corresponds to Dahl's account (open conflict in the policy 
arena), the second dimension corresponds to Bachrach and Baratz's 
account of non-decisions, and the third dimension corresponds to Luke's 
notion of power as the realisation of interests. According to Luke, to 
understand power, there is a need to understand the preference-shaping 
of actors. In this third dimension of power, actors may be aware or 
unaware (through for example false consciousness) (Rosen 1996) of her / 
his interests. Power thus corresponds to the manipulation of A over B to 
make B think that the situation serves her / his interests. That means that 
power is not only exerted in a conflictual situation but also exists in 
situations of consensus (Hay 2002). This approach, which draws on 
structuralist Marxist or Radical feminist epistemologies, is interesting in its 
contribution concerning the complex dimensions that power can embody, 
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but the distinction between real and perceived interests seems difficult to 
sustain and under-estimates actors capacities, as classic critiques of 
structuralist Marxism and radical feminism illustrate (Hay 2002). 
For Crozier and Friedberg (1977), in their strategic analysis approach, 
actors are able to identify and assess where their interests lie, and act 
strategically to attain achievable objectives (rather than being able to 
optimise their position). It is through understanding of the context and 
other actors' interests that an actor draws up her / his strategy. According 
to Crozier and Friedberg, "power is a relation between actors, and not an 
attribute of actors" (1977: 65). It is a relation of exchange between 
dependant actors which can only exist, in such conditions of dependency, 
in the accomplishment of common objectives. In this sense relations of 
power have an instrumental aspect, since an actor uses it in her / his own 
interests. For Crozier and Friedberg (1977), relations of power are also 
non transitive, i. e. power is specific to an action, and is not 'transferable' 
to any other action. It is by the actor using her / his room for manoeuvre 
that s/he is able to increase her / his power. The control of the zone of 
uncertainty beyond structural relations is the main source of power for 
actors inside the structure. 
These different approaches presented here focus on power in terms of the 
capacity to influence other actors, in terms of domination of one actor 
upon another. Stone's (1989) account of power is interesting and to some 
extent relates to Habermas's notion of communicative rationality. Stone's 
approach focuses on 'power to' do things rather than 'power over' people 
(Stone 1989; 227). In other words, he directs attention to an 
understanding of power expressed through social production rather than 
power as an issue of social control (Stoker 1995). His concern is about 
how a discourse is constructed and legitimated, and not how that 
discourse is used by one group to further its interests over another in a 
Foucauldian sense. Stone's concern is with how one group gains the 
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capacity to act. 
Stone (1989) describes four forms of power: 
- systemic power: available to certain interests because of their 
position in the socio-economic structure. 
- command power: an active mobilization of resources and 
achievement of domination over other interests. 
- coalition power: the power to construct a coalition or a group 
around a specific project or set of projects rather than around a 
broad and long term programme. 
- pre-emptive power: where leadership is the result of a group of 
interests which are reflected in the establishment of a long-term 
network; there is a need to manipulate their strategic position and 
control over resources into an effective long-term coalition. 
Systemic power implies greater access of one or more parties to systemic 
resources to influence decisions, whereas command power implies 
imposition of outcomes to achieve the domination of a particular set of 
interests. The distinction between coalition and pre-emptive power is the 
distinction between the power to construct a coalition, and the power to 
construct the conditions under which coalitions of interests emerge in 
organisational and political forms. 
Stone's work focuses on pre-emptive power. In his account, power is 
measurable in terms of resources that people are able to exchange. Power 
is thus not simply a matter of relation between actor, but rather a matter 
of competencies. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to exclude the notion of 
power as the result of a relations between actors, since there are always 
more than one individual / institution in the decision-making sphere with 
non-identical sets of interests and resources, implying that the relations 
between them will be significant. 
The issue of power at a micro-level adopting a critical realist position 
implies a focus on relations between actors, their resources, and their 
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level of influence, in order to address the different dimensions of power. 
Actors' discourses will invariably play a great role in understanding how 
actors construct the reality of the policy context and to what extent that 
discourse can become a source of power. However, we do not follow a 
Foucauldian approach in which discursive construction is 'all that exists' or 
"all that counts', but would argue that actors in order to dominate 
discourse need to access wider structural resources (e. g. channels of 
communication). Thus, the notion of power which informs the formulation 
of our research questions, presented in the next section, is one which 
draws on strategic action, structural resources, coalition building and the 
development of value consensus as the context of decision-making. 
3.3. A critical realist research strategy. 
This research project was developed in several stages. 
Stage 1: Literature review. 
The literature review had two aims: first, to inform the study about what 
has been found in other similar contexts and how it has been theorized; 
and second, to help to articulate research questions. This research mostly 
focuses on two types of literature: the first is that relating to urban policy 
and politics, governance and specifically to French policy; the second 
relates to the specificity of the urban context in Marseille. This allows us to 
characterise structure in a particular national (French), and urban 
(Marseille), context and the nature of local agency in this context. Thus, 
the first stage of this work represents a review of critical concepts and 
applied literature in the field of urban governance to aid the emergence of 
research questions. 
Stage 2: Research questions 
Informed by the literature, we have been able to formulate pertinent and 
coherent aims for the study, to formalize research questions and also to 
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choose adequate data, to interpret the interdependency of structure and 
agency in Marseille. Research aims and questions are introduced in 
Section 3.5. These represent a refinement of the initial research questions 
raised in Chapter 1. 
Stage 3: Data collection. 
For critical realists ""we need to identify and understand both the external 
reality" and the social construction of that 'reality"' (Marsh and Furlong 
2002: 31). Thus, this research has to take into account both the reflexive 
agents' discourses about events, and an understanding of how the context 
within which these events take place has been shaped by its history. This 
is largely accomplished through the collection of documents and 
interviews. Details of data collection are presented in section 3.6. 
Stage 4: Qualitative content analysis 
The data collected were from interviews and documents. This was 
subjected to detailed qualitative content analysis in order to identify both 
manifest content and latent content (Berg 1998). Section 3.7. shows the 
different steps taken in this qualitative content analysis, which are derived 
from Altheide's (1996) ethnographic content analysis approach. 
3.4. Reviewing the literature on methodologies adopted 
in previous studies employing these three approaches 
(growth coalitions, policy networks, and urban 
regimes). 
To understand the methodology employed in growth coalition theory, 
policy network and urban regime approaches, we have to consider work 
that has been undertaken in the urban policy studies field since the middle 
of 20th century. The first major work to consider is Hunter's (1953) study 
on Atlanta. He based his study on a reputational analysis to identify 
community influentials. Hunter (1953) asked a panel of people to rank the 
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names of the community elite - which he had previously assembled into 
categories of business, government, civic associations and society activists 
- according to their perception of how powerful they were. The top forty 
people were subsequently interviewed. He then sought to ascertain who 
were the most powerful, what was the nature of interactions between 
them, and how did they relate to community projects. In his elitist 
approach, Hunter concluded that an elite group from business and society 
ruled Atlanta. and that the structure of Atlanta society was that of a 
pyramid capped by a ruling elite. 
In contrast to the findings of Hunter, Dahl (1961) in his study of New 
Haven, tried to evaluate whether the local form of governance was an 
oligarchy or a polyarchy. He focused his research on three policy areas: 
urban development, public education and political nominations, and 
sought to identify whether the most influential individuals were the same 
for all three policy domains (providing evidence of an oligarchy) or 
whether different domains had differing leading individuals and groups (a 
polyarchy). He concluded that New Haven was ruled through a polyarchy. 
The differences in these methodological approaches arise from the 
authors' view of power. According to the view of power that one has, 
methodology and methods employed to investigate it will differ. Both 
authors in this case focus on 'power over' (power of one group over 
others), but they do so in different ways. For Hunter (1953), the question 
of power is directly linked to the influence that actors can have on other 
actors. It is this influence that explains the power of actors. For Dahl 
(1961), the power is much more a matter of influence on decisions. 
Indeed, Dahl's research questions were "who is involved? ' and 'how are 
they involved in policy decisions? ', whereas Hunter's research question 
was 'who has the greatest influence? '. 
62 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
The three perspectives adopted in this thesis promote slightly different 
methodological approaches, which in effect are based on different 
conceptions of power. The policy community / policy network approach 
presupposes, in most instances, a pluralist or neo-pluralist approach. In 
Lukes' (1974) seminal text, this constitutes the first and second 
dimensions of power. Power may be viewed in such contexts in the overt 
struggles over decision-making or access to resources (pluralism) or in the 
control over agenda setting (neo-pluralist / managerialist notions of non- 
decision-making). The growth coalitions literature stresses Lukes' third 
dimension of power - where power is manifest in terms of those whose 
interests are met. Thus growth coalition analysis focuses on the interests 
of local capitalists and how such interests are met. 
Thus in relation to these first two approaches, contrasting methodologies 
are suggested. The first implies investigation of the overt struggles 
between interest groups - as evidenced in public debates (recorded in 
documents and media commentaries) and personal recollections (through 
documents and interviews). It also (in its neo-pluralist / managerialist 
form) implies consideration of how agendas are shaped and restricted 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970). The second approach relating to growth 
coalitions suggests that whatever the superficial battles are about, 
analysis of interests is required, with individual interests of local capitalists 
being represented as the interests of the wider community. Such an 
approach implies discursive analysis of documents in order to see how 
private interests are 'masked' in discourse about public welfare. 
Regime analysis, in contrast to the other two perspectives, focuses on 
what Stone (1989) terms power to' rather than 'power over'. Such an 
approach is related to Arendt's (1970) normative distinction between 
violence and power, in which she argues that power can only truly be 
exercised where there is sufficient (democratic) consensus. Analysis of 
power will thus involve analysis of how such consensus can be built and 
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sustained, and implies analysing processes through description of 
meetings and how construction of potential to act is developed. 
Because the three perspectives focus on who has power, a reputational 
analysis is often conducted. This can take different forms. In terms of 
quantitative methods, it can take the form of a socio-metric analysis for a 
policy network approach (John 1998) or a 'wheel of involvement' as 
developed by Smith and 'Beazley (2000) in an urban regime perspective. 
In terms of qualitative methods, interviews, documentary and media 
analysis are common, employing qualitative content or discourse analysis. 
Often quantitative methods provide a basis for the sampling of 
interviewees, and interviews enable an understanding of interactions 
between actors. 
Perhaps the most interesting methodological approaches are those 
developed in the urban regime perspective, not only because of the 
methods employed, but also because of the view of power. The focus on 
'power to' (power to do things, to mobilise resources and to accomplish 
change, rather than power over others) seems much more relevant to an 
understanding of policy-making. 'Power over' limits analysis on the 
influence, or capacity to influence, of actors. This notion does not take 
into account the capacity of actors to act, which is clearly critical when 
governments are in crisis and when the pressure of globalisation 
accentuates claims about the powerlessness of local actors to respond. 
Governance is a result of the gathering of actors capable of action, and 
not simply capable of influencing others. 
Adopting this view of power, Harding (2000) presents 3 phases of regime 
analysis: 
" to identify the keys players - formal and informal - in urban politics 
of production, 
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" to describe how and to what extent they interact and what 
motivates them to do so, 
" to assess the outcomes and effects of their interaction. 
Similarly, Di Gaetano and Klemanski (1993a), in their study on the 
capacity of urban regimes in Birmingham and Detroit, interviewed 35 
people, (city government officials and business elites) as a primary source. 
Their secondary source was local newspapers. Their aim was to 
understand the decision-making process in both cities with regard to 
urban regime theory. The use of both tools allows more valid findings. 
Interviews highlight formal aspects of the political process, but they also 
inform us about its informal side. Documentary analysis provides 
information about formal aspects and the context of the city, as an 
account of the one side of the reality' of the policy making process. 
Paramio Salcines (2000), in his study of Sheffield and Bilbao, used the 
following tools: semi-structured interviews, the content of which evolved 
as the research progressed, with snowball' sampling; and a documentary 
analysis of materials produced by local authorities, the local press, policy 
literature and central government reports. 
Ward (1996) listed the methodologies of major studies of urban policy and 
pointed out that if local press coverage is almost always used, this is often 
accompanied by analysis of interviews and materials produced by public or 
private bodies. But when interview material does not exist (for example 
when access to interviewees is problematic) then documentary sources 
have tended to be given increased prominence. 
The research conducted in this study thus draws upon the following data 
sources and methods: 
(a) reputational analysis - identifying who the key actors are and 
how they extend their influence; 
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(b) explanations of behaviour by key members of the policy elite 
through interviews and documentary accounts; 
(c) minutes of policy meetings, analysis of agenda in order to 
establish what key decisions and non-decisions are made by 
which sets of actors; 
(d) analysis of (particularly local) media; 
(e) qualitative content analysis which is critical to the analysis of 
embedded interests and the evaluation of how the public 
interest is represented. 
3.5. Research questions 
The literature review on urban policy focuses on groups in power, and the 
actions and behaviours of actors in the decision-making process. To 
understand how groups emerge, a number of questions need to be asked, 
linked with the table presented in Chapter 2: 
- who are the actors involved in the decision-making process, and 
who are they representing? 
- what are the objectives of the group? 
- what are the means used to achieve them? 
- what are the kinds of resources that actors bring to take part in the 
decision-making group ? 
- what are the relationships between them? 
- what is the stability of the decision-making group involved in the 
events? 
Answers to those specific questions will involve feedback to theoretical 
foundations, and raise general questions: 
" How might the mode of governance of sports event policy (in 
relation to the two events identified) be characterised? 
" To what extent does such a characterisation reflect aspects of a 
growth coalition, a policy network or an urban regime, as presented 
in the literature? 
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Behind those questions linking theories and empirical results, there is a 
further critical issue implied. 
" In a French case study, are such local theories (growth coalition, 
policy network, urban regime) pertinent to an understanding of the 
decision-making process, or is French urban politics too specific to 
be captured' by `Anglo-Saxon' theories? 
In this sense, this research is subject to debates about the use of these 
theories in culturally different contexts. As Harding (1997) says: 
The key to overcoming (... ) reservations is not to reject the 
literature wholesale, but to take from it what is widely 
applicable, to use work whose general applicability is 
questionable as a basis for research hypotheses that are 
amenable to empirical verification and actually to test whether 
the underlying conditions that promote subnational coalitions 
in the United States are also found in Europe (1997: 185). 
3.6. Data collection 
In a qualitative research project dealing with a relatively lengthy period, 
understanding the historical context of the city and the constant link 
between decision-making and context are very important. In this respect, 
local newspapers can provide the local and contemporary context for 
policy decisions. Newspapers are sources of interpretation as well as of 
information because articles are written by journalists. Also, people 
interviewed have their own memories of the past, which provide a 
particular perspective on events and their reality' (Bendikat 1996). Thus 
"Qualitative data collection methods were chosen to help provide a strong 
sense of context, which facilitates an understanding of the case" (Cassell 
and Symon 1994) and "can be used to seek actors" accounts of the 
structural context and their response to it" (Denyer 2002: 127). 
Such qualitative sources are critical for contextualising purposes. Thus, a 
preliminary step in the data collection process was a literature review 
about Marseille, to understand its context and its history. This is presented 
in Chapter 4. Subsequently, document analysis was employed to get 
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beneath the surface of the two projects. Three kinds of documents were 
collected. 
Press articles: 
Le Provencal, (which was retitled La Provence3 in June 1997) was 
analysed from January 1991 to December 2003, thus covering the period 
of bidding for both events. For the America's Cup project, the Nautical 
Affairs Editor also provided access to her press book. This incorporated 
regional and national articles about the America's Cup bid. The 
exhaustiveness of this list was checked. Three kinds of articles were 
collected: 
- those directly linked with events, 
- those related to the political life of Marseille and the main projects 
relating to the city, 
- those related to the sporting life of the city. 
The analysis of press articles had to be undertaken with care since these 
were potentially politically biased - Le Provencal was clearly written by 
journalists with their own particular interests, and related to, and 
supportive of, left wing political interests. In other words, newspapers 
articles were the result of agents' subjectivity, and of structurally located 
interests. The analysis of the press sources was thus tempered in this 
study in two principal ways. The first was to acknowledge and to 
continuously bear in mind the possibility of left wing bias, that is, to read 
the sources with care and anticipation of these factors. The second set of 
precautions adopted was to triangulate the press analysis with analysis of 
other kinds of data, most notably interviews and proceedings of political 
meetings including views from different political perspectives. 
3 The newspaper La Provence represented the merging of both main regional 
newspapers: Le Provencal and Le Meridional.. Le Provencal has been the main regional 
newspaper. 
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Municipal documents 
From 1991 to 2003, Town Hall reports and deliberations linked to both 
events were collected: the reports because they had informed discussions 
between elected members during the meetings of the City Council; the 
deliberations (or minutes) because they note the official decisions taken. 
The second kind of municipal document was editorial comment provided 
by mayors in the municipal magazine Marseille le Magazine. This provided 
direct insight into what the mayors wanted to highlight in their actions and 
their policy. 
Official documents: 
This kind of document was only available for the America's Cup project. 
The City of Marseille put at the author's disposal Marseille's bid file of July 
2003, which was supplied to the Swiss decision-makers. For the World 
Football Cup 1998, access to official documents was not provided, despite 
repeated requests. 
Having analysed the local structural context, informed by the above 
sources and having charted the course of decisions, and identified in 
preliminary fashion the major actors, the second step - interviews - was 
undertaken. The analysis of documents enabled the researcher to draw up 
a list of actors to interview. This list was the result of a twofold process. 
First, with regards to the formal institutions involved, a list of their leading 
figures was set up: Mayors, Deputy Mayors, the office-holders of 
association involved - the Regional Organisation Committee for the World 
Cup, AC Management for the America's Cup. Second, key actors emerged 
from the media accounts, reinforcing or / and increasing the first list: the 
General Secretary for the City Council, the Technical Advisor for the City 
Council, the Director of Economic Development, Bernard Tapie, the 
directors of firms involved in 'Marseille La Decouverte' (for the World Cup) 
and 'Entreprises Marseille America' (for the America's Cup). The list was 
then completed and refined with a snowballing approach in that 
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interviewees were asked to suggest other significant actors for further 
interviews. 
The principal aim of the interviews was to gain an understanding of 
interviewees' perceptions of the reality of the policy process in these key 
areas of local sports policy, and of their role in the decision-making 
process. The list of people interviewed and their function is listed below: 
Table 3.1: List of the interviewees 
Institution represented Function In relation with 
City elected both Deputy Mayor World Football Cup 
responsible for sport 
across the period 
City elected Deputy Mayor America's Cup 
responsible for maritime 
and nautical business 
City civil servant Technical Services World Football Cup 
Advisor for the City and America's Cu 
City civil servant the former Director of World Football Cup 
Communication for 
sports services 
Departmental Direction The former Director World Football Cup 
of Youth and Sports 
Urban Community Director of the Economic America's Cup 
"Marseille-Provence- Development 
Metropole"' 
Port Authority Director of East Dock America's Cup 
This list of interviewees contains only public officials and elected 
politicians. In addition to these formal interviews, informal discussions 
were held with a number of sporting and other city officials and 
journalists, which provided useful background information but which were 
not recorded and subjected to qualitative content analysis. 
Sustained efforts were made to contact individuals from the commercial 
sector. However, requests for interviews met with either refusal or non- 
response. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry was contacted over 
the America's Cup since it is credited with having promoted the idea, but 
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this was met with the official response that no action had been taken 
since the America's Cup did not go ahead. Officials / members of the 
public-private partnership Euromediterranee, claimed to have no 
knowledge of the involvement of the organisation in the establishment of 
the bid for the America's Cup, although the bid document cites the 
organisation as being involved. This may be because the 'involvement' of 
the organisation simply reflected an agreement between the senior deputy 
mayor (president of Euromediterranee) and the Director of 
Euromediterranee. In relation to the commercial organisations taking part 
in the Club Marseille la Decouverte, for the World Football Cup, and in the 
association Entreprises Marseille America, the directors indicated that they 
were too busy to give an interview. The head of the Regional Organisation 
Committee of Marseille, did agree to give an interview but failed to arrive 
on the day, and afterwards failed to respond to the researcher's requests 
for an alternative date. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted, according to the research 
questions. The rationale for choosing semi-structured interviewees - 
rather than structured interview, free interview, questionnaire or focus 
group - is directly linked to the research questions. There was a need to 
introduce certain themes, without constraining interviewees in terms of 
the range and form of their answers. A questionnaire, for example, would 
not have been an appropriate tool since the research was concerned to 
focus on the agents' interpretation of local sport policy. Similarly other 
approaches such as a focus group, would have been both inappropriate, 
and impossible to conduct, especially with politicians who have a very 
busy agenda. Nevertheless, semi-structured interviews, it should be 
acknowledged, can result in deflecting some themes that might be 
important. Triangulation of data (particularly with public documents and 
media reports) was a response to this issue. Also, the interview guide was 
not fixed. Versions were modified following the 'snowballing technique', 
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with the position of the interviewee and the direction of the interview, 
being taking into account. 
The interview guide was divided into three main parts (see Appendix). In 
the first section, items were directly related to the interviewee: 
- professional history, 
- her or his function. 
In the second section, general questions were asked about the event: 
- her or his role, 
- the context of the decision-making, 
- who was involved in originating of the project, 
- expectations from the project. 
A third section was about the partners and the work procedure: 
- who were the institutions involved, 
- how did they meet, 
- the place of the private sector, 
- who had the greatest influence, 
- who had responsibility for final decision, 
- what deadlock periods and issues were there, 
- what problems were encountered, 
interviewees"regrets', observations on how things might have been 
done differently, 
- results. 
The interview ended by asking if the interviewee wished to add anything 
and with a request for advice concerning further interviewees. Through 
those items, key players gradually became visible. The interview data 
were subsequently interpreted through qualitative content analysis. 
3.7. The use of ethnographic content analysis. 
With critical realist assumptions, qualitative content analysis seeks to 
document and understand the communication of meaning, as well as 
verifying theoretical relationships (Altheide 1996). The researcher has a 
key role in the process. His / her theoretical knowledge, data reading and 
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understanding will provide material that probably s/he alone can give, 
because of the subjectivity of the research process. However, by providing 
the reader with a clear understanding of how and why a particular 
interpretation has been reached, the validity (or in Wood and Kroger's 
(2000) terms, the 'warrantability') of the researcher's account can be 
demonstrated. 
After the theoretical review, common indicators were developed to 
compare 'growth coalition', 'policy network' and 'urban regime' concepts. 
The main questions of this research are: who are the key actors in the 
decision-making process in sports policy in Marseille?; and to what extent 
are these three (Anglo-Saxon) concepts useful in characterising this 
decision-process? With preliminary readings of the data, the seven 
common indicators retained appear to be appropriate categories to 
analyse the data. In effect, identification and analysis of objectives, means 
employed, kinds of actors involved, motivations, resources, kinds of 
relationships and stability, enable us to identify decision-makers and their 
strategies, and to make a direct link between the sports policy process in 
Marseille and the theories, and thus to evaluate their relevance to 
explanations of this context. 
Although this deductive approach employs categories / codes derived from 
a careful analysis of the literature, it could be argued that such an 
approach will not capture' concepts or insights which fall outside this 
frame of reference. In order to avoid this pitfall, categories derived 
inductively from the text were also employed. Initially these were coded 
under the heading 'other' and subsequently the `other' category was 
subjected to detailed inductive analysis. This approach of commencing 
with deductive and concluding with inductive analysis is thus consistent 
with Altheide's characterisation of the Ethnographic Content Analysis 
approach 
Categories and variables initially guide the study, but others 
are allowed and expected to emerge throughout the study 
(Altheide 1996). 
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The analysis of data was made by hand for all documents and interview 
transcripts. Each document was coded by line. Then, results for each 
category were gathered. Initially, results were separated in two 
categories: for the World Football Cup 1998, and for the America's Cup, in 
order to interpret the decision-making process for each separately. 
Subsequently, results for both events were compared to identify 
similarities and differences, and to review stability' across the two policy 
events. 
The following chapters develop in the same manner. After an introduction 
to the history of Marseille and the local policy context in chapter 4, 
chapter 5 analyses the 1998 Football World Cup case study, the America's 
Cup case study is presented in chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides analysis of 
the decision-making process in sport policy in Marseille against the 
backdrop of the three theoretical traditions. 
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Chapter 4: The City of Marseille 
4.1. A city in crisis. 
4.1.1. A structural crisis. 
Since the beginning of the 1970s Marseille, France's second city, has been 
experiencing a major social and economic crisis. This situation has its 
roots, however, in the immediate post-World War II period (Morel 1999). 
Although the French state had launched a policy of industrial development 
based on a Fordist model of production, Marseille remained stubbornly 
focused on its role as a port. At the centre of Marseille's economy, was the 
transport of primary materials, which local industries treated but with 
production of few finished products for the market. The materials that had 
been processed left the city via the port: road and rail links were little 
used, with the city turning its back' on its hinterland. This system 
collapsed in the 1950s and 1960s with the on-set of the colonial wars, 
Marseille having developed as a colonial port (Morel 2001). The crisis of 
the port was a function of the broader crisis of traditional industries. 
Marseille was not oriented towards the industrial modernisation, which the 
state wished to promote, the city simply adapted, rather than modified its 
system of production. The demographic explosion, which the city 
experienced between 1959 and 1975, a product of both immigration and 
an influx from the countryside, allowed it to continue to experience a 
certain level of growth. The influx of population fostered a dynamism in 
the area of construction, which offered numerous jobs, and together with 
the clientelistic city management of Gaston Deferre, this masked the 
profound economic crisis which the city was experiencing (Morel 2001). 
This great port city had lived through the twentieth century without really 
adapting to the changing industrial context. As a city of trade Marseille 
had relied for a long time on primary materials as its core business. When 
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new technologies and new models of production emerged Marseille 
remained committed to its traditional role, and failed to invest in 
manufacturing production of finished products, preferring to maintain its 
identity as a centre of trade. The crisis of Marseille is structural in nature. 
The industrial port model of production of the 1970s lagged behind the 
Fordist approach. Marseille did not grasp change when the moment was 
right and as a result fell well behind its competitors (Pinson 2002). The 
port, the centre of the economic life of the city, declined bit by bit, 
becoming simply a platform of maritime transport from which the rest of 
France might profit but which itself did not retain benefits. Marseille's 
large scale enterprises dealing with primary materials were absorbed one 
by one into large international groups (Zalio 1999), compounding the 
employment crisis, and the city began to lose population from the end of 
the 1970s to the hinterland, which was more active than the metropolitan 
area (Donzel 1998). 
Gaston Defferre, Mayor of the city from the end of the Second World War 
put in place a crisis management plan. This emblematic socialist figure in 
coalition with centrists and the liberal right sought to deal with the crisis, 
in order to combat the communist left in the city, principally employing his 
own policy ideas. Thus, in order to deal with the increasingly impoverished 
economic base, for thirty years Marseille was the site of a clientelistic 
system in the domain of public employment and housing overseen by 
Defferre. Defferre pushed the local bourgeoisie to move investment into 
the property market (Morel 1999). Morel describes how local capital, since 
it was losing control of industrial activities, began to invest in property, 
selling land, which hosted industrial activities. With the arrival of an 
incoming population during the different waves of immigration, the 
property market proved an effective investment (Zalio 1999). 
However, the Defferre clientelistic system was based on a day-to-day 
management, rather than strategic thinking in relation to the future of the 
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city. It was only with the arrival of Vigouroux at the head of the city that 
there was a recognition of Marseille's problems, with the beginnings of 
reflexion about how the city should address them, and in particular what 
economical orientation the city might adopt. 
4.1.2. The image of Marseille: between myth and reality 
Marseille is exceptional in terms of its place in the popular imagination. 
From the outside, Marseille has always had a very distinctive image, a 
mixture of cliche, reality and exaggeration. First of all, Marseille is a city of 
sun, pastis and petanque. In both literature and cinema, these three 
characteristics are evoked over and over again. Marseille also 'lives' in the 
accent of local people implying a local character 'b/en braver. This image is 
a positive aspect, the sympathetic dimension of the image, which 
strangers hold of this Mediterranean city. But the image also carries with it 
more than a hint of irony and superiority. 
Elements of the image linked to Marseille are also in some respects quite 
negative. It is a city of the Mafiosi, bogged down in scandals, shady deals 
and crimes. It was in the 1930s that this aspect of the image of the city 
took root. During this period, the links between politicians and the criminal 
milieu became evident, and tarnished the reputation of the city. It became 
known as the "French Chicago" (Donzel 1998). It was not a city in which 
one could walk safely at night. These cliches have fed into and continue to 
nourish stories about Marseille, evident for example in fictional accounts 
such as the Hollywood film The French Connection. These accounts have 
tended to foster a misleading impression to the external world. 
Marseille also has the image of city set apart from others in the French 
political landscape. It is often referred to as a rebel, rebelling against the 
decisions of Paris. It is argued that the Mediterranean city often feels that 
it is ignored by central government, based in Paris, and the Marseillais 
harbour a feeling of rejection by Paris (Rochu 1983; Meunier 1985; 
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Bertrand 1998; Donzel 1998; Peraldi and Samson 2005). The city also 
tends to run counter to French national electoral tendencies. When it 
comes to presidential elections, results in Marseille rarely reflect results at 
the national level (Bertrand 1998). 
From an economic and social point of view, Marseille has the image of a 
city, which has failed to adapt to the changes of 20th century. It is a city in 
which there is an incapacity to establish a comprehensive political vision, a 
port city which seems to know of no other way to make a living except 
through its port. This perspective is not improved by the difficulties 
experienced in trying to establish cooperation between various local and 
regional governmental bodies, and this is a factor, which has also been 
used as an excuse by politicians to cancel projects (Morel 2001). It has 
thus proved very difficult to change the city's image. On the social level, 
Marseille has been able to integrate its immigrant population, thanks to 
jobs provided by the port. The spatial location of immigrant groups has 
been dependent upon their place of work and they have tended to settle 
around the port (Donzel 1998). With the onset of the economic crisis, 
entire districts in this area found themselves without work and without 
financial, material or organisational resources. Local government has 
abandoned the centre of the city to impoverishment and to the eking out 
of a fragile economic existence based on the port. 
However, the different communities have at least emancipated themselves 
through the port. They have developed local trades, working with their 
countries of origin, although the government has tended to ignore the 
significance of this economic activity based on little shops, with such 
shops being omitted for example in the Euromdditerranee project 
(Bertoncello and Rodrigues Malta 2001). In relation to building, Marseille 
continues to be a place of residential segregation with a dilapidated set of 
properties in the centre of town, and the growing construction of housing 
in the southern part of the city (Donzel 2001). The rehabilitation of certain 
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districts has begun, as in the case for example of the Panier quarter, but 
this is with a view to the attraction of a student population. The problem 
of rehousing the residential population was quickly put to one side and 
has not yet been addressed (Pinson 2002). 
At the international level, Marseille's identity and reputation has been 
promoted via its football team, /'O/ympique de Marseille. Known for its 
excellent results in the 1990s (it won the European Champion's League in 
1993), it is also well known for its fanatical supporters. These are the 
most committed in France, ecstatic in victory, desperate in defeat. 
However, it is above all within the city that O. M. has a very special place. 
The city is said to vibrate to the rhythm of the results of its team 
(Meunier, 1985). Across the city, all social classes support the team 
(Bromberger, Hayot and Mariotini, 1995). In the Stade Ile%odrome, the full 
range of the local population is represented. The location within the 
stadium of spectators reflects the demographic structure of the city. Every 
stand is populated by a particular (dominantly men) social group, shop 
keepers, heads of business organisations and politicians from the northern 
part of the city, the southern quarter, the young, the old etc. Spectators 
change their place in the stadium as a reflection of their changing social 
position, to such an extent that a young supporter will be able to do a full 
circle of the stadium, in terms of the position from which he spectates 
(Bromberger 1989). Marseille is also a city to which things seem to 
happen', rather than one with a proactive polity, or truly participative 
citizenry (Donzel 1995; Morel 2001). 
4.2. A brief urban political history of Marseille. 
4.2.1. The Defferre years. 
Gaston Defferre was a politician who made his special mark on the history 
of Marseille. He was Mayor from 1953 until his death in 1986. From the 
end of the Second World War, he held an important place in the political 
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life of the city through his active political engagement and through his 
control of the daily newspaper, Le Provencal which he took over in 1945 
(Rochu 1983). In the municipal elections, he presented himself as a 
bastion against communism. To achieve this, he brought together a 
socialist-centrist alliance which held until 1977. 
Defferre's management of the city was crisis management, resolving 
problems one after the other as difficulties arose (Pinson 2002). The 
reason for the longevity of this alliance lay in his political ability to divide 
and rule. Municipal responsibilities were divided into two large categories: 
one for the right, "management of material resources", and the other for 
the left, "the management of people" (Morel 1999). The former area of 
activity consisted of urban development and the local economy, and the 
latter of the day-to-day management of municipal services. This 
separation of powers allowed him to maintain a front against communist 
influence, but it also permitted him to reinforce his influence among the 
local population. Effectively, local politicians 'solved' the daily problems of 
their fellow citizens by rendering them services. In this way, the 
clientelistic system of Defferre was developed. Two principal policy 
domains operated under this principle, those of housing and employment. 
Socialist politicians responsible for 'management of people' controlled the 
housing service and the allocation of municipal employment, and jobs and 
housing were thus offered with the goal of generating votes (Roche 
1996). The local elected representative acted as the intermediary between 
the local authority and the citizen and passed on information or solved 
problems. The Marseillais have thus always felt 'close' to their mayor. In 
addition, with the political right in the Deferre coalition retaining 
responsibility for the "management of material resources", this enabled 
the industrial bourgeoisie to develop its interests in property and land. 
Defferre organised a local cross-spectrum political coalition and, among 
other initiatives, he revived a particular type of local organisational entity 
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to serve this purpose: the Comites dinterets de Quartiers (CIQ). He asked 
local activists to found a CIQ in each of their residential districts, and to 
run this organisation themselves. However, some local groups founded 
their own CIQ and immediately placed a local elected socialist politician at 
its head (Rochu 1983). This gave Defferre a high profile with the different 
local communities, and local Armenian, Israeli and subsequently pied-noirs 
associations all provided him with strong support. In addition, he gained 
the support of the Marseille bourgeoisie thanks to the stance he took 
against communism. His marriage to Edmonde Charles-Roux, who came 
from an important Marseille business family, also aided acceptance by the 
industrial bourgeoisie (Roche 1996). Moreover, his newspaper, Le 
Provencal, became a very important communication tool in the Defferre 
system because it was the most widely read daily newspaper within the 
city. This clutch of strategies helped Deferre to appeal across a wide range 
of opinions to the Marseilles electorate. 
Defferre had based his system upon networks. He used these networks to 
his own political advantage, as evidenced during the second round of the 
1983 municipal elections. Defferre, as Minister of Decentralisation at the 
time (as well as Mayor), proposed specific legislation related to the 
electoral boundaries within the major cities of Paris, Lyon and Marseille. 
Marseille was divided into sectors, or political constituencies. Defferre 
steered the legislation which gave more importance, in terms of numbers 
of elected representatives, to sectors which he knew would be oriented 
towards the political left (Rochu 1983). Despite this, he was in second 
position after the first round of the election. At this point he drew on his 
local networks, asking his local lieutenants' to mobilise support. This was 
highly successful, and a number of local communitarian and corporatist 
associations delivered citizens' votes for Defferre, allowing him to retain 
his seat as mayor (Rochu 1983). 
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At the national level, Defferre held a number of important posts. He held 
ministerial office several times under the Fifth Republic and was even a 
candidate in the presidential elections in 1969 (Rochu 1983). From 1981 
to 1984, he was Minister of Internal Affairs and Decentralisation. The most 
important laws that he realised were those relating to local boundary 
changes and the 1982 decentralisation laws. He was an influential and 
proud man who reputedly would bear neither failure nor affront (Bertrand 
1998). Before the municipal elections in 1977, he accused the local 
centrist group of corruption and excluded them from the coalition. In 
doing so he was actually seeking to distance himself from the supporters 
of Valerie Giscard D'Estaing, of whom the future mayor, Jean-Claude 
Gaudin, was one (Rocchu 1983; Morel 2001). In relation to the 
management of the city, the Defferre system did not halt the city's crisis. 
Perhaps the most one could claim is that he successfully masked its 
symptoms. 
Defferre's first political defeat was his last. He died in 1986, the night 
following his defeat in a socialist meeting, during which the local socialist 
organisation had to elect a new committee. This meeting involved a major 
struggle between Defferre and his opponents, who had become more 
numerous. The candidate that he supported to lead the organisation was 
not chosen, a sign of his decreasing influence. But with his demise, his 
main opponent, Michel Pezet, was seen by the population and other 
politicians as being primarily responsible for Defferre's death (Leras 1991), 
and as a result Pezet never realised what was expected of him in terms of 
a political career. Thus in a sense, this was also Defferre's last victory. 
4.2.2. The Vigouroux Period. 
Before becoming a politician, Robert Vigouroux was an internationally 
recognized surgeon, working at the city hospital, La Timone. From 1971, 
he was one of Defferre's town councillors, and he also held a second 
political post as county (dpartementj councillor. A loyal lieutenant of 
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Defferre, he was not particularly well known by Marseillais voters. When 
Defferre died, Vigouroux was chosen to succeed him, supported by 
Defferre's widow and the body of Defferre supporters within the Town 
Council (Peraldi and Samson 2005). He was for them the man the most 
able to manage a smooth transition before the municipal elections of 
1989, but it was something of a surprise when he was elected in 1989. He 
was chosen by the Marseille electorate to carry forward the heritage of 
Deferre, the city patriarch, whose loss, local people seemed to find difficult 
to accept, though he had disappeared three years earlier (Bertrand 1998). 
Though, Vigouroux wanted from very early on to break with clientilistic 
system of Defferre, his priority was to reinstall economic growth in 
Marseille. He wanted the city to become the great metropolis of Southern 
Europe, with international influence (Pinson 2002). Such messages appear 
frequently in the editorials of the City Council's own magazine, in which 
Vigouroux places great emphasis on the necessity of reinforcing the place 
of Marseille as a/ the leading city in the Mediterranean axis and in 
Southern Europe. 
On a practical level, he increased the number of trips and visits 
undertaken in order to make the city better known and more widely 
acknowledged. According to Morel (2001), Vigouroux used his electoral 
program "50 projects for Marseille" to show to the population that it could 
benefit from his vision. For his colleagues, he was a great visionary 
(Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). He became known 
above all as the man who made a transition from the left to the right in 
political terms. His policy was tainted' by a right-leaning political vision 
and he subsequently chose to support Edouard Balladur (RPR), a politician 
at national level from the right, for the 1995 presidential elections. This 
support sparked off an important crisis within his own municipal majority, 
with some of his supporters affirming that he could make such a choice as 
a personal matter, while others resigned their offices faced with what they 
saw as a betrayal. 
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When it came to the municipal elections of the same year, Vigouroux 
waited until the last moment before announcing that he would not put 
himself forward. Marseille public opinion never fully warmed to Vigouroux 
as a candidate with his cold and aloof character. During the months before 
both elections, Le Provencal averaged almost one article per day relating 
to Vigouroux' political life; his support for Balladur and its political 
consequences; his position within the life of Marseille, and his candidature 
and / or subsequently his non candidature. 
Vigouroux was essentially not a politician, a factor, which led to his 
political demise. According to observers and his colleagues, he was a man 
who was a poor communicator, both with the general population and with 
his peers, practising policy like surgery (Peraldi and Samson 2005): a 
surgeon does not have to communicate well to obtain what he wants. 
At this level of surgery, one just believes in oneself. When 
you have to open a skull, you only make gestures. People 
who are skilled know what to do to assist the surgeon, but 
he has nothing to say, he does his job and people do 
theirs to assist him. And that, we found was the same in 
politics (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). 
This description seems to summarize Vigouroux' political life during his 
nine years in office: a man with strong ideas, but with poor skills in 
political relationships. 
4.2.3. Jean-Claude Gaudin and the accession to power by the 
right. 
In 1995, the election of Jean-Claude Gaudin (UDF) marked the end of 60 
years of socialist government in Marseille. He was not an unknown in 
terms either of local or of national politics. Born in 1939, he became 
involved very early in political life. At the age of 16, he joined the 
Jeunesse Independante et Paysanne, going on a little later to join the 
Centre National des Jeunesses Inddpendantes et Paysanne. He was 
involved with associations from the traditional right from Christian 
84 
Chapter 4; The City ofMarseie 
democracy to liberalism. In 1965, when he was President of the Centre 
National des Jeunesses Indpendantes et Paysannes, he was nominated 
as a candidate on the list of the socialist-centrist group of : Defferre and 
Rastoin and became the youngest municipal councillor in Marseille (Leras 
1991). 
In 1973, he joined the Republicain Independants, founded by Giscard 
D'Estaing, and took part in the electoral campaign of Giscard in the 
presidential election of 1974. He was a member of the Defferre ruling 
group in the city until 1977, the point at which the socialist centrist 
alliance effectively broke up (Leras 1991). From 1975 to 1976, he was 
involved in "management of material resources" in the city because he 
was the deputy mayor responsible for urban development. 
In 1978, he was elected to the Assemb/ee Nationale, and three years 
later, was re-elected, even though the majority of colleagues from the 
right were swept from power by the resurgent socialists. He was then 
named as president of the UDF group in the Assemblee Nationale. His 
political rise in national politics and his victories at the local level made 
him the focal point of municipal opposition to Gaston Defferre from 1978 
to 1983 (Leras 1991). He managed to gather all of the right in Marseille 
around him at a point at which Defferrism was beginning to run out of 
steam (Morel 2001). In 1983, he was the natural candidate to lead the list 
of the right (RPR and UDF) in the municipal elections. He suffered a 
narrow defeat and it was only by virtue of the redrawing of electoral 
boundaries in the city that Defferre managed to keep his seat as mayor 
(Bertrand 1998). In 1989, he lost again to Robert Vigouroux. However in 
1986, he was elected president of the region thanks to the support of the 
Front National. This alliance cost him considerable unpopularity among the 
population of Marseille and notably during the municipal election of 1986 
(Levreau and Baudin 2000). 
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Even though during the last few years of Defferre's life, the two regularly 
opposed one another, Gaudin always had a profound respect for the 
patriarch' of Marseille. He had learned at the side of the master how to 
manage networks in his own favour. From 1977 and his break with 
Defferre, he became responsible for CIQs which he had worked on from 
the moment that he became a municipal councillor (Leras 1991). He took 
control of the daily newspaper Le Meridional, a publication supporting the 
right, which would be his major tool for the municipal elections campaign 
in 1983 (Rochu 1983). 
In 1989, he once more lost the municipal elections and he concentrated, 
therefore, on his role as president of the Conseil Regional, a mandate 
which was renewed in 1992, when he defeated Bernard Tapie and Jean- 
Marie Le Pen (Levreau and Baudin 2000). He was able to make use of this 
victory to finally overcome the negative effects of his alliance in 1988 with 
the Front National. 
In 1995, he last achieved his major objective: he became Mayor of 
Marseille on a UDF-RPR list, seconded by Renaud Muselier (RPR). This 
alliance avoided the violent struggles between both of the parties of the 
right at national level produced by the confrontation between Chirac (RPR) 
and Balladur (UDF) for elections in the main time. It also permitted him to 
gain the support from the whole of the right in Marseille (Peraldi and 
Samson 2005). He subsequently took up the mantle of Gaston Defferre in 
seeking to re-establish the link with the Marseillais, which had been 
broken (Morel 2001). This year was to be one of success for the former 
professor of history and geography. In November, he entered the 
government of Alain Juppe as Minister for the City and Local Development 
and Integration, a post that he occupied for two years. 
In 2002, he again ran for election on the Gaudin-Muselier list and was re- 
elected as mayor. 
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4.2.4. Some concluding comments about city politics in Marseille. 
In France, political life at the local level is dominated by the figure of the 
mayor (Cole and John 1995). Because of proximity to the local electorate, 
the mayor is probably the most representative' of elected roles in France. 
Municipal elections are those, which gather the highest proportion of 
votes. Mayors have thus a particular place within national political life 
(Landrieu 2000). In Marseille, strong personalities have always governed 
the city, and Defferre is almost a mythical' figure among politicians, civil 
servants as well as the local population. Even if he was single-minded and 
if his political practices were not always very clear or fair, politicians who 
worked with him say that they learned a lot from him (Interview with 
Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). 4 Furthermore, both mayors who 
succeeded him were marked by his stamp. For Vigouroux, seen as his 
most evident successor by politicians, the heritage was not really positive 
because he had to work through the Defferre clientelistic system. Gaudin's 
approach had more to do with Defferre's image in the sense that he would 
have liked to have the same charisma among the local population. 
Nevertheless, both of these Marseille mayors had a strong image and 
personality. In the view of politicians, they were total opposites in terms of 
political approach. Interviewees liked to compare their behaviour in 
explaining their political actions. They refer to a complete contrast of style. 
So there was a difference of methods. An approach to 
problems which reflected this specialisation of the man in 
charge. One [Gaudin] saw his role more as an historian than 
a geographer. The other looked at it in the way a dissector of 
skulls would do... You have to know how to join nerves... 
there is a need to know the mechanisms of both hemispheres 
to manage to connect the whole... And now [with Gaudin], it 
is a bit like a 'sequin and gloss' policy (Interview with Marc 
Vincent, 8 June 2005). 
The same idea emerges from the discourse of Rene Olmeta who compares 
the reality of policy under Vigouroux to that of the superficiality of policy 
4 And film « Marseille contre Marseille », Comolli and Samson. 
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under Gaudin. In relation to communication, Vigouroux did not find it easy 
to deal with this side of the political life, whereas Gaudin seemed to really 
enjoy this aspect. For example, on the evening of his election, Gaudin 
declared 'we are going to set you alight', which is the slogan of O. M. 
supporters (La Provence, 19 June 1995: 2). Whereas for Vigouroux 
Unfortunately, he didn't manage to sell himself. He is not a 
communicator, it is not his thing. For me, he was an great 
visionary for the city... But as we say in Marseille, he is 
unbearable (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). 
For me, he was an 'autistic'. Sometimes, I have spent several 
minutes alone in his company. Whereas with Gaudin, you do 
not stop talking, well, that is he does not stop talking. There 
is a complete contrast here (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 
June 2005) 
It is thus clear, they are very different characters: on one side, Vigouroux, 
the strong but cold individual, and on the other one, Gaudin, a smooth 
talker but with little broad policy action or vision. In terms of the role of 
the mayor in France, one might expect opposing tendencies at play in the 
way these two conducted the negotiations concerning the Football World 
Cup 1998 project. 
4.3. Sport in Marseille. 
Sports policy in Marseille reflects the same kind of evolution as has been 
the case in other French cities. Callede and Dane (1991) propose a three 
stage chronology of this development. The first stage relates to what they 
term a "heroic" period from the 1880s. Clubs and associations began to be 
initiated at this time under a federal hierarchy, which was not well 
developed and whose relations with municipalities were limited to 
administrative issues. The goal in this period at the end of the Franco- 
Prussian War was the control of young people and their values (Arnaud 
and Riordan 1997). The second stage, the 'topique period', beginning in 
the 1930s was related to a period in which the first municipal sporting 
facilities were developed. Most cities began to develop a set of sporting 
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activities and facilities and financial aid in this period from 1936. The State 
looked to develop leisure provision and began to engage in the meeting of 
need and provision of services. Sport was developed with the wish to 
promote sports for all (Clement et al. 1994). From the 1960s, the State 
reacted to the lack of sporting facilities by provision through local 
authorities. The 'strategic period' from the 1970s is characterised by the 
explosion of sporting phenomena with an increasing demand and 
emergence of a hierarchy in sport participation. The differences between 
cities in terms of sporting development began to grow and in particular 
between those cities that experienced strong demographic growth, and 
those which did not. Sporting institutions and facilities were much more 
developed in the former and this was at a time when municipalities were 
gaining more prerogatives from, and promoting more initiatives in 
comparison with, the State. This local response to demand also reflected 
those municipal authorities which were dealing with local populations and 
sports clubs, which were more politically engaged, and which were trying 
to develop a distinctive image of their locale. 
Callede and Dane's chronological stages fit well with the evolution of sport 
in Marseille. At the end of the 19 century, the heroic period began in 
Marseille with the creation of its first clubs. The gymnastics and nautical 
societies were initiated: La Phoceenne (1879); Le Gymnaste-Club (1892), 
La Gauloise (1893) (Echinard, 2005) for the former discipline, and Union 
Nautique Marseillaise (1882); Societe Nautique de Marseille (1887) 
(Lorimier and Sirost 2005) for the latter. The Anglo-Saxon sporting 
disciplines were established little by little in Marseille as in the rest of 
France in the beginning of the 20th century (Echinard 2005). The second 
period is characterised by the construction of an important sporting 
heritage in terms of facilities. Gabriel Vallerian, municipal councillor 
responsible for sports from 1929 to 1935, promoted a policy of strong 
support for provision of sporting facilities. Numerous facilities were 
constructed during this period in a context, which offered good financial 
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conditions and in which manual labour was cheap (Raoult and Bonneau 
1999). From 1935 to 1947, sport had little place in a municipality which 
was made subject to central government control. Roger Lebert 
subsequently relaunched a major programme of facility construction when 
he was in charge of sport. The numerous facilities built in this period were 
a response to the need of the population, which had grown with waves of 
immigration from the pied-noirs and from North Africa more generally. But 
like most policy action by municipalities in this period, the construction of 
facilities was carried out on a piecemeal basis with little concern for 
comprehensive sport policy (Niel and Cometti 2005). The imbalance 
between neighbourhoods from the north and the south of the city in terms 
of subsidies for sport facilities, dates back to this period. The strategic 
period marked in Marseille the recognition of elite sport and the varied 
needs of different types of participants. Rene Olmeta who was deputy 
mayor for sport in 1977, among other things was instrumental in the 
development of a centre for female gymnastics, the creation of a sports 
ground for children with disabilities and was the first to promote elite 
sport in the city of Marseille (Raoult and Bonneau 1999; Brun 2005). It 
was also the beginning of the intensification of the relationship between 
the city and its major sporting club 1Olympique de Marseille. This club 
often dominated sporting debates within the city. Demanding high level of 
subsidies, and with the firing of coaches and the debts which the club 
accumulated, O. M. remained the club with the highest sporting and 
political profile in the city. In 1981, it was the city in large part, which 
saved the club from bankruptcy. Relations were further strengthened 
when Bernard Tapie resumed the presidency of the club in 1986, called in 
by Gaston Defferre shortly before his death (Levreau and Baudin, 2000). 
Because of the open conflicts between Mayor Vigouroux and O. M. and 
with Tapie's own political ambitions, the situation dominated political 
debate in the city. Overshadowed by the presence of the O. M. debate, the 
other clubs fought to demonstrate their importance to the general public 
and to the city. However, this was an uphill struggle, so central is O. M. to 
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the cultural and political life of the city. In this respect, Marseille is like no 
other city in France (Bromberger 1989). One only has to walk in the city 
streets the day after a match to sense' the result. As we have noted, the 
crowd at the Stade V/ /odrome provide an accurate reflexion of the social 
make up of the city. It represents the place where elements from the 
whole spectrum of Marseille society can meet (Bromberger 1989), and this 
is a phenomenon, which the mayor cannot ignore. The football team is 
seen by local elected politicians as a precious tool as well as a burning 
issue. In regards to the political advantages it can confer, interviews with 
the two former Deputy Mayors with responsibility for sport provide real 
insights. Both argued that Marseille has few problems of social disorder in 
disadvantaged areas compared to other French cities largely because 
young people have got O. M. The quotation that follows is about Gaston 
Defferre's arguments to justify O. M. subsidies, according to Rene Olmeta: 
That was, as he (Defferre) said, because (O. M. and its 
players) give young people something to think about... They 
help me to balance a little bit the big problems that cities 
usually have with youth. And that is true in terms of deprived 
neighbourhoods. Marseille is completely different from /es 
Minguettes (Lyon) and from the banlieue in the Paris region 
(Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). 
Given the importance of the club, the city's mayors have always made 
every effort to select the president of the leading club of the city. It is 
important to have an ally in this job. And Rene Olmeta even says: 
Defferre told me: you are my deputy mayor mister Olmeta, 
but dealing with O. M., it is my business. Vigouroux did not 
need tell me, for him it was the same, and Gaudin followed 
the same line (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 
2004). 
Beyond the importance of the institution, one has also to consider team 
supporters (Peraldi and Samsom 2005). Organised in different groups, 
they gained, during the Tapie years, a not inconsiderable power, above all 
in vote terms. O. M. is used to represent the city, to enhance its image, 
and also to serve political interests. All of the city's politicians, and even 
those in the Conseils Genera/ and Regional, are very careful when they 
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have to deal with the club. When decisions concern O. M., boundaries 
between the different parties disappear. 5 These are the reasons why O. M. 
still remains a 'thorny political issue', to use the title of an article by Michel 
Samson6 (2006), published in Le Monde. 
In the contemporary context, according to the documents of the Directory 
of Sport Services, Marseille has around 200,000 registered sports 
participants in 1,500 clubs with about as many participants again involved 
in informal sport. The current orientation of sport policy places an 
emphasis on the renovation of facilities and few new facilities are being 
built. An ice rink is nevertheless one project underway, but other sporting 
disciplines such as fencing lack facilities (Niel and Cometti 2005). A 
significant imbalance in the funding of facilities in the north and the south 
of the city still exists although the municipality has tried to compensate for 
this in part by designation of certain open spaces for multi sport uses. The 
1998 Football World Cup resulted in a reduction in that element of the 
budget allocated to the running of facilities while the budget for 
supporting sport events grew. However, Robert Villani announced a major 
sports facilities construction project for 2007, notably the building of an 
ice sports arena, but this was still accompanied by major investment in 
sports events such as the World Rugby Cup 2007 and the Tour de France 
(Brun 2005). There is an almost total silence in such documents in relation 
to amateur sport. 
5 The analysis of town hall reports reveals that there is no longer political division when 
the debate is about O. M. Whereas for other sport decisions, political ideology emerges 
easily in politicians discourses, the O. M. topic makes disappear it, and leaves the place to 
very careful discourses. 
6 xxL'O. M., objet po/itique epineux, by Michel Samson, published in Le Monde on the 25 
March 2006. 
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4.4.1986-1989: the debate about the future of the city 
relaunched. 
With the death of Gaston Defferre, the political system, which had lasted 
for three decades collapsed. The political elite in Marseille seemed to want 
to distance themselves from the management of the city and to engage in 
a fundamental reassessment of its future. The Defferrist management of 
the city had, as we have noted, only masked the crisis, which was only 
fully recognised after his death, and this had significant implications in all 
urban policy domains, including sport. 
Different reports were thus produced by the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry on the one hand and by the Agence d'Urbanisme de 
lAgg/omeration Marseillaise (AGAM) on the other. In 1986, the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry published a report promoting action to develop 
Marseille into a platform for international commerce, relying on the port 
(Isoard 1997). It is here that the idea of renewal of the districts around 
the port was first evident (Pinson 2002). The AGAM focused its reflexion 
on the development of a business centre in the north of the city (Pinson 
2002). These reports were to have two major consequences. The first was 
that they inspired the policy programmes of candidates in the 1989 
municipal elections. The Gaudin team proposed a programme entitled 
Euthymene, promoted by Jean-Francois Mattel, requiring large scale urban 
renewal. The project was oriented toward tourism development and a 
major restructuring of the port. Vigouroux also took into account the 
findings of the reports, proposing '50 projects for Marseille' although this 
programme did not promote a global urban development vision (Morel 
2001). Pezet, a candidate supported by the Parti Socia/iste also proposed 
a project, which reflected an interest in developing a new vision of the 
city. "The Pezet project promoted an opening up of the city, the pursuit of 
economic development" (Morel 2001: 26), which was to be based on high 
level technologies. The second consequence was the emergence of a 
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grand projetf Euromediterranee, proposing an operation, which would 
provide a new image for the city and a way out of the crisis. 
4.5. A `grand p rojet: Euromediterranee. 
The 1990s saw the development of a significant programme of urban 
renewal in the city centre. The two major city events that we are focusing 
upon are contemporaneous with this development. The project of the 
Football World Cup 1998 arose at the same time as the emergence of 
Euromediterranee and the project of the America's Cup came at the same 
time as the implementation of the Euromediterranee programme. It is 
thus important to understand what the Euromediterranee project was in 
order to appreciate better the context in which decisions concerning the 
two major sporting events were taken. 
The emergence of the Euromediterranee project thus makes 
sense in a context marked by the end of the system of 
Defferist compromises and the emergence of a new style of 
municipal management most notably characterised by a 
willingness for the city to address the problems of its 
environment (Pinson 2002: 184). 
Vigouroux embodied the figure of the mayor-entrepreneur, the promoter 
of his city. He launched numerous projects, always focusing on a long 
term perspective. Vigouroux, according to his former collaborators, did not 
engage in politics, so much as in managing the city by anticipating the 
future (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). 
He [Vigouroux] intended to introduce to Marseille a use of 
urban management with, at the centre of his preoccupations, 
the creation of an image of the city which was to be both 
[socially] integrated internally and externally attractive 
(Pinson 2002: 180). 
Although the city had a negative external image, Vigouroux sensed that 
for the Marseillais also themselves, there seemed to be a lack of belief in 
the city. The Euromediterranee project was developed in this perspective. 
In creating a business centre in the neighbourhood of La Joliette and in 
renewing the surrounding area, Marseille would engender a new dynamic 
94 
Chapter 4; The City of Marseille 
image, oriented towards high level technologies and bringing new life to 
the city centre with an influx of new inhabitants. 
The Euromediterranee project succeeded in getting the representatives of 
the various local authorities around the same table. These authorities 
were involved as decision makers and not just simply as financiers, as had 
been the case in the past. In the framework of this project, the local 
authorities sought to shape the future of Marseille. The project also 
incorporated representatives of the private sector. Thus, there are some 
signs of what might have been an urban regime. The Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (CCI) collaborated closely with the public sector, 
to develop a common vision for the city, indeed, this was in effect initiated 
by the CCI. Moreover, the different local authorities (communes, 
departement and region), which usually hardly collaborated, managed to 
engage in discussions and to work together in the same way. 
However, the more the project went on, the less an urban regime type 
configuration was evident. This was firstly because this novel approach 
had been promoted by central government, which had established a Public 
Department of Development (Etablissement Public dAmenagementi in 
1994, requiring an agreement between the various authorities operating 
at the local level. The presence of the State guaranteed the long term 
survival of the Euromediterranee project, despite political squabbles and 
electoral deadlines. But the presence of the central State also gave the 
impression of dispossessing local authorities of ownership of the project, 
an impression confirmed by the announcement of Euromediterranee as an 
operation of national interest (Operation d7nteret , National) in 1995 
(Pinson 2002). By giving it this status, which is rarely attributed, 
... it seemed... that 
it was the State that was playing the role 
of guarantor of the public interest, having as an objective the 
positioning of France in Mediterranean Europe through this 
project (Bertoncello and Rodrigues Malta 2001: 419). 
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The regional and local role of the project was masked and the local 
positioning of the project as a high technology district risked becoming 
decoupled from the interests of the local population in this neighbourhood. 
The Euromediterranee project was the result of plans, which aimed to halt 
the crisis in Marseille. According to Gilles Pinson: "'a crisis situation leads to 
a series of policy stances that construct a local agenda around city 
positioning issues" (2002: 190). 
The crux of the project was the development of Marseille's status as a 
city, by creating a high technologies quarter and by renewal of districts in 
the Euromediterranee area. For the project to become real, public 
partners had to cooperate with the private sector. They needed bankers, 
and property owners, because they did not have the financial and 
property resources to get the project done. This kind of association seems 
to be on the increase, even if slowly, in France, where local actors have to 
find partners other than central government, which is decreasing its 
investments because of budget restrictions (Dubois and Olive 2001). It 
seems, however, to be more by obligation than by choice, that the public 
sector has developed its contacts with the private sector. Indeed, Gilles 
Pinson (2002) concludes that something akin to a growth coalition 
developed around the Euromediterranee project, because the private 
sector is the dominant presence in this group, particularly in regards to its 
capacity to invest in the different projects. 
Through this major programme, local elites wished to develop the image 
of Marseille, from a city simply trying to survive, to a dynamic city 
concerned with its future development, a concern which they shared with 
non-local, State actors as will be seen in the following chapters. 
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4.6. Conclusion. 
Behind the image of sun and pastis, Marseille has had to deal with an 
important crisis. Although the situation has improved to some degree 
since the middle of the 1990s, Marseille is still in a difficult position. Image 
enhancement was recognised as key to the city finding a way forward to 
deal with its difficulties, and sports policy relating to image 'became an 
increasingly evident feature. The city's bids to form part of the staging of 
the Football World Cup 1998 and for staging the America's Cup have thus 
to be understood within this context and it is to these two sets of events 
that attention is now turned. 
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Chapter 5: Bidding to stage the Football World 
Cup 1998 in Marseille 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the development of the city's bid to become one of 
the centres for hosting the 1998 Football World Cup, drawing 
predominantly on documentary sources and the press, before going on to 
develop an analysis of how the decision-making process related to the 
Football World Cup project might be interpreted by reference to the three 
theoretical frameworks. The Football World Cup is an event, which is 
staged not in a single city but normally in a single country, with matches 
taking place in cities with stadia of sufficient size and appropriate standard 
of facilities. The competition to host' this event, therefore, takes place at 
two levels. One is the global competition between countries. The second is 
the national competition between cities. In France, with one notable 
exception (Auxerre), clubs do not own their own stadia, as they do for 
example in the UK. As is the case for American football or baseball in the 
United States, professional soccer clubs play in stadia owned by municipal 
authorities. The internal national competition between potential locations 
for World Cup matches is, therefore, essentially a competition between 
municipalities / local government, in partnership with their local 
professional clubs, amongst others. 
5.2. The history of Marseille's candidature for the World 
Cup. 
5.2.1. Introduction: the official process. 
a). Decision-making 
At the beginning of 1991, France declared an interest in organising and 
hosting the Football World Cup 1998. In an internal process, the French 
government called for expressions of interest from cities willing to host 
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matches for the event, and Marseille along with others received this 
invitation. Robert Vigouroux, Marseille's mayor, after an informal meeting 
with some of his colleagues (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 
2004), decided to present the project to the City Council. On 27 May 1991, 
the council voted unanimously to promote the participation of Marseille as 
a venue for the Football World Cup, for which France was, at this stage, 
still just a candidate (City Council deliberation and report, 27 May 1991). 
Marseille had to wait for the FIFA decision on the choice of the host 
country for the 1998 edition of the World Cup. The years 1991 and 1992 
were relatively calm in regard to the decision. Since nothing had yet been 
decided, there was little or nothing to be done. 
However, on 2 July 1992 when France was officially chosen (Le Provencal, 
3 July 1992: 17), the process began in earnest. A number of meetings 
took place between leaders of the CFO (French Organising Committee of 
the World Cup) and local authority representatives, and feasibility studies 
were undertaken for potential host cities. Following such discussions in 
Marseille, the City Council voted again unanimously to fund the extension 
of the Velodrome Stadium, from 40,000 to 60,000 places (City Council 
deliberation, 22 February 1993). The reason for this expansion was the 
wish to host a semi-final, since according to the terms of reference of the 
World Cup, semi-finals could only be played in stadia with at least 60,000 
places. This decision was taken even though the State only announced the 
name of the official host cities on 14 October 1994. The outcome was that 
which was anticipated unofficially. Ten cities were designated for hosting 
games: Bordeaux, Lens, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, Nantes, Paris, Saint 
Denis, Saint Etienne and Toulouse. The Prime 'Minister, Edouard Balladur 
himself, made the announcement and confirmed that three cities would 
definitely be accepted when their financial plans had been completely 
finalised: the three were Lens, Nantes and Marseille (Le Provencal, 15 
October 1994: 21). 
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The main decisions taken by the City Council were: to vote to support the 
participation of Marseille; and more specifically to vote to support the 
staging of a semi-final. This second decision involved the major aspect of 
the Marseille investment, the expansion of the Velodrome Stadium. 
b). Organisation of the event 
Once France had been chosen by FIFA and the different host cities 
designated, the French Organising Committee (CFO) assumed greater 
importance in the process. Until the decision to go ahead with the stadium 
project, which took place during the Vigouroux period, the CFO was the 
intermediary with FIFA in establishing terms of reference. Like the French 
State, the CFO put the city authorities in Marseille under pressure when 
they took too long to reach agreement on the financial plan for the 
Stadium. The CFO was concerned to ensure that the different host cities 
would be ready in time for 1998. From October 1994 to January 1995, 
Fernand Sastre and Michel 'Platini, co-presidents of the CFO, made a series 
of public statements encouraging Marseille to reach agreement with local 
authorities to finance the stadium so that work could start on time. 
Fernand Sastre, for example, threatened to stage the second semi-final in 
Lyon rather than Marseille if the matter was not resolved quickly (Le 
Provencal,, 6 October1994: 3). Once the financing had been finalised, the 
City had to choose a preferred design from amongst those presented by 
different architects. 
Apart from the stadium project, the City was also responsible for cultural 
events / animation around the event, and it was free to choose how to go 
about hosting spectators and programming events. The CFO was solely in 
charge of the organisation of the competition. During 1996, the CFO 
organised the work of the different host cities by creating Regional 
Organisation Committees (CROs). In Marseille, the creation of the CRO 
was announced in February 1996 (Le Provencal, 10 February 1996: 21), 
with the announcement that Jean-Claude Gaudin would be one of its co- 
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presidents. In the following months, the regional newspaper, Le 
Provencal, expressed concern that the CRO had not yet been created. 
Nevertheless, the leadership of Marseille CRO seemed unofficially to have 
been given to Jean-Louis Genovesi, an unknown figure in the football 
world, even though the nomination of the Comite Departemental 
Olympique et Sportif 13 (CDOS 13) had been widely anticipated. However, 
Genovesi was apparently a friend of Jean Tigana and knew Michel Platini, 
who spent regular holidays in Cassis (Genovesi's home town), and 
Genovesi had also been supported by one of the deputy mayors of 
Marseille. This nomination would have generated some conflict in the 
Marseille City Council (Le Provencal, 22 May 1996: 17). Moreover, in the 
presentation of Genovesi's curriculum vitae, it was indicated that he had 
worked as general director in a firm, which Edouard Balladur was for a 
while a director (Le Provencal, 20 May 1998: 5). It was only in 1998, with 
the event imminent, that Genovesi was explicitly introduced as a friend of 
Platini. In an interview with a La Provence journalist, he explained that 
Platini himself had advised him to put his name forward for the job. He 
also claimed that he had no link with football, but that his relevant 
expertise was in how to manage people (La Provence, 20 May 1998: 5). 
Platini, it seems, preferred to have a friend in place where good 
relationships facilitate working relationships. 
Genovesi officially became the director of Marseille's CRO on 24 July 1996 
(La Provence, 25 July 1996: 3). The CRO consisted of 2 sections: public 
consultation (ce//u/e de concertation) and operation. Jean-Claude Gaudin 
and Jean-Claude Neviere, President of the Mediterranean Football league, 
were co-presidents of the communication section. This section was 
responsible for bringing together people representing different sectors and 
institutions. Their mission was to bring 'efficiency and coherence to the 
preparation of the most important media event of this end of century' (Le 
Provencal,, 22 May 1996: 17). 
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The communication section was further divided into 4 thematic 
committees: 'business action, promotion and tourism'; animation and 
relationships with the sport world, communication, and culture'; 
`education, social insertion, and youth'; and 'traffic, security, and 
transport'. Different ideas emerged from these sub-groups, which were all 
led by local elected or local official representatives. These included a 
charter for accommodation and catering, and the locations for big screens 
from which to view the matches. But although their proposals were 
regularly reported in La Provence up to May 1997, there was little news 
after that date. This may be because the most important work of the CRO 
was conducted by the operations section, which was responsible for the 
organisation of the main event. This second section brought together 
technical experts led, like the other section, by Genovesi. For the local 
authority, "Mister World Cup" was Marc Vincent (La Provence, 5 June 
1996: 5; and interview with Robert Villani, 8 July 2005). He was 
responsible for coordinating the municipal activities associated with the 
organisation of the World Cup, in other words, he was the link between 
the City and its services and the CRO. 
On the 4 May 1998, the CR0 officially became the tenant of the 
Velodrome Stadium and Chanot Park (La Provence, 5 May 1998: Sports I). 
Genovesi was thus in a sense the 'mayor of the Stadium' until the 21 July 
1998. The City was, during this period, without any legal power in this 
area. This was a decision accepted by the City, which was preoccupied 
with the main facility project for the event, the extension of the 
Velodrome. 
5.2.2. The stadium project 
If, from the outside, the extension of the Velodrome Stadium appeared to 
be an easy project to realise, this was far from being the case, especially 
in relation to the establishing of the financial plan. As indicated earlier, the 
City Council had agreed an extension of the Stadium from 40,000 to 
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60,000 places. But a range of opinions were subsequently to be heard in 
relation to the extension. The first was that of the mayor who wanted to 
organise the final in Marseille, which required an extension to 80,000 
places (Le Provencal, 24 February 1993: 3). With the support of the 
newspaper Le Provencal, the mayor argued that such a stadium in 
Marseille would be cost-effective with the size of the potential audience in 
the region for football or other major events. He added that the 'City of 
football' was the national location for organising the final of the World Cup 
(Le Provencal, 28 May 1993: 3). However, the sports world would simply 
not consider starting and closing the competition in any city other than 
Paris (Le Provencal, 3 May 1993: 14). Vigouroux's hopes definitively 
disappeared when FIFA announced that the stadium in Paris would be 
built and would be the venue for the final. Nevertheless, Marseille would 
have a specific role to play because it was to be the location for the 
holding of the draw for the final phase (Le Provencal, 19 March 1994: 5). 
Thus, a stadium of 60,000 was what the city council of Marseille finally 
agreed upon (City Council deliberation, 30 May 1994). 
Subsequently, Bernard Tapie, General Councillor (i. e. `County Councillor' 
for the Departement) representing the left, declared that it would be more 
reasonable to build a stadium of 50,000 places for a lesser amount. The 
existing stadium, with a capacity of 42,000 places was rarely full, he 
argued, and so a facility with 18 000 additional places would not be cost 
effective. Despite this, in 1989, he had led a campaign against the City 
Council's plan to build a stadium of 60,000 places. He had even 
threatened to build a private stadium for his team (he was President of 
OM at that time), outside the City if nothing was done (Peus 1991). 
However 4 years later, he was arguing that the cost for a 60,000 seater 
stadium was too high for the inhabitants of Marseille (Le Provencal, 12 
October 1994: 17). Lucien Weygand, President of the General (County) 
Council, followed Tapie's suggestion and added that he would accept a 
larger stadium if a number of sport federations would commit to 
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organising different competitions in Marseilles and if central government 
would increase its financial contribution (Le Provencal, 12 October1994: 
17). This debate provides an illustration of the difficulties experienced in 
trying to finalise an agreement for the financing of the stadium expansion. 
a). The financing plan. 
When the City voted for the extension of the Stadium two commitments 
were made, one from central government to meet 30% of the costs, and 
the other from the City also to provide 30% (City Council deliberation and 
report 22 February 1993; Le Provencal 23 February 1993: 3). Robert 
Vigouroux had to find the remaining third and it was natural that he 
should turn to both the Region and the Departement. The fact that 
Presidents of both Region and Departement were elected local 
representatives and, therefore, had taken part in the Town Hall vote, 
voting for the extension of the Stadium might have been expected to run 
smoothly. This was not the case however. 
In September 1993, the City, the Conseil Genera/ and the Conseil Regional 
were unable to reach an agreement on the financing of the stadium. 
Relationships were most difficult between the City and the Department. It 
was almost a tradition that on virtually every project, representatives of 
both bodies would confront each other, and the World Cup was no 
exception. At the beginning of October, central government agreed to 
increase its contribution from 30% to 38,72%, following a request from 
the City one month earlier (Le Provencal, 5 October 1993: ). However, this 
did not break the deadlock between the local authorities. Yet the decision 
relating to the Stadium was still supported unanimously by the City 
Council. For example, on 30 May 1994, the Town Hall agreed unanimously 
on the extension of the stadium to 60,000 places for a 341 million francs 
budget, even though the involvement of the Conseil General (the 
Departement) and the Conseil Regional had not yet been agreed (City 
Council deliberation, 30 September 1994). These other two local levels of 
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government had voted funds, which would be insufficient for a facility to 
host a semi final: the Conseil Genera/ (Departement) proposed 28 million 
francs and the Conseil Regiona/ had agreed 25 million francs. There was 
thus a shortfall of 50 million francs. A real struggle began in September 
1994. During the City Council meeting of 30 September, Vigouroux called 
the Conseil Genera/ and the Conseil Regiona/s bluff. He declared that if 
they were unwilling to face up to their responsibilities, there would not be 
a stadium and the sole responsibility for this outcome would rest with the 
parties. If Vigouroux wished to build a big stadium, it was 'to please 
Marseille's inhabitants who had loved football for many years' (City Council 
report, 30 September 1994). The mayor was thus able to seize 'the 
highground' casting the other two local bodies as the villains of this 
political game. 
During a municipal election campaign all sides take advantage of issues, 
which will mark them out as different in the eyes of the electorate. 
Nevertheless, in this case there was a time pressure: the official 
designation of the host cities for the World Cup was anticipated during 
October 1994 and solution had to be found quickly. Different national 
figures involved in the project, began to put Marseilles under pressure, 
including the CFO President and the Minister of Youth and Sport (Le 
Provencal, 12 October 1994). But the Presidents of both the Conseil 
General and the Conseil regional continued to resist: Lucien Weygand 
declaring a wish for more involvement from the State and from the sport 
federations; Jean-Claude Gaudin wishing to know whether the objective 
underpinning the project was to organize a semi-final or to renovate the 
Stadium by increasing its capacity (Le Provencal, 17 November 1994: 20). 
Nevertheless, everyone agreed on one point: the necessity of a meeting 
(Le Provencal, 14 October 1994: 22). The official nomination of the host 
City appears to have had no impact on the major actors. A meeting was 
planned, delayed, and finally held bringing together officials of 
the 
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different local authorities, but no elected representatives (Le Provencal, 17 
November 1994: 20). According to Vigouroux the financial plan had to be 
agreed by December, a date which was already late in the process (Le 
Provencal, 19 November 1994: 3). 
Rene Olmeta, after a meeting between the different host cities of the 
World Cup, declared his optimism, convinced that the State would 
increase its contribution, and so break the deadlock in the situation (Le 
Provencal, 2 December 1994: 19; 3 December 1994: 21). However, even 
though the State had in effect decided to provide a further 13 million 
francs which had initially been earmarked for provision by the local 
authorities, Olmeta was still waiting for news from the Conseil Genera/and 
the Conseil Regional, with the threat hanging over both Councils that 
Marseille would not be taking part in the organisation of the World Cup, 
and with attendant problems for O. M. as well, e. g. to play and to train in 
another stadium (Le Provencal, 22 December 1994: 20; and 30 December 
1994: 17). However, these claims were false: no deadline had been given 
by the CFO, and the issue of Marseille's involvement was not under 
consideration. The sole consequence of a delay in the financing 
arrangements would have been a move for O. M. to another stadium (Le 
Provencal, 3 January 1995: 3). The disagreement between the different 
local authorities stemmed from the budget presented by the Town Hall. 
The City had announced a cost of 341 million francs, taking into account 
costs linked to unforeseen risks associated with work to be undertaken. 
But this cost incorporated work only related to the City of Marseille. 
According to central government, the element of the project to be 
subsidised represented 263 million francs. Both the Conseils General and 
Regional, therefore, wanted the City to reduce the budget it had 
presented (Le Provencal, 3 January 1995: 3). By the end of January, the 
City had agreed to present a new amount, and an agreement between 
local authorities was reached (Le Provencal, 26 January 1995: 16). The 
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budget was to be 263 million francs with the following division of 
contribution: 
- central government: 101,5 million francs, 
- the City: 101,5 million francs, 
- the Conseil Region/`. 30 million francs, 
- the Conseil Genera/`. 30 million francs (City Council deliberation, 27 
February 1995). 
The City finally agreed to take responsibility for unforeseen costs linked to 
the project. 
Exactly two years had passed between the decision to extend the 
Velodrome Stadium and the agreement of a financial plan for the project. 
The length of time taken to make the decision has to be understood in the 
context of the municipal election campaign. The leaders of the three local 
authorities, City, Departement and Region, were all expected to be 
candidates for Mayor. Thus, each sought to take advantage of the 
situation. A background factor, which allowed the politicians to play this 
kind of game, was the timing of the procedure for the selection of the 
preferred Stadium project design. 
b). The choice and the realisation of the Velodrome Stadium extension. 
As soon as the Town Hall had decided on the extension of the Velodrome 
Stadium, in May 1993, an invitation to tender was published for architects 
and construction firms. A Technical Commission, headed by Rene Olmeta, 
the Deputy Mayor for sport, was responsible for selection of the successful 
tender. This Commission was made up of technicians and professionals 
from the construction sector, such as architects (interview with Rene 
Olmeta). The Mayor was to have the final decision, although the 
leadership of the Commission would change with the results of municipal 
elections. 
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A number of proposals were assessed, though little was reported in the 
press about this process. It was announced by Le Provencal in March that 
eight projects were still in the running (Le Provencal, 7 March 1995: 5) 
and on the 22 May 1995 the eight companies involved were to present 
their projects according to FIFA's terms of reference, together with 
proposals about developments around the Stadium (Le Provencal, 16 
March 1995: 5). On 3 July, Le Provencal published details of the eight 
projects, some proposing to cover the stadium, others not. The 
presentations were made at the time when the leadership of the 
Committee had just changed as a result of the municipal elections. As 
indicated above, Jean-Claude Gaudin led only one Committee, that which 
was to make the final decision. The winner, nominated on 24 July, was 
the team Chagnaud-Travaux du Midi led by the architects Averous and 
Buffi (Le Provencal, 25 July 1995: 3). The choice of the mayor was for a 
proposal with an uncovered stand (although the current stand was 
covered). The choice was not debated in the City Council (City Council 
report, 27 July 1995) but it was by journalists who pointed to a possible 
conflict with fans (Le Provencal, 28 July 1995: 15), and this is indeed what 
happened. Spectators who normally used this stand were furious (Le 
Provencal, 28 July 1995: 15), and began a petition (Le Provencal, 30 July 
1995: 13). Although the co-president of CFO emphasised that having a 
covered stand was not a request made by FIFA, particularly in the 'City of 
sun', Robert Villani, the new Deputy Mayor, declared that he was seriously 
studying this question (Le Provencal, 3 August 1995: 15). In the end, the 
Mayor denied any possibility of amending the plan because of the cost 
ramifications (Le Provencal, 8 August 1995: 15). 
Although this controversy died down during the work on the Velodrome 
Stadium, it returned as soon as the Stadium was fully re-opened, for the 
drawing of lots for the tournament. The regional newspaper, it seems, 
took every opportunity, through interviews or articles, to promote the 
controversy (La Provence, 4: 23,8: 3,30: back page, December 1997; 22: 
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back page, 27: sport II February 1998). It appeared that the Velodrome 
Stadium was considered a main feature of the Mediterranean city, and 
thus a matter involving every inhabitant. The covering of the stand even 
provoked a declaration by the president of O. M. who suggested that he 
was thinking about financing the covering of the stand himself, and was 
seeking sponsors to assist with this. He even declared that he had not 
dismissed the idea of buying the facility (La Provence, 12 February 1998: 
3). The Deputy Mayor for Sport, and the Mayor himself, reminded the club 
President that the stadium was not for sale, because it was essentially a 
municipal facility, part of the heritage of Marseille (La Provence, 15 April 
1998: sport II). Thus it is very clear that the Velodrome stadium was a 
sensitive topic, for a wide section of Marseille society. In addition to the 
covered stand controversy, some people complained about the lack of 
comfort within the new stadium. For example, the ground on which the 
press stand was built collapsed slightly, with one journalist being hurt (La 
Provence, 23 January 1998: 3), and people at the top of the stands felt 
insecure because of the steep gradient (La Provence, 27 February 1998: 
sport II). These different problems led the City Council to vote an increase 
of 2.4 million francs to the Stadium budget in order to improve spectator 
comfort (La Provence, 30: 5 and 31: 3 March 1998). This new increase 
came in addition to another voted in October 1997, which was required in 
order to have the Stadium ready for staging the draw for the final on 4 
December (City Council report 27 October 1997). The opposition began to 
argue that the budget was spiralling out of control, even though it voted 
in favour of both decisions. In total, the global budget for the Stadium 
project represented 391.9 million francs, compared with the initial 
estimate of 341 million (for the global budget). 
As one can see, the Velodrome Stadium extension project was not realised 
without difficulty. It is interesting to note that when a journalist asked 
Jean-Claude Gaudin if he had any regrets since the beginning of his period 
in office, he answered: 'My sole real regret is about the Stadium. Its 
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architecture is not conducive to the atmosphere. But there was a need to 
make a decision quickly in order for Marseille to be on time for the World 
Cup appointment' (La Provence, 6 June 1998: 3). This statement, coming 
from the man who led the group that made the decision, seems 
surprising. When one graps the importance of the municipal facility for the 
population, one can understand the importance of this statement. An 
article in La Provence on 5 June 1998 provides reassurance for the Mayor, 
arguing that the Velodrome project was the best available, considering the 
quality-price trade-off. 
Rather less controversially, a range of smaller projects were realised for 
the World Cup - including events and other facilities for visitors. These 
were intended to illustrate Marseille's capacity to be as good a host as one 
would expect from the second city of France. 
5.2.3. Around the event. 
a). Expectations from the event. 
During Vigouroux's period in office few expectations were clearly 
formulated. During City Council meetings, where the World Cup was 
discussed, politicians repeated the mantra that the World Cup represented 
a major opportunity for the Mediterranean city, without ever explaining 
why or in what way (Town Hall Council report, 21 May 1991; 30 May 
1994). Until Jean-Claude Gaudin came to power, the political discourse 
was different. In effect, it was Fernand Sastre who, during a visit in 
Marseille to see the stadium project, outlined what the city could expect: a 
positive economic impact with 450,000 people expected for matches, and 
a huge boost to publicity thanks to the media coverage and its world 
audience. In that, millions people would hear about Marseilles (Le 
Provencal,, 6 September 1995: 2). 
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It was in the context of an interview' in which he recounted his track 
record after 100 days in office that Jean-Claude Gaudin talked about his 
expectations from the World Cup. The event, he argued, would benefit 
Marseille in terms of image change. Specifically, he wanted this 
competition to be a vehicle for eradicating or downplaying its 'Pagnol' 
associations8 by which Marseille had been caricatured with, in its place, an 
image of a city opening up to the world. The Mayor in fact was relying on 
two major events to revive the city's reputation: the Football World Cup 
1998 and the celebration of the 26th century of the city's history in 1999. 
The former in particular would be a way for Marseille inhabitants to regain 
a certain pride in their city (Le Provencal, 10 October 1995: 5). Without 
pre-claiming an official policy, both events were presented as crucial to 
the development of Marseille, but are largely significant in terms of the 
Mayor's political reputation. This is illustrated in an editorial of the 
municipal magazine in which Jean-Claude Gaudin talks about the World 
Cup as an historic event, in which the citizens of Marseille are invited to 
participate, notably to showcase the wealth of the city. Vigouroux, by 
contrast, when he was mayor, made no allusion to this event in his 
contribution to the same magazine. 
For journalists, economic outcomes were the most important factor, in 
particular, provision for visitors to sleep and eat, as well as to have fun 
were seen as major profits opportunities. Other outcomes such as jobs 
generated and improvement in the image of the city were acknowledged, 
but benefits of this type were regarded as difficult to estimate in advance 
(Le Provencal,, 9 February 1996: 2). It was widely recognised that the 
generating of a new image for the city would depend on local people. The 
' Jean-Claude Gaudin had spent one hundred days as Mayor of the City. For this symbolic 
birthday, he outlined his initial track record and presented his policy and ambitions for 
Marseille. 
8 Marcel Pagnol, 1895 to 1974, was an author, playwright and film-maker whose work is 
renowned for a poetic and picturesque depiction, often in comic caricature of Marseille 
and Provence. His plays, books and films are attributed with cementing the association of 
the Marseillais, with pastis, petanque and of patois, a tendency for exaggeration and for 
the conducting of shouted conversation. 
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local bureaucrats and politicians responsible for this, therefore, had high 
expectations of the local population for celebrating the World Cup and the 
26th centenary of the City. Deputy Mayors responsible for sports, tourism 
and culture held numerous meetings with local associations to mobilise 
the population (La Provence, 19 June 1997: 3). The event was seen as a 
crucial opportunity for image change, and would generate tourist and 
business challenges (La Provence, 5 November 1997: sport II; 14 March 
1997: 21). 
If expectations in term of image were largely introduced in articles about 
the World Cup, they were clearly expressed in entire articles dedicated to 
the topic when 'D-Day' approached. 9 For example, an article entitled 
'World Cup: one month to seduce' presents the challenge that a new 
image of Marseille would represent (La Provence, 28 April 1998: 3). More 
explicit is the content of '4 weeks in balloon'. It is said that 'the City is 
relying on the 7 matches that it will host to renew its image'. The most 
important match is 
... the one that the 
City has to play against itself (... ) Marseilles 
knows that it is playing its reputation (... ) Will it be able to 
satisfy the visitors, to seduce them, to give them the desire to 
come back. The same questions exist in the other host cities, 
but the difference is that Marseille has a specific image: as an 
undisciplined, disorganized, and whimsical city. The World 
Cup is a huge opportunity to change this. The entire city is 
mobilized for it (La Provence, 5 June 1998: 5). 
One can see that as the event approached discourses and ideas were 
beginning to be exposed more clearly. The aim was not simply to host a 
football competition; it was to change the image of the City through the 
successful organization of the event, with everybody active in the 
achievement of this aim. In essence, as reported in La Provence, 'the 
World Cup is first of all a motive and a showcase' (La Provence, 6 
December 1997: 5). 
9 At the time for the draw for the finals, La Provence emphasized this point on 5 
November 1997 (p. 5). 
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In relation to discourses around the themes of the economy and tourism, 
during the Gaudin period, this is much less evident. In other words, 
whereas expectations in terms of image grew more and more significant 
as the event approached, expectations about tourism and the economy 
diminished. At the beginning of 1996, much was reported about the major 
implications for tourism and economy (La Provence, 9 February 1996: 2). 
As the staging of the draw grew closer, some commentators began to de- 
emphasise economic expectations because in terms of accommodation, 
Marseille would not be able to accommodate all incoming spectators, and 
this would benefit neighbouring cities (La Provence, 5 November 1997: 5). 
These fears appeared to be confirmed as some fans, such as a group of 
Brazilians, indicated they were going to make the return trip on the day of 
the match to Marseille because they would be staying in Paris during the 
competition (La Provence, 11 February 1998: 2). Moreover, it was 
reported that for the accommodation sector, the usual business clients 
and congress participants might be put off from coming risk not to come 
to Marseille, by the prospect of the World Cup (La Provence, 29 April 
1998: 3). One month before the event an article entitled 'Will the World 
Cup disrupt the tourist economy? ' made the point about negative 
expectations for tourism. According to an officer responsible for tourism 
services, there would not be a net negative effect during the event 
because spectators for the World Cup would replace the normal clientele, 
but this group was coming solely for the football, and not to visit and stay 
in the city. The tourist office representatives argued, however, that 
consequences would be visible in the long term because of Marseille's new 
image from which tourism would benefit in the future (La Provence, 1 
June 1998: 3 and 5 June 1997: 5). Shop owners reportedly had similar 
expectations, some hoped to increase their activity, while some expected 
nothing (La Provence, 8 June 1998: 2). 
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To summarize, the most important expectations for the event related to 
enhancement of the city image, with a hope that Marseille's new image 
would have positive consequences in the middle and long term for the 
local economy and tourism. Thus for journalists and political 
representatives alike the World Cup represented an opportunity to change 
the image of Marseille, thereby promoting city development, and projects 
and actions drew on this expectation for legitimation. 
b). The different projects associated with hosting the event. 
Apart from the stadium extension, the first major project to take effect 
concerned the laying-out of the area around the stadium. For this Jean- 
Claude Gaudin announced that 180 million francs would be allocated (Le 
Provencal, 10 February 1996: 21). The aim was to improve access to the 
stadium, and to host thousands of people in a small area. Residents living 
close to the stadium were very much in support of these plans (Le 
Provencal, 13 June 1996: 3). There would be development of the 
underground, of the roads and pavements, and protection of houses 
around the Velodrome (Le Provencal, 13 November 1996: 3). The moving 
of the municipal tennis club, next to the stadium, was also planned to 
allow the stadium to be extended and for car parks to be built. In the 
same locale, the pedestrian area around the stadium entrance would be a 
free space (Le Provencal, 17 August 1996: 5), with this was seen as a 
means of giving back' the stadium to the local population. The idea was 
to leave a space between the gates and the facility itself, to which 
Marseille inhabitants should be allowed free access. '° 
There was one important element, which would cause significant 
difficulties if nothing was to be done, and this was the city's 
accommodation capacity. With only 4,500 rooms, Marseille would not be 
capable of accommodating all the spectators visiting the city. However the 
io Since 1998, this space has become the main area in the city for the practice of 
different urban sports: rollerbiading, skates, street-hockey and so on. 
One can observe 
families, groups of friends or single people sharing this space peacefully. 
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City Council was reluctant to start constructing new hotels. It was 
regarded as too great a risk to build hotels because of one event, however 
big, because of fears that, after the event, they would be under-used (Le 
Provencal, 11 June 1996: 3). The tourist professionals agreed. The 
solution proposed was that neighbouring cities would provide additional 
accommodation, while boats could also be transformed into hotels. This 
solution met with consensus from all parties. 
In relation to other aspects of the project, nothing more was publicly 
discussed. However it was not only the physical aspects of the stadium 
project but other aspects of the city environment that required actions. 
The city required a face lift: graffiti were erased (La Provence, 25 October 
1997: 3); the centre of the city was renewed (La Provence, 29 May 1998: 
2), and the town centre was made safe (La Provence, 5 February 1998: 
3). In this manner, Marseille aimed to present the face of a clean, safe 
and well organised city. In addition, various socio-cultural animations were 
planned. 
c). Cultural events. 
If the image of the city was to be overhauled, the organisation of cultural 
animation programmes would have to be a success, and the 
communication section of the CR0 did not lack ideas in this respect. The 
different committees proposed creating a charter in the different sectors: 
for local people in terms of promoting a welcome for strangers (Le 
Provencal, 21 November 1996: 7 and 6 May 1997: 3); and for hotels and 
restaurants in terms of commitment to a high quality of service (Le 
Provencal, 17 December 1996: 10). For spectators and for young people, 
the setting up of giant screens in the city was proposed (Le Provencal, 15 
February 1997: 5). From July 1997, it was known that three main sites 
were to be dedicated to animation in the city: the Vieux Port, the Prado 
beaches and Borrely Park (La Provence, 11 July 1997: sport I). While the 
first two were eventually used for the event, the last was replaced by the 
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site of Mourepiane (La Provence, 30 March 1998: 5 and 31 March 1998: 3; 
and Town Hall Council report, 30 March 1998). Thus, animations were 
planned in the North, in the South and in the centre of the city, allowing 
all inhabitants of the city to be involved. Although other host cities 
contributed to the financing of animations, Marseille was alone in leaving 
the private sector to do this. The association 'OM-Centenaire' was given 
responsibility for the organisation of animations (La Provence, 30 March 
1998: 5 and 31 March 1998: 3). Private investors included the Club 
'Marseille-La Decouverte'-an association that consisted of 15 firms from 
Marseille - as well as international and national firms: Coca-Cola, 
Budweiser, Adidas, Canal Plus, Lavazza, France Telecom, Danone and 
Eurest (La Provence, 7 April 1998: sport II). Most of these companies 
were regular sponsors for FIFA. Although the 'OM-Centenaire' was 
responsible for the financing and organisation of animations, the city 
contributed to the planning of most of the events. Initially, Jean-Claude 
Gaudin had wanted the city to finance the animations. However, faced 
with opposition from his City Council, he agreed that the private sector 
should finance it (La Provence, 30 September 1997: 5). On 4 June 1998, 
La Provence published details of the finance plan for the animations: the 
budget of 21,5 million francs was divided as follows: 19 million francs 
would be provided by the ISL marketing company - which obtained 
sponsorship from international and national companies; 1,5 million francs 
from 'Marseille La Decouverte': and 1 million francs for the Conseil General 
(representing investment by the public sector). The three main sites would 
host different events. At the Vieux Port, concerts were planned, as well as 
an exposition of products from regional firms and an art exhibition. The 
Prado Beaches and Mourepiane would host the two giant screens and 
sporting events (La Provence, 7 April 1998: sport II). 
If the animations planned appeared to delight the local population, this 
was not the case for shop owners in the Vieux Port. The charm of the 
Vieux Port, the boats, the port and the sea, meant that animations needed 
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to be less visible. Shop owners opposed the animation proposal - about 
which they were not consulted - because they obscured the main 
attractions of the port (La Provence, 3 June 1998: 3). The regional 
newspaper also began to echo the negative reactions of individuals as the 
World Cup approached. Residents near the Velodrome Stadium expressed 
some fears (La Provence, 10 June 1998: 3), for example, about poor road 
signage (La Provence, 11 June 1998), the location of seats within the 
Stadium (La Provence, 6 June 1998: 3), and the lack of tickets allocated 
for disadvantaged groups (La Provence, 3 June 1998: 5). By contrast 
however, the newspaper emphasised two positive topics: security and 
traffic. La Provence thus struck a balance between periods of hope and 
enthusiasm, and of doubt and fear, between the positive and (not so) 
negative consequences. 
5.2.4. Results. 
a). Economic outcomes. 
From the second week of the competition, shop owners in the town centre 
and the Vieux Port were largely disappointed (La Provence, 19 June 1998: 
3), and this impression was confirmed after the event, since not all shops 
benefited equally from the event. In catering, the only sector that 
increased its activity was fast-food. Others reported little impact from the 
World Cup (La Provence, 11 July 1998: 2). Similar results were reported 
by the accommodation sector: few establishments increased their activity, 
and the loss of 'normal' clientele was not compensated by spectators for 
the World Cup (La Provence, 18 July 1998: 5). In fact, the only shop 
owners to increase their activity were those located at strategic points or 
on the spectators' routes'. Two other explanations were given for this lack 
of impact. First, none of the teams were based in the same city for the 
month, hence supporters travelled from city to city. Second, this World 
Cup was an event, which gave prominence to VIPs and their guests but 
VIPs tend to stay in their hotel where they sleep, receive people and eat, 
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with little external expenditure in the city itself (La Provence, 11 July 
1998: 3). 
Economic results were thus mixed. In fact, they corresponded with the 
expectations formulated by the Head of the Tourist Office. However, as he 
argued, the impact on tourism and on the economy was likely to be over 
the long term, as a result of image change, and in this respect at least, it 
seems that the city was successful (La Provence, 11 July 1998: 2). 
b). Image outcomes. 
During the World Cup competition Marseille portrayed itself as a city with 
a good atmosphere. In the festivities for the opening of the competition, 
the population demonstrated its warm and friendly character (La 
Provence, 10 June 1998: 3). The site where this atmosphere was most 
evident was on Prado beach, with its giant screen attracting 106,500 
spectators up to the 27th June (La Provence, 28 June 1998: 2). It 
represented freedom and a friendly atmosphere for the World Cup (La 
Provence, 24 June 1998: 2), benefiting from the mixed public coming from 
different parts of Marseille and its hinterland, as well as foreigners coming 
to support their team. These people came to 'enjoy a wild time peacefully' 
(La Provence, 24 June 1998: 2). The second site with a giant screen did 
not enjoy anything like this success. Mourepiane is located in an industrial 
area, and the giant screen was set up between business premises, and 
was 'walled in. Only 5,000 spectators attended the site to watch matches 
(La Provence, 28 June 1998: 2). Obviously, beaches are more attractive 
than an industrial zone, and the success of Prado beach led to demands 
for further animation events. Even though the City Council agreed to this 
proposal, the local authority at neighbourhood level did not, since it 
objected to the noise and the damage to the grass (La Provence, 20 July 
1998: 3). 
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In general, the City managed to do what Jean-Claude Gaudin had wished, 
that is it showed a 'friendly and warm image, to demonstrate once again, 
the example of fraternity and generosity' (La Provence, 4 December 1997: 
2-3). Yet, the organisation did not get off to a good start. In effect, the 
match between England and Tunisia was the occasion of violent 
opposition between supporters of each team as well as of problems with 
some young inhabitants of Marseille (La Provence, 15 June 1998: 2). 
Clashes took place the day before the game, as well as on the day of the 
match. The security system that had regularly been presented as being 
ready and prepared to deal with just such events, became the subject of 
debate. The police were criticised for allowing the hooligans to come into 
the town centre, even though there were reports of trouble near the 
stadium. In the town centre and the Vieux Port, shop windows were 
broken, cars were damaged, and some people were injured (La Provence, 
15 June 1998: 2). As a consequence of this, shop owners closed their 
shops the day after, and the town centre was deserted (La Provence, 16 
June 1998: 2). However, despite initial fears that the football party would 
turn into a violent affair, the rest of the competition passed by with little 
difficulty. These images of violence were not associated with the city for 
long, thanks to an improved security system and to supporters becoming 
more peaceful. Moreover, these events were nothing compared with 
situations in other host cities, such as Lens, where a policeman died 
during a battle between supporters. 
For the inhabitants of Marseille, the event was a success. A survey, 
commissioned by the City, demonstrated the positive views of people: 
- 94% of Marseilles inhabitants interviewed thought that the 
hosting of the World Cup was a good thing for the City. 
- 66% of people interviewed thought that it would make a lasting 
change to the image of Marseille in a positive sense. 
- and 93% of people interviewed thought that Marseilles lived up to 
the event. 
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With regard to animation events, 57% of people interviewed declared that 
they did not enjoy animations as much as they would have liked, whereas 
74% thought that animations were 'for everyone'. About the quality of 
animation events, more than 75% of people found them to be of good 
quality, though less than 40% of people interviewed took part in an event. 
Finally, at least, 95% of people interviewed thought that if it had to be 
done again, Marseilles should host the World Cup (La Provence, 11 July 
1998: 3). 
Jean-Claude Gaudin was delighted with these results. According to 
Gaudin, Marseilles succeeded in its goals: there was good media coverage, 
an increase of business in some sectors and the events were a success, in 
particular on Prado beach (La Provence, 11 July 1998: 2). When, later on, 
the opposition of the City Council lamented the fact that shop owners 
were disappointed about the lack of positive impact for them, as well as 
the poor use made of the Vieux Port and the cost of the project, Gaudin 
replied: 
without any doubt, in the years to come Marseille will benefit 
from the huge promotion campaign which was developed 
around the event and which represents almost 10 years of 
effort in promotion. (... ) We did not host the World Cup for 
restaurants and pubs to sell more sandwiches or beers (Town 
Hall report, 20 July 1998). 
The redirection of image seems to have been successfully initiated, as 
were the events organised to support this goal. One such major event was 
'the City of Success' in November 1997, a Congress, which was usually 
hosted in Paris. The event brought together scientists, intellectuals and 
philosophers, to discuss social issues. The fact that famous personalities 
were drawn to the city enabled Marseille to claim that it was enjoying a 
better reputation (La Provence, 12 November 1997: last page; 14 
November 1997: 2 and 17: 3 November 1997). The city then had to build 
on this success. 
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Informed by the above 'history' of the event, we turn now to the decision- 
making process for this project. 
5.3. Analysing data. 
5.3.1. Objectives. 
The way that the decision was made under Robert Vigouroux to host the 
World Cup matches was as follows. The Mayor gathered some close 
collaborators to discuss the opportunity to participate, including those 
Deputy Mayors with responsibilities for related areas. All gave their 
approval and thus proposed to vote for this proposal in the City Council. 
This was the way that Rene Olmeta, Deputy Mayor for Sport at this time, 
presented the decision-making process and the rationale for participation: 
It was an interesting operation including for the city of 
Marseille because the stadium, the mythic Velodrome 
Stadium, was beginning to pose a certain number of problems 
in terms of its operations and of its facilities. I was well placed 
because as the Deputy Mayor for Sport, my services were 
responsible and we had already concluded quite quickly that 
we would have to do a lot of work quite soon. So it was an 
argument used by the Mayor to say that work would have to 
be done in any case, one might as well say that we benefit 
from this operation to obtain State financing, and while doing 
something at the same time that Marseille wanted to do 
(Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). 
The starting objective was thus simple for the Mayor and his Deputy 
Mayor for Sport: the participation of Marseille in the Football World Cup 
1998 was an opportunity to renovate the stadium, which needed to be 
done anyway. The second objective was to please the citizens of Marseille. 
This Mediterranean city, which 'lives and breathes' its football, would thus 
become the location of the greatest competition in this sport. The 
inhabitants of Marseille could only be in favour of this decision (Interview 
with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004; and with Rene Olmeta, 3 
November 2004), and thus politicians would also support it. Rene Olmeta, 
talking about the importance of football in Marseille stated that: 
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For a politician, so for a mayor and for Vigouroux who had 
lived this as well [the importance of football in Marseille], that 
leads to say: well, a big event like the World Cup, it is 
football, we cannot neglect it (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 
November 2004). 
It would also enable the city to have a major facility with additional 
spectator capacity and which could be used not only for football. Other 
sports events, concerts or other large gatherings could take place in the 
stadium, and this would 'benefit the whole tourist sector in Marseille. For 
some people, it was the visionary spirit of Robert Vigouroux, which 
involved the city in this adventure (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 
2005). 
When Jean-Claude Gaudin came to power in 1995, the World Cup project 
was already underway, and there was just one significant decision to 
make: the type of stadium development to adopt. The new Mayor thus 
shaped the event in a particular fashion. For him, international 
competition would be a starting point for the city and its citizens to 
undertake renewal. As one of the project actors put it: 
The policy of Jean-Claude Gaudin was able to be expressed 
more freely [than was the case of Vigouroux] because the 
project had already been accepted, because Marseille was 
officially a host city in Marseille, then one could extend 
ambition beyond (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 
2004). 
But there were no clear objectives stated by Gaudin. Of course he 
exhibited the World Cup as a major event for his city, but we do not really 
know with what goals in mind, except to provide an unspecificied boost to 
the city. It appears that things were clearer for civil servants - the 
technocrats. One of the civil servants who worked on the project only 
under Gaudin expressed it this way: 
[The role of the city] was to host the event and to ensure the 
event went well. And also that the good image of the event 
should be reflected on the city (Interview with Marc Vincent, 
8 June 2005). 
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To summarize, the objective of Vigouroux was to participate in the 
competition in order to renew the stadium, which was something that 
needed to be done. For Gaudin, the objective was to provide a new boost 
to the image of Marseille through the hosting of World Cup matches. His 
late involvement in the project had enabled him to orient the project as he 
wished. One of the interviewees summarizes this element well: 
In terms of political ambition, one might say that sometimes 
the politicians make a decision and the ambition comes later, 
with all the material support being provided (Interview with 
Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004). 
Marseille simply applied to take part in this project. Having done so 
successfully, objectives for the city followed, rather than the other way 
around. Strategic thinking was thus emergent and not formative. 
5.3.2. Means. 
For this project, the city depended on two systems. One was the 
decentralised state system involving central government, the Conseils 
Genera/ and Regional for the financing of the stadium. The second was 
the football authorities in charge of the competition, with the CFO and 
CRO, representing FIFA for the event. The convention signed between the 
CFO and the City Council required that the latter put its sport facility at the 
disposal of the former. The City Council was thus not responsible directly 
for dealing with the event. The operational section, whose President was 
officially designated by the CFO was formally independent of the City 
Council. The public consultation Section, made up of local representatives 
from different sectors was responsible for organising the hosting process 
and staging the animations linked to the competition. In a sense the CRO 
took over responsibility once host cities had been chosen. 
The city thus became just another location where FIFA organised its 
activities. With regard to both systems, Marseille helped itself where it 
needed to. The financial collaboration of other public bodies enabled 
Marseille to set up a project that it would not have been able to take on 
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alone, and the decentralised arm of FIFA, the CRO, took on the 
operational aspects of the event. In relation to the other local and national 
government levels, their involvement was even presented as 'natural' 
something which, despite disagreements, was always going to take place. 
For the city of Marseille, partners were quickly found: the system of 
decentralisation provided these in the form of the Department and the 
Region. The idea of recruiting other partners, notably from the private 
sector, was touched on, but quickly put aside. 
In terms of infrastructure for the World Cup, this mostly concerned 
developing the stadium area and the transport network linked to it in 
order for the thousands of spectators to be accommodated in good 
conditions. To host seven matches with 60,000 spectators at each game 
this work was essential. Thus, works included development of the 
underground, of roads, of the pavement area, protection of houses around 
the stadium, the moving of the tennis club, and the construction of car 
parks near the stadium and at the different underground stations of the 
city. As Marc Vincent explained 
The Football World Cup has also been a means to change the 
use of public spaces and thoroughfares, places, in fact to 
change the nature of a neighbourhood. In a sense, it was 
also, an opportune, mini-operation of town planning 
(Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005). 
As we have already noted, the objective was not only to develop the 
stadium, but also to reorient the space around it in order to make the 
main city facility more accessible and to give local inhabitants more of a 
sense of ownership of the space (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 
October 2004). 
5.3.3. Kind of actors. 
In a project such as the Football World Cup, a certain number of bodies 
are almost automatically regarded, in the French system, as likely to be 
involved in decision-making and financial plans. In other words, central 
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government, the Conseils Regional and Departemental are usually 
partners for such event. For this specific competition, FIFA and 
committees especially created at the national and local level, were to be 
added. At the city level, interest groups were consulted to a greater or 
lesser degree. Figure 5.1. illustrates the role of each of the actors 
involved. 
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Under both mayors, the Deputy Mayor with responsibility for sport was in 
charge of the project. However, the political style and the personality of 
each of the mayors led to different roles for both Deputy Mayors. Thus, 
Rene Olmeta was the voice of the project, its official representative 
notably at the national level, with little intervention from Robert 
Vigouroux. In contrast, Robert Villani adopted a more common deputy 
mayor role, as the political go-between at the local level, with Jean-Claude 
Gaudin as the City representative and its voice when mayoral influence 
was required (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004). 11 The 
local authorities had, for their part, played the role of sole financers of the 
project. Their competences were not requested in other respects. 
Nevertheless, some of their representatives were part of the CRO, 
although only in the communication section. 
Central government, however, performed significant tasks on this project, 
through the different ministries involved in the event. The first of these 
was the Ministry of Finance, because the State brought an important 
financial contribution to the table. The Ministry of Youth and Sports was 
the main interlocutor of the CFO, and had to choose the host cities, 
ensuring that stadiums conformed to FIFA requirements. The local 
representatives of this Ministry, the Regional and Departmental Direction 
of Youth and Sport (DRJS), thus had an important role in this process. It 
provided expertise, liaised in dialogue between partners, and undertook 
technical assessments, for the central government, the city and the CRO 
(Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004). Central government 
was also involved through its Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversaw 
security during the competition. 
11 There is an example of this division of role: in an article about relationships between 
the CFO and the host cities, it is described how, when Michel Platini came to Marseille, it 
was Jean-Claude Gaudin who had lunch with him; but when there was a meeting 
between the CFO and the different host cities, it was Robert Villani - accompanied by 
Marc Vincent - who represented the city (La Provence, 17 January 1998: sport 
I). 
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The final major set of actor for the project were the football authorities. 
FIFA designated France as the organising country and produced the terms 
of reference for the competition. Subsequently, it created the French 
Organising Committee of the Football World Cup, in charge of the national 
organisation of the competition. Subsequently, the French Committee 
named site directors, responsible for the Regional Organisation 
Committee. This local committee then had to put in place the necessary 
context for the competition to take place. In Marseille, the different actors 
had to deal with the site director Jean-Louis Genovesi who was appointed 
in 1997, and thus did not work with Vigouroux's team. 
As discussed, the CRO had a specific organisation to lead the event. It was 
divided into two sections: operational and public consultation. The former 
played the major role, in terms of the logistics and technical organisation. 
This operational section incorporated experts chosen by Genovesi. The 
public consultation section had, as its mission, to think about hosting 
issues and the animation for spectators. Within this section there were 
elected members: the Mayor, Deputy Mayors for sport, culture, and 
tourism; a departmental (county) councillor, Rene Olmeta and at least one 
regional councillor. One also finds numerous public officials, representing 
different bodies: prefects, chief education officer, the president of the 
DRJS, but also directors of municipal services, amongst whom was Olivier 
Latil D'Albertas, the Director of Economic Development, and Marc Vincent, 
Technical Councillor, 'Mister World Cup' for the City. Public institutions 
were the most important suppliers of members, followed by the sports 
world (mostly football). For the former, besides league and committee 
representatives, the director of O. M. participated in this section. The 
sector, which was least well represented, was the economic world, 
because there was only one company director and a member of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Although the public consultation 
section wanted to be open to the whole population, and its role was 
highlighted by the press in the early stages, this did not last. It seems that 
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the aim of the section was to involve local people in order to gain their 
support for the project. However, their concern was rather more with 
ensuring people were represented rather than with taking action. In 
addition, interviewees who took part in the activities of the public 
consultation section did not make reference to it during our interviews. 
If, during the process, the State and local authorities always had the same 
role, it was not the case for the City and the CRO. In effect, until the 
arrival of the CRO in 1997, the City was master in its own house'. It was 
the one that was making decisions concerning the stadium development, 
even if it had to follow the line imposed by FIFA. As soon as the CRO was 
in place, it took control of the project. The City thus became simply an 
executive of the CRO in relation to World Cup issues. The CRO was 
actually in a position of acting extra-territorially' since the stadium area 
was a territory, which did not belong to it but in which it had power to do 
as it saw fit. Thus, the main actors of the project were public bodies and 
an association. 
The private sector had little or no involvement in decision-making terms. 
It performed a largely supporting role. In other words, it was an 
accompanying partner for the event, upon which the project had to rely 
because the domains of transport, accommodation and catering were the 
bedrock of the World Cup for players, spectators and the host 
communities. The business sector was consulted, notably via the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry of Marseille. Work for the stadium extension 
was also undertaken by private firms and designed by private architects, 
because the municipal services did not have the capacity to carry out 
these tasks (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). In this case, 
the relationship between the city and these private actors was simply one 
129 
Chapter 5. " Bidding to stage the Football World Cup 1998 in Marseille 
of employer and employee. 12 
If the private sector had a role as supporting services under Vigouroux, as 
well as under Gaudin, this role, nevertheless, took a different turn with the 
Mayor from the political right. In effect, as indicated earlier, the Mayor 
called in the private sector to take on the financing of animations, led by 
the association 'O. M-Centenairer. Thus, although the private sector under 
Gaudin still had no role in decision-making, it did have a role as an 
investor. The public-private partnership, which was until December 1997 
"de facto" because of the services that the private sector could offer, 
became official largely in the area of organising animation. The process 
was not simply a call for sponsors from the City: it was a request for 
financial help. The City Council decided that the city did not have the 
finance to support animations, or at least it was not desirable to take on 
financial commitments given the costs already committed to the project. 
Private sector bodies were then called in. If we look in detail at the firms 
involved in the animation projects, there were the usual sponsors of FIFA 
- international firms on the one hand, and 15 regional firms on the other, 
organised through the association 'Marseille La Decouverter. For the 15 
firms, which were national or international, each had a head office in the 
Marseille region. The private sector was thus more operator than actors. 
In relation to the general population, dialogue was mostly conducted 
through the normal channels in Marseille. Thus, when interviewees were 
asked about consultation with the population, this was said to have been 
done through associations, sport associations, the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry and the CIQs. Even though the role of the CIQs had become 
less important since the demise of Defferre, they were still key actors for 
12 Nevertheless, during both interviewees, Raymond Mallet emphasized the influence that 
the architects had in the project, especially in defending their ideas. But this approach is 
to be expected in the case of people who were chosen for their ideas, as is always the 
case when an architectural team is selected. 
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Marseille politicians. Consultation took place largely through the networks' 
head. According to one technocrat: 
There was consultation, of each of the representative bodies 
in Marseille. Through forms, which criticized by certain 
networks, by certain channels, for being simply sufficiently 
visible to showcase that it was done. Dialogue of this kind is 
questionable. When one talks with networks heads, it is a kind 
of dialogue. When one communicates with a larger population, 
this is very different. It is not always satisfactory. So, it was 
the alternation between a wish to consult to the maximum and 
also simply to take account of the answers of the network 
heads, the lead voices' (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 
November 2004). 
The dialogue was thus regarded by this technocrat, at least, as having 
been conducted as a cosmetic exercise rather than a real exercise in 
listening to the people. 
From the beginning, the participation of Marseille in the Football World 
Cup was a decision of the City Council, the State and FIFA, and these 
three bodies were key to the project. The main actor, in terms of decision- 
making and power, was not consistent across the period of the project. In 
the early stages it was the City Council but once the CR0 was established, 
it took the major role with the City Council becoming simply a collaborator. 
5.3.4. Motivations. 
Motivations, which underpin the main objective, were of different types. At 
the social level, Vigouroux's team wanted to please citizens, given the 
population's passion for football. However, the Vigouroux team sought 
predominantly to reach out to the young through this project, by giving 
them dreams, a topic for passionate debate, a focus, something to do or 
to talk about. Marseille politicians recognised, whatever their political 
party, that football engenders a fervour which would allow young people 
to dream: "It has the advantage of being able to preoccupy them' 
(Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). 
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It was argued that there are fewer problems in the inner city in Marseille 
than in other French cities because of the existence of O. M., the football 
club, and the sense of community it engenders. Subsidies given to O. M. 
represent money, which should not be available for neighbourhood 
associations (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). Hosting the 
World Cup would make young people dream for a month, and 12,000 
more places in the Velodrome would give more of them the opportunity to 
come to support their team. For politicians, it was a godsend. Even though 
this factor (i. e. the usefulness of the project as a political tool) was only 
the fourth most significant argument raised by Rene Olmeta, it is one of 
the few factors to be cited by all interviewees. 
In relation to economics, there were two kinds of motives evident, one in 
each of the municipal teams. For Vigouroux and his colleagues, a 60,000 
seater facility would enable them to respond to expectations, notably from 
the restaurant and accommodation sectors (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 
3 November 2004). For Gaudin's team, the event would attract new firms 
(Interview with Robert Villani, 8 July 2005). This illustrates something of 
the two political visions: the first from the political left, involved 
responding to the demands of Marseille inhabitants, the second from the 
more liberal right, emphasised the attraction of new firms, and thus of 
new forms of capital. 
In relation to the event itself, the interviewees did not talk directly about 
economic outcomes anticipated from the hosting of thousands of 
spectators. It was only press commentary that emphasised this aspect, 
and then, only later in the process. Indeed, it was the President of the 
CFO who reminded Marseille inhabitants what the World Cup could bring 
to them (Le Provencal,, 6 September 1995: 2). 
In relation to motives concerning media outcomes, there were also 
differences corresponding to each municipal team. In both cases, a major 
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motive was to improve Marseille's image, but in different ways. For Rene 
Olmeta, this was the least significant motivation: 
'And the last element was the communication element... 
There was an impressive press gallery... I mean that, also 
from that point of view, the communication could widely 
promote, if there was a need, the city, Marseille, as organiser, 
as passionate about sport and so on... So, if you like, at 
different points there was first the political choice for 
investment by the city, and afterwards there was the 
economic side, the social, and then 'pourquoi pas' the 
communication' (Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 
2004). 
The expression 'why not' used by the former Deputy Mayor for sport 
demonstrates that he did not anticipate this aspect of the event. The view 
of his successor was somewhat different: 
... and with a hope, that is the whole world will see images of Marseille, will see what Marseille is, will discover Marseille and 
maybe will change the image that people have of it (Interview 
with Robert Villani, 8 July 2005). 
Nevertheless, this aspect of changing the image of the city was most 
prominent for civil servants. All such interviewees laid greater emphasis on 
their expectations in this domain than elected politicians: 
Expectations were first of all to fill the gap in the image of 
Marseille (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 
2004). 
... [Outcomes] of image 
because... it means you don't have to 
have a press campaign, if you have a team that becomes 
UEFA champions, or even wins another competition. So there 
was town planning, providing facilities, but also over the 7 
matches there would be an impact on the image of Marseille 
on the part of the tourists who will come (Interview with Marc 
Vincent, 8 June 2005). 
Nevertheless, even if interviewees did not talk about it, it is hard to 
divorce this decision from the political context of that time. Bernard Tapie, 
President of the football club at the beginning of the 1990s, was a political 
14 spoiler'. He was attracting more and more supporters and publicity. Yet, 
at this time - 1990 -a conflict was developing between Vigouroux and 
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Tapie. The latter threatened to build a private stadium outside the city if 
the municipality would not start work for the Velodrome Stadium (Peus 
1991). The World Cup arrived' just in time: work was to be done at less 
cost to the city and the conflict ended. This decision enabled Robert 
Vigouroux to regain some esteem in the opinion of the city's inhabitants, 
he was thus able to avoid getting into a major argument during the 
electoral campaign with the man who seemed likely to be a strong future 
opponent in the 1995 municipal elections. 
It seems that the Vigouroux team wished to project the message that it 
was still master in its own house. It was a way of gathering public support 
against an opponent, Bernard Tapie, from the private sector, who would 
readily have called on other private support if it had to come to a fight. 
The local authority was thus not ready to cede power, and revealed a 
capacity to maintain control. 
5.3.5. Resources. 
It was clear that financial resource was the first thing needed for this 
project. Conflicts relating to this aspect between the local authorities 
demonstrate their importance. This kind of major project provides the 
opportunity for each of the local authorities to flex their political muscles, 
and assume control over respective opponents. In terms of influence, as 
noted, one cannot deny Bernard Tapie's role in the first stage of the 
decision. He got his way virtually without doing anything, and thus 
managed to demonstrate his political weight. A year after his strong words 
about the stadium, he again came to the fore expressing his opinion in 
relation to a 60,000 capacity facility. Nevertheless, he was unable to avoid 
the complaint against the club management registered by Vigouroux. 
On the other hand, the relationship between Edouard Balladur, Prime 
Minister at that time, and Robert Vigouroux, though officially political 
opponents, was positive. Because of this relationship, plans were 
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facilitated for the Mayor, notably a semi-final to be staged in Marseille, as 
we'll the staging of the draw. This was significant for a single city, knowing 
that other cities could have taken its place since state rather than local 
budgets were allocated for it. Of course, Marseille is the city of football in 
France, which led logically to the organisation of one of the semi-finals in 
the city. The decision with regard to the staging of the draw was made by 
the CFO. But Edouard Balladur named Marseille among the organising 
cities even though at the time the city's application file was far from being 
finalised (Le Provencal, 15 October 1994: 21). Two other events lead one 
to think that the links between both men played a part in this project: the 
first is that Edouard Balladur had been the person who had ratified the 
Vigouroux Euromediterranee project; second, and even more surprising, 
was the decision by the Marseille Mayor to support the Prime Minister for 
the presidential elections, a choice opposed by his own team. Was this a 
reciprocal courtesy? 
Things were, once again, different in the case of Gaudin. The only 
requirement placed on him was that the event be hosted properly. And 
this task was largely fulfilled by the CR0 and its operations section, and by 
Marc Vincent, Mister World Cup' for the city. Everything had been 
planned, it simply had to be implemented effectively. 
There is thus a confusing situation with regard to resources and their 
application by both mayors. If Vigouroux was dealing with the 'power 
over', Gaudin was more concerned with the 'power to, because of his late 
arrival in the decision-making process, and because by the time he arrived 
in power the major internecine political battles had already been fought. 
5.3.6. Kinds of relationships and links between decision-makers. 
What first of all strikes one in this study concerning relationships between 
bodies and groups, it is that they were dominated by political interests. 
The local authorities - the Conseil General, the Conseil Regional and 
the 
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City - related to one another in a manner, which can be read as the 
opposition between right and left. The most significant 'impasse' related to 
the financing of the project. Two years of prevarication had passed before 
reaching the first official agreement. Even if such difficulties were not 
unusual between local authorities, these positions have to be understood 
in the context of that time. Before providing an abstract of an 
interviewee's discourse, let us remind ourselves of the situation. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the Mayor of Marseille was Vigouroux, a man of 
the political left but who, following his election, had pursued a policy line 
more akin to the right, which led to his expulsion from the Socialist Party 
(PS). Lucien Weygand, also from the left and representing the PS, was the 
head of the Conseil General.. The Conseil Regional was directed by Jean- 
Claude Gaudin, from the right. The political inclination of Vigouroux, which 
placed him between the right and the left, placed him in a difficult 
situation among the other local authorities. He could not have the support 
of Jean-Claude Gaudin, who was from the political right, neither could he 
gain the support of Lucien Weygand because of his position in relation to 
the PS. So, there was a conflict between these three figures, particularly 
between Weygand and Vigouroux, where most regions were experiencing 
conflict between only two such parties. For the World Cup project, 
Raymond Mallet summarises the situation as follows: 
... in the 
final implementation of the financing 
arrangements, we had shifted from a situation as the city of 
Marseille - which had to be noted - led by a mayor who had 
been elected on a policy platform of the political left, to one of 
a municipality with a vision of the future reflecting a political 
declaration from the right. And as a result there should only 
have been a limited number of discrepancies and dysfunctions 
[between the political entities of City, Departement, and 
Region]. At the Conseil Regional, the situation was simple 
since Gaudin was still the President. But from his point of 
view, there was still a need to make people think or see that 
he was not using the Region to promote his own interests at 
the city level in Marseille which 'owned' this project. And as a 
consequence, he had to maintain a certain distance. He 
responded to the request for finance not before or after the 
Departement, but at the same time, otherwise his decision of 
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going ahead before, or responding after the Departement, 
would have been construed as an electoral ploy in the first 
case, or simply going along with the others in the latter case (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004). 
Political manoeuvres dominate the management of the project for the 
local authorities. The men at the head of each of the authorities had 
political ambitions at the city level, and thus, by that time, every project 
was an excuse to demonstrate his will and his power. Beyond these 
political positions, each actor was defending his own institution. Raymond 
Mallet went on to discuss this: 
I would like to point out here, because it was a problem in 
almost all regions involved - because of the political 
orientations of the various levels - the entry into the process 
of the Conseils Genera/ and Regional since these had 
implications for management and efficiency. They [the 
Departement and the Region] were actors who knew they 
would get involved, but they wanted to do so only at the 
express demand of the city of Marseille, and this political 
situation broadly overtook us [speaking as a representative of 
the Ministry of Youth and Sport at Regional level]... We were 
technocrats who wanted a response from both entities but 
neither wanted to respond... They did not want to appear to 
be party to a project about which the city of Marseille had 
never asked their opinion beforehand... and so with different 
political agendas there was an attempt to marginalize interest 
in hosting the World Cup (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 
November 2004). 
The situation was considerably simplified when the CRO was created. 
From this moment, the aim was not to be against the project or to slow 
down processes, since it was no longer the public institutions alone that 
participated but the whole football hierarchy. None of the local authorities 
thus had a real interest in interfering in decisions, but rather had an 
interest in facilitating the work of this non-political body, which was 
perceived as very important at the national level. All the petty squabbling 
had quickly disappeared. Nevertheless, in 1994 and 1995, years in which 
there was a municipal political campaign brakes were placed on the 
project whereas they could have been avoided if there had not been 
political conflict' (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004). 
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The civil servants had thus to juggle with situations that they were not 
able to change, obliged to wait until each of the politicians felt that his 
view had had sufficient impact on the direction of the project. The political 
context thus weighed heavily on the process. 
Among the local population, opposition had existed but had not lasted, 
and had little impact on the progress of the project (Interviews with 
Raymond Mallet, 18 October 2004; with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004; 
and with Robert Villani, 8 July 2005). The general sport movement (rather 
than that of football), the fan clubs of O. M., the stadium residents, and 
city shop owners, all these groups had made their voices heard at some 
point in order to ascertain what the event should bring them, or to make 
sure that their interests would not be disturbed or damaged. Through 
discussion and meetings organised by the City and the DRJS any fears had 
been calmed (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004), at 
least officially. Nevertheless, the trade unions did try to take advantage of 
the World Cup to organise events. The day of the draw for the finals, 
employees of the RTM (the main transport company in Marseille for 
buses) planned an event to obtain certain benefits from their employer. 
The choice of the day, defended by trade unions as giving their demands 
more weight, was greatly criticized by different sections of Marseille 
society (La Provence, 1 December 1997: 30; 2 December 1997: 31 and 3 
December 1997: 5). Although this action reduced the influx of spectators 
on the day, it had little lasting effect. At the beginning of June 1998, a few 
days before the beginning of the competition, other union events were 
also planned (La Provence, 5 June 1998: 2), but few employees 
participated. 
Despite these side shows, the decision-making process followed a well 
respected schema. For the stadium extension project, the final decision 
was in the hands of the city. There was close collaboration between the 
City services, the central government through its different local 
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representatives, and FIFA through its committees, but it was the city that 
made the final decision. In relation to the competition organisation, 
authority was vested in the CRO, with the different partners collaborating. 
However, from this point on the city of Marseille no longer had control 
over the event even though the competition took place within the city 
boundaries. It had to accept the organisers' decisions. Thus two rigid 
hierarchical systems in turn dominated relationships between event actors. 
5.3.7. The consequences of the project. 
Throughout the interviews conducted for this study, interviewees 
highlighted consequences for the city. The Football World Cup 1998 
represented an event, which had marked effects on the City for a number 
of reasons. This demonstrates that actors had not expected so much in 
terms of consequences from hosting the World Cup across different 
sectors. 
First, all agree that renewing the city's image renewal is linked to this 
event. Whereas Marseille had been labelled as an inactive, perhaps 
incompetent administration, it demonstrated that it was able to host and 
to organise, to a high standard, a major cultural event. Furthermore, this 
was demonstrated both to the outside world and to the citizens of 
Marseille themselves. In other words, for some commentators, from this 
moment local inhabitants began to recover confidence in their city and to 
feel positive towards it not simply because of O. M. (Interview with Edel 
Melin, 17 January 2005; Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004 and Robert 
Villani, 8 July 2005). According to interviewees, the city's performance as 
host enabled Marseille to gain acknowledgement for its accomplishments. 
And as we have noted, this image change engendered consequences in 
other domains where the perception of a city is important, such as local 
economic development and tourism. The Football World Cup 1998 is now 
an event which has been used 'to sell' the city (Interview with Edel Melin, 
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17 January 2005). It is like a visiting card which professionals are happy to 
present. 
With regard to sport policy, there are two important consequences. First, 
the cost of the stadium extension provoked a reduction in the general 
sport budget for several years. Few sports facilities have been built during 
the years following the event, the focus being the management of existing 
provision. Secondly, although the stadium was expensive, it, nevertheless, 
enabled Marseille to take on a new dimension in the hosting of major 
events. Thus, the hosting of the World Rugby Cup matches in 2007 was 
possible only because the stadium could accommodate 60,000 spectators. 
Numerous concerts with international stars were also organised around 
the stadium and this too was a long term consequence of the project. In 
addition, a sports event policy was formally developed since the city was 
better equipped to host major events. After 1998, Marseille was involved 
in both bids by Paris to host the Olympic Games (Interview with Edel 
Melin, 17 January 2005), it will host matches in the World Rugby Cup 
2007 and it was able to bid for the hosting of the America's Cup, all 
because of this increased competence and capacity in the city. If one just 
talks simply in terms of yachting activities, the number of competitions 
staged increased significantly after 1997 and such competitions now 
dominate the Marseille sporting calendar (Interviews with France 
Gamerre, 31 May 2005; and with Marc Vincent, 28 June 2005), an aspect 
reflected in the growing number of articles about yachting events in La 
Provence since 1997. 
These various sporting events, particularly those at an international level, 
were thus established not simply because of the stadium, but more 
especially because local politicians had been sensitised to what major 
sporting events could do for the city (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 
November 2004). The following quotation aptly summarizes the 
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impression of many the interviewees, that is, that the Football World Cup 
marked a turning point for the city: 
So the event added value, and... in a sense it helped to tear 
down the dark curtain, which had hidden the real Marseille... Changes in simple ways in terms of how the city 
was viewed: from a city which has a multi-ethnic population 
and is dangerous' to one of a city which is multi-ethnic but no 
longer dangerous; from a city which had a long way to go in 
terms of a work and economic environment and there was a 
huge gap between political rhetoric and action,... we had 
proof that this was wrong; the city had an ability to operate 
effectively in terms of the local economy with a return for 
those who had invested... and so in a way there has been a 
total change in the way the city is judged... and in this respect 
the World Cup played a key role [in change]. The proof? 
There was a bid for the Americas Cup, the Rugby World Cup 
has been attracted, and this is because openings had been 
made (Interview with Raymond Mallet, 23 November 2004). 
Thus the claim is that the Football World Cup 1998 demonstrated the 
potential of Marseille, dispelling the negative cliches traditionally 
associated with the city. This perennial image had seemed difficult to 
break but the major actors and the local press refer regularly to the claim 
that the World Cup provided the trigger or means for shedding such 
negative connotations. On a more pragmatic level, the Football World Cup 
1998 also had consequences in terms of the working methods of the 
different services in the city. In other words, it enabled the development 
of a mode of operation. As Marc Vincent maintained: 
... before the Football World 
Cup, technical meetings, about 
events in general, they were something of a 'rush job'. Now, 
we have a real method when we have a major event, we plan 
sufficiently early and meet with all people concerned with it... 
So, if I have to characterise the impression that I had after 
the World Cup, it is that things had been haphazard but that 
now they are methodologically arranged, and left potential in 
the organisation, which can be reactivated (Interview with 
Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005). 
During the World Cup, Jean-Louis Genovesi, the site director and Marc 
Vincent, 'Mister World Cup' for the city, had worked according to an 
approach created especially for the event by the advisor Algoet, for both 
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the city and the CRO. The legacy of this approach has been the 
simplification of connections between the services and the organisations 
involved. As Marc Vincent argues, people having worked closely together 
can 'reactivate' this system as soon as it is needed. In other words, 
networks are activated with more speed and actions are more efficient 
because trust networks have been established. The fragmentation of the 
sector has given way to a direct interconnection of people where there is a 
need, and a system for staging events was brought into existence. People 
from the various bodies involved have met and cooperated effectively, and 
this is now a latent resource. The formal mode of governance that was 
adopted is no longer in place but if there were a need to awaken the 
network, this could be done. 
5.4. Conclusion. 
This then is the 'storyline' for the hosting of the Football World Cup 1998 
and of the emergence of themes, issues, political responses, and the stet 
and significance actors and networks. In Chapter 7, we go on to consider 
the extent to which such phenomena can be characterised as evidence of 
a policy network, growth coalition, or urban regime employing the 
indicators outlined in Chapter 2. However, before doing so we consider 
the development of themes, issues, responses, actors and networks in 
relation to bidding for our second major event, the America's Cup. 
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Chapter 6: Marseille's bid to host the America's 
Cup. 
The second major event to be considered is Marseille's bid to host the 
America's Cup 2007. The whole process in relation to this bid took less 
than one year, from January to November 2003. After an introduction to 
the background of the bid, section 6.2. presents an analysis of the 
decision-making process involved. 
6.1. The history of the Marseille candidature. 
6.1.1. The main steps of the project. 
The America's Cup is considered to be the oldest international sport 
competition in the world. Inaugurated 150 years ago on the English coast, 
it takes place in several stages. First, there are head-to-head heats 
between boats during the Louis Vuitton Trophy, until just one winner 
remains. The winner then becomes the challenger for the America's Cup 
proper. During the Louis Vuitton Trophy competition, the winner of the 
previous edition of the America's Cup, the Defender, does not participate. 
The defending champion qualifies directly for the Americas' Cup, which is 
normally held in the champion's own country, more or less every four 
years. 
During the 2003 edition, the Louis Vuitton Trophy was won by the Swiss 
Defi Alinghi, skippered by the multi-millionaire Ernesto Bertarelli. The 
winner of this competition thus qualified to compete against the previous 
winners, Team New Zealand, in their vessel Oracle. The Swiss team then 
were to compete with the New-Zealanders in New Zealand and if they 
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won, would earn the right to host the competition next time around. 
However, the rules of the competition are clear, and the race has to take 
place on salt water, a problem for a land-locked country such as 
Switzerland. This realisation provoked a strong current of interest among 
a number of port-cities. 
From 16 November 2002, the newspaper La Provence began to consider a 
Swiss victory because of its results during the first regatta of the Louis 
Vuitton Trophy. In this article, France Gamerre, Deputy Mayor in charge of 
maritime and nautical business for Marseille, was interviewed on this 
topic, and declared: ""The interest [to host the Americas' Cup] is obvious... 
And it would be a very enthusiastic challenge" (La Provence, 16 November 
2003). Nevertheless, Sete was the first French city, which declared in the 
middle of January 2003, that it would bid in the event of a Swiss victory 
(Reuters Agency dispatch, 26 January, 2003). Sete was already the 
training base for the Swiss Defi. On 27 January, during his New Year 
speech to the press, Jean-Claude Gaudin declared his interest in the 
competition, and stated that he would be ready to support efforts to win 
the right to host the competition (La Provence, Liberation, 28 January 
2003). In Mediterranean ports, there was a remarkable flurry of interest to 
host the America's Cup, since the Swiss multimillionaire had overtly 
expressed a preference for a Mediterranean venue. Although the final 
stages of the 2003 competition had not yet begun, representatives of the 
different cities began their lobbying and went directly to where the 
competition was taking place. For the city of Marseille, France Gamerre, 
accompanied by several specialists, made the trip to Auckland (Liberation, 
28 January 2003) between the end of the Louis Vuitton Trophy and the 
beginning of the America's Cup. 13 
13 During her interview on 31May 2005, France Gamerre talked about her first trip in the 
following terms: Thus we went to Auckland with an audio montage, gifts, books about 
Marseille, indeed all that was needed to charm the Swiss'. The second trip at the end of 
February was organised in the same vein: "it is important to cry on Ernesto's shoulders 
when he is about to win. Emotion links people'. 
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During February 2003, the number of press articles about the possible 
arrival of the oldest world trophy in Europe intensified. One can thus read 
articles with titles such as Europe is awaiting the return of the old Cup' 
(Le Journal du Dimanche, 23 February 2003) or "The America's Cup seeks 
a port' (La Croix, 24 February 2003), which described the history of the 
competition and provided a portrait of Ernesto Bertarelli. The multi- 
millionaire, it was declared, was thinking of blowing away the cobwebs of 
the competition, notably by playing the card of professionalization. He 
wished to attract more participants or challengers, organising several 
regattas over four years (Le Journal du Dimanche, 23 February 2003; 
L'Express, 6 March 2003). In local newspapers, it was obviously Marseille's 
bid, which journalists emphasized: ""Marseille reaches out for the America's 
Cup" (La Provence des Sports, 24 February 2003), "America's Cup: 
Marseille in the running" (Marseille /Hebdo, 26 February 2003), "Marseille- 
metropolis on Swiss time" (La Marseillaise, 2 March 2003). By the time 
that the Swiss victory was imminent, Jean-Claude Gaudin solemnly 
announced Marseille's bid, to host the America's Cup during the 
inauguration of the Ciotat's Yachting Show on 1 March (La Marseillaise, La 
Provence, 2 March 2003). It was during the following night that Alinghi 
won, enabling cities' dreams to become potentially realisable. The battle 
had begun. 
The prestigious image of the competition and the competitors, the media 
coverage of the event, the number of people that it would bring to the 
host city, and the economic benefits (La Croix, 24 February 2003; 
Aujourdhui en France, 3 March 2003; Le Figaro Magazine, 20 September 
2003; Marseille lHebdo, 26 February 2003; La Provence, 28 February 
2003) led to 60 cities declaring an interest in hosting the competition 
(Le 
Figaro Magazine, 20 September 2003). The Swiss, through an 
intermediary America's Cup Management' (ACM) -a company especially 
created to manage the next Cup and led by a very close colleague of 
Bertarelli - announced on 27 March that only eight candidate 
cities were 
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accepted. This was a first victory for Marseille, which was chosen along 
with Valencia, Barcelona, Palma de Majorca, Porto Cervo, Naples, Ile 
d'Elbe/Toscane and Lisbon (La Provence, 28 March 2003). These cities 
then received a questionnaire in order to be able to identify the four 
finalists by May. The final result was scheduled for the 15th of December 
(Liberation, 4 April 2003). 
The result of the second phase was delayed because it was only on 12 
June that AC Management designated not four but five cities: Lisbon, 
Naples, Palma de Majorca and Valence (Le Monde, La Provence, 13 June 
2003). This decision was taken while Marseille was the location of protest 
movements, which France was experiencing, against retirement reform. 
Refuse collectors were about to strike for ten days, leaving Marseille's 
streets transformed into a rubbish dump. Commentators were pessimistic 
about the chances of the city in such circumstances. Jean-Claude Gaudin 
alluded to the harm that the strike could cause to Marseille's bid (La 
Provence, 7 and 13 June 2003). He argued that it was stabbing the city in 
the back' (La Provence, 7 June 2003). This second phase involved a 
questionnaire with around 80 points as a basis for comparing the 
organisational capacities of the candidate cities. The questionnaire had to 
be returned by 31 July (La Provence, 16 June 2003). 
During the same stage, an ultimate test was planned on 20 August: every 
city was received by the AC Management officials for a major oral 
evaluation. The main project actors formed the Marseille delegation: 
France Gamerre; Jean-Claude Gondard, General Secretary of the City; 
Olivier Latil d'Albertas, Director of Economic Development of the 
Communaute Urbaine "Marseille-Provence-Metropole' (Metropolitan 
district), and of course, Jean-Claude Gaudin, the city Mayor. The aim of 
the exercise was to test the different projects and the people in charge. 
Following thirty minutes of presentation, one hour of questions was 
scheduled to discuss the main points. Marseille's team ended its interview 
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in a confident vein (La Provence, 21 August 2003). Three points were 
examined closely by the Swiss society officials: 
The French central government commitments, the schedule of 
port development in the Fort Saint-Jean/J4 area, and the 
conditions, which the threat of social conflicts that would be 
likely to impede the under progress of the competition, could 
be eliminated (La Provence, La Marsei//aise, 21 August 2003). 
During this meeting, Jean-Claude Gaudin stated the limit of the financial 
commitments, which the city could not exceed. An article in La Provence, 
on 22 August entitled "The city does not want to slide into 'the Athens 
syndrome", set out the mayor's statement. He argued that the city should 
make reasonable investment, but that in an aggressive competition 
between finalists the city should not mortgage its future. Press sources 
commented that 'As a result Marseille risks appearing less ambitious than 
its opponents' (La Provence, 22 August 2003). 
Some days later, on 5 September, a rumour began to circulate that the 
number of candidate cities was to be reduced (Marseille Plus, 5 September 
2003). AC Management announced the elimination of Palma de Majorca 
(La Marseillaise; France Soir, Metro; La Provence, 6 September 2003). 
This left only four cities in the running, one per country. The major oral 
evaluation stage had thus been successful for Marseille. Now, all the 
competitors were 'back to zero', according to France Gamerre (Marseille 
Plus, 8 September 2003). This phase involved the formalization of 
contracts in order for commitments to be binding. A new set of questions 
had to be answered. According to the Director of AC Management: 
The candidate which is the quickest, with the clearest and 
most precise plan will inevitably be well placed because our 
goal is to have the best project possible in place at the 
moment of the signing of contract, (Reuters Agency, 5 
September 2003). 
During the last week before the final decision, three major events in the 
PACA region made the front pages of local newspapers. In effect, on the 
same day, 26 November, the host city for the next America's Cup would 
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be announced; as would the European city that would represent Europe to 
compete with the Japanese to house the experimental thermo-nuclear 
fusion reactor (the ITER project); 14 and finally to conclude this busy 
sporting day, a major international football match between O. M. and Real 
Madrid would take place in the Champions League (La Provence, 24 and 
26 November 2003; La Marsei//aise, 26 November 2003). Journalists 
explained the issues for each event, with strong views, especially in La 
Provence. Both of the 'hosting competitions' were presented as real 
springboards for the renewal of Marseille and the PACA region. One 
promised growth plus tourism impacts and the creation of thousands of 
jobs. In effect this was a real dual between France and Spain. 
Eventually, as planned, on 26 November just before noon, Valence was 
designated the host city for the next America's Cup (AFP dispatch, 26 
November 2003). Real Madrid won against O. M. but France, through 
Cadarache, was chosen to represent Europe for the hosting of the ITER 
project. With regard to the America's Cup, the Mayor, after the usual 
thanks and wishes of good luck to the winner, was quick to declare that 
certain projects would still be realized, arguing that, 'we have to take 
advantage of our bid's impetus to speed up our development in water 
sport, the local economy and urban development' (La Provence, 27 
November 2003). His discourse echoed earlier themes. It was indeed a 
failure, but city projects should not simply disappear with the failed bid. 
Most of the politicians interviewed promoted the same line: the failure was 
disappointing, but the city should still take advantage of the human and 
financial 'mobilization' that the project had fostered in order to boost the 
city. In addition, the newspaper La Provence sought to illustrate the 
benefits engendered by the bid. Journalists described development 
projects for the ports and in particular Vieux Port, which should be 
realised; the city's ambition and potential were praised, arguing that the 
bid had given the city a new credibility; and indeed the tourist, economic 
14 Two locations were retained: Cadarache, near Aix-en-Provence and Vandelos in Spain. 
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and media coverage that the communication campaign generated was 
seen as worthwhile since it cost just 2 million euros (La Provence, 27 
November2003). 
We can thus summarize the history of the designation process in 5 main 
steps: 
3 March: victory of Alinghi team in the America's Cup; the 
process begins, 
27 March: 8 cities chosen: Marseille, Valencia, Barcelona, Palma 
de Majorca, Porto Cervo, Naples, Ile d'Elbe/Toscane and Lisbon, 
- 12 June: 5 cities remain in the running: Marseille, Valencia, 
Palma de Majorca, Naples and Lisbon, 
5 September: Palma de Majorca was eliminated, 
26 November: Valencia was chosen. 
We will now consider the process across these five stages in Marseille. 
6.1.2. Numerous commitments. 
Following the decision, the press not only gave information about the 
Swiss decision-making process, it also provided supportive comments 
about Marseille's candidature. 
In the city, those responsible for the bid, apart from declarations about 
the work required to stage the event, had also chosen to mobilize the 
population: poster campaigns and support postcards proliferated 
throughout the city. Ernesto Bertarelli declared that he wanted the next 
America's Cup to be a truly popular event in order to break its image as an 
elitist competition (Le Journal du Dimanche, 23 February 2003). Marseille 
grasped the message well: there is only one city that would give a popular 
aspect to the America's Cup: Marseille. The policy of the group responsible 
was quickly steered towards a charm offensive on the Swiss, seeking to 
show them that Marseille would be on 'Swiss time'. Jean-Claude Gondard 
declared: "It is a business of charm. If we want to win, we will have to 
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make Bertarelli say "I want Marseille"" (Le Journal du Dimanche, 2 March 
2003). 
In addition to the support of the population, the City put in place a 
promoting committee, with singers, sportsmen, journalists, company 
directors, all supporting it. On 28 April, France Soir, Le Figaro, La 
Marsei//aise, La Provence and Aujourdhui en France published accounts of 
Jean-Claude Gaudin's press conference called to present the promoting 
committee. The press was united in emphasising the presence of football 
hero Zidane. His media significance had not decreased and the City had 
understood this well. By this time, with giant posters, press articles, 
conferences and supporting postcards distributed in every street, no 
Marseille inhabitant could be unaware of the bid for the old trophy. On 30 
April, La Provence even titled an article: America's Cup: first prize for 
enthusiasm', because Marseille was the only candidate that had gained the 
full support of its citizens. 
At a political level, Guy Teissier (UMP) was charged with securing the 
support of members of Parliament (La Provence, 3 June 2003). In the 
business sector, support was forthcoming just a few weeks before the 
designation of the winner. Although a group of company directors were 
already part of the promoting committee, this group intensified its 
commitment. Under the name of 'Entreprises Marseille America', 30 
Marseille company directors launched an advertising campaign to carry out 
the charm offensive. They announced several actions: a file in the "Times" 
newspaper, the collection of 1,000 supporting signatures of company 
directors from the area, and also putting senior personnel at the disposal 
of the competitors and operational staff for the event in order to help 
them (La Marseillaise, 31 October 2003). 
During the nine months of the competition to win the organisation of the 
event, the newspaper La Provence was the regional daily, which 
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supported the bid most openly. Articles were often real pleas for support 
for the City and a column named "America's Cup" was regularly fed by 
interviews with people, known personalities or unknown, who were clearly 
in favour of the city's candidature. 
In relation to those responsible for the Marseille project, the lobbying that 
began in January with meetings between France Gamerre and the Swiss 
team, intensified. The day after the announcement of the five finalists, a 
delegation from Marseille, including France Gamerre and Jean-Claude 
Gondard, went to Geneva to collect the new questionnaire. It was the only 
city to do so (La Provence, 16 June 2003). During this visit, the 'dynamic 
duo' Gamerre-Gondard (La Provence, 16 June 2003) engaged in a rapid 
round of meetings. They visited the Vice-Mayor of Geneva, had radio, TV 
and newspaper interviews, and meetings with members of the Geneva 
watersports society during a regatta in which Bertarelli's partners 
participated. The determination to charm was very evident: '... Marseille 
has already started long-term work, aiming to convince the different 
circles of decision-making and influence, which have links with Bertarelli' 
(La Provence, 16 June 2003). In the same article, which dealt with the 
perception of Marseille by the Swiss and with Marseille's lobbying, the 
journalist underlined rules of conduct to which the population would have 
to submit if it wanted victory for Marseille: 
... not to tell off foreign 
drivers who are lost or... not to dump 
rubbish at every hours of the day or night. More than ever, 
foreign visitors have to be treated with consideration, helped, 
directed and given information without ulterior motive, except 
that of acting in favour of the improvement of Marseille's 
image (La Provence, 16 June 2003). 
The journalist, Philipe Galini, clearly harboured some doubts about the 
behaviour of Marseille's inhabitants. He continued the article by inviting 
the municipality to be more strict and authoritarian. 
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By the beginning of July, the municipality had announced the establishing 
of commissions within a `bid committee', which had to improve the 
Marseille project by proposing innovative projects for the competition 
organisation (La Provence, 2 July 2003). Marseille decision-makers tried to 
ensure that nothing was forgotten in terms of communication or charm. 
6.1.3. The difficulties of the project. 
From the outset, one of the significant weak points of Marseille's 
candidature, which the newspapers highlighted, was Marseille's 
accommodation capacity (Le Monde, 3 March 2003; Liberation, 4 April 
2003; La Marsei//wise, 4 April 2003; Les Echos, 4 and 5 April 2003). The 
city had a quantitative as well as qualitative deficit. A further difficulty 
related to the negative image that the Swiss might have of Marseille as 'a 
dangerous city'. More implicit than explicit in the Swiss pronouncements, 
there is evidence of such concerns nevertheless. Explicit reference was 
made by Loic Peyron in Le Figaro Magazine on 8 March: 'I should clearly 
prefer Marseille, but it does not only have advantages, and it causes some 
apprehension for the Swiss who are not very used to things like moped 
robbery'. 
The regional press also reminded people that a French 'Deft - or 
America's Cup challenger - wished to use Marseille as a base (La 
Provence, 21 and 27 February, 2003; La Marsei//aise, 21 February 2003; 
Marseille Plus, 3 March 2003). La Provence viewed this as a positive point 
for the Marseille bid because this might attract other teams to Marseille 
and would show that the city was acknowledged as a centre for sailing 
and training. On the other hand, others argued that Marseille had 
compromised its chances with this announcement because the Swiss 
multi-millionaire champion would not choose a city that hosted one of his 
future opponents (Le Figaro, 2-3 March 2003). 
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The potential for social conflicts such as strikes, seen by foreigners as 
peculiar to the French context, was also often part of the debate. Could 
Marseille guarantee calm during the competition? If this question was 
posed by the Swiss, the trade unions themselves sought to provide an 
answer. In April, there was anxiety from the Port Authority CGT trade 
union, which regretted it had not been part of the discussion around the 
project, and which feared that the competition would be hosted to the 
detriment of industry (La Provence, 19 April 2003). On the other hand, to 
reassure the Swiss by the end of the process, some trade unions promised 
that there would be no strikes in 2007. Thus, Force Ouvriere (F. O. ) 
declared its support for Marseille's bid, and reminded people that it was 
the majority trade union for employees of the municipality and the 
Communaute Urbaine. The privileged dialogue that F. O. had with the 
municipality enabled its representative to announce: '... this mutual 
attitude enables us to affirm that today, it would be unthinkable that a 
conflict should disturb this prestigious event' (La Provence, 2 October 
2003). Four years before the competition, one might ask how significant 
this declaration was. Jean-Claude Gaudin made similar noises, suggesting 
that during an electoral year, there should be no social movements 
because 'trade unions should leave elected representatives to do their 
talking' (Le Monde, 3 October 2003). 
Exposing concern about the project, members of the opposition warned 
the municipality not to be tempted to hold Pharaonic' projects which 
would prejudice the city's future financial position (Marseille Autrement, 
April 2003, published by the socialist and allies group of the City of 
Marseille). In the same vein, the financial plan had already been discretely 
but surely criticized in a press article in La Marseillaise (2 March 2003). 
After the presentation of the bid, the institutions involved and the aspects, 
which needed to be reinforced, the journalist ended the article, 
commenting that "It remains to be seen how all of this will be financed'. 
The newspaper La Provence, though it was a strong supporter of the city, 
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finding no weak points in the project (5 March 2003), argued, 
nevertheless, - in the La Provence de /Economie supplement- that there 
was a lack of financial contribution and of a long term development plan 
from the public powers in the sailing area in Marseille. It was very evident 
that Marseille was one of the last cities to start lobbying, because it did 
not anticipate a Swiss victory. Nevertheless, criticism soon became muted, 
leaving a kind of tacit consensus. 
It was only in the last months of the decision-making process that 
conflicts and opposition became evident again. Hostilities were reopened 
by Jean-Claude Gaudin. Confronted by the Valencia bid in which the King 
of Spain was fully involved, the Mayor argued that he was disappointed by 
the lack of support from the higher levels of the French State (Le Nouvel 
Observateur, from 4 to 10 September 2003). According to Gaudin, the 
involvement of the President of the Republic and also the Prime Minister 
should have been much more significant and vigorous. A journalist from 
La Provence took up the same argument by comparing the Spanish and 
French bids. Valencia, thanks to the king and the mobilisation of the 
government, advanced through the process with significant political and 
financial backing. As reported in La Provence, Jean-Claude Gaudin is not 
wrong when he regrets the lack of mobilisation on the point of Jacques 
Chirac to secure Marseille's bid' (14 September 2003). 
Responsibility for the smooth running of the project was thus placed 
directly on the shoulders of the major State actor, and the President 
subsequently became more heavily involved. During a reception of French 
champions, he underlined his involvement in the Paris bid to host the 
Olympics Games 2012 and for Marseille's bid to host the America's Cup 
(AFP, 16 September 2003). Nevertheless, Marseille's project was a 
subsidiary concern, even though the final decision concerning the city was 
expected in November 2003, and the one for Paris in June 2004. 
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Michel Pezet (P. S. ) exposed the low level of financial commitment from 
the central government. The 40 million euros promised by the President 
were not sufficient with regard to the necessary investments required to 
host the competition. For him, this low level of support meant that: "... the 
present government condemns the city faced with the increasing demands 
of the organising company and with the savage competition between the 
four remaining candidates" (La Marseillaise, 10 September 2003). Michel 
Pezet also wrote about his anxiety concerning the risk of escalation in 
costs for Marseille inhabitants if the city were to win (La Marsei//aise, 10 
September 2003). In a small insert in La Provence of the 25 September 
2003, the words of the Communist local politician Jean Dufour were 
reported talking about the Cup budget: "120 million euros, it is equivalent 
to the budget for the building of... ten lycees ! ". At the same time, those 
responsible for the bid announced that projects would be implemented 
even if Marseille was not successful. "Marseille has already won", 
according to the Mayor (Metro Marseille, 8 September 2003; L Equipe, 12 
September 2003). The promoting group thus expected to take advantage 
of the impetus that this bid would give to boost the city. On 4 October, an 
AFP dispatch took stock on the Marseille Bid. There was a return to the 
problems and fears evident at the beginning of the project: "the 
candidature should be weakened by fears of social conflicts, as well as by 
a limited hotel and residential capacity" (AFP dispatch, 4 October 2003). 
Was the action taken in these domains insufficient? Such comments led 
people to think this might be the case. 
During the last month of the process, the final project preparations were 
put in place. The Prime Minister chose this period to allay criticism against 
his government in relation to the Marseille candidature, declaring that the 
State would increase its contribution if Marseille were to be successful (La 
Provence, 12 November 2003). He also announced that a Public Interest 
Group - Groupement d? nterets Publics (GIP)15- would 
be created to 
15 Legal structure to manage funds provided by public institutions in a project. 
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manage and organise financing from the public institutions, i. e. the central 
government, the Conseil Regional, the Conseil General, the Communaute 
Urbaine Marseille-Provence-Metropole and the City of Marseille. 
An extraordinary City Council meeting was convened to ratify the 
partnership contracts with the Swiss team. This step was important for the 
project because it was the city's indication of commitment to finalise. 
Though decisions and commitments were validated, each of the opposition 
groups made comments expressing disagreement. Les Verts (the ecologist 
group) and the Communist Party voted against the proposals, members of 
the Convention Citoyenne (a party from the left) abstained, whereas UMP, 
UDF (right wing parties), and MNR and PS (left wing parties) members 
voted for them. Nevertheless, the socialist group declared to the Mayor 
that they had voted in favour in order not to be blamed for project 
sabotage, and stated that the set contracts would leave the Swiss free to 
do virtually as they pleased (La Provence, 15 November 2003). 
La Provence regularly reminded its readers of the consequences, which 
the America's Cup would have for the city, while rumours about the duel 
between Marseille and Valencia were growing. The other finalists no 
longer appeared to exist so far as journalists were concerned. In addition, 
a Swiss daily newspaper (according to La Provence, 21 November 2003) 
announced that victory had already gone to Valencia. Faced with this 
news, France Gamerre called a press conference to remind 
correspondents of all the rumours, which had bedevilled the city's 
candidature, and took advantage of this occasion to announce the 
participation of French firms in the project providing finance amounting to 
30 million euros (La Provence, 21 November 2003), though details were 
not given. 
The Swiss victory in the America's Cup had led to a host city designation 
for the first time in the competition's history. The schedule for the process 
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was very tight for the cities involved. During a period of less then a year, 
each had to draw up an extremely specialised document. There was a 
necessity to set up construction projects, to guarantee financing, to 
demonstrate enthusiasm for the event, and to continue trying to charm 
the Swiss. Competing cities had thus to show adaptability and particularly 
a strong and efficient mobilization of the groups involved in developing the 
project. 
Marseille showed that it was able to rise to the challenge, demonstrating 
that its image as an ossified city was disappearing or at least that there 
was a determination to change it. The city momentum, however, was 
halted at the final moment when the Swiss had to make their final choice. 
So, the experience of the project was positive to a certain point. 
6.2. Analysis of the decision-making process. 
The aim of this section is to explore what emerges from press articles, the 
candidature document and interviews for each of the operational 
indicators described in Chapter 2: objectives, means, kinds of actor, 
motivations, resources and kinds of relationships. The indicator "stability" 
is not appropriate because the study is limited to one year, which does not 
allow due consideration of the duration or durability of the group in 
power. Stability is thus considered in relation to the continuities between 
the Football World Cup 1998 and America's Cup. 
6.2.1. Objectives. 
This is the clearest indicator to emerge from the data. From the 
announcement of Marseille's bid, newspapers promoted the event, and the 
large scale development that it would engender. The same phrase is used 
several times, by journalists as well as politicians: the America's Cup 
would give the city a ten years boost (Marsei le L Hebdo, 26 March 2003; 
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Les Echos, 4 and 5 April 2003; Le Figaro Magazine, 20 September 2003). 
Olivier Latil D'Albertas emphasises similar sentiments: 
... We had a city that was already on the first step of take off, 
of its image evolution, of maturity in its projects of development, and at this time, a big event is a tremendous 
boost. (... ) It was one of our challenge, there was not only 
the water sport aspect, there was the boost for the 
metropolitan projects which was very important. This means 
that, when you have an event like that, with a quite strong 
visibility really, in the medium term, since it was a visibility to 
2007, this type of time-scale would enable the city to 
accelerate investment (Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 
27 June 2005). 
In the candidature document, the same idea emerges. The term 
"acceleration" is used in this context talking about for example "the 
acceleration of infrastructure" in respect of: 
Servicing of road works, work on an underground network 
extension, the creation of a tramway network, development 
for sailing, the development of reception capacity at train 
stations and airports in Marseille and its wider region... (Bid 
File, sheet 47). 
It was not the intention to create new projects but largely to improve 
what already existed, actions necessary both to host the event but also to 
develop the city. In the same page of the Bid File, economic objectives in 
relation to the America's Cup were clearly presented and related to the 
general policy direction taken by the metropolis. Thus, following objectives 
relating to development of infrastructure, six other objectives were 
specified by Marseille decision-makers: 
- the strengthening of development strategies in priority areas, 
- strengthening of the city reputation as a port destination and 
of its logistic functions, 
- strengthening of the development programme for nautical 
industries, 
- acceleration of the establishing of high tech' industries, 
- reinforcement of the city's sailing culture, 
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- enhancing of the total amount of tourist accommodation (Bid 
File, sheet 47). 
These relate to the broad lines of the city's expectations in the hosting of 
major events (cf. Chapter 1). The aim is to establish and / or promote 
anything that can enhance the city based on already existing resources 
and infrastructures. We should note in particular that the port 
development represents part of these objectives. 
The intention was to give a new boost to the city, through an event which 
required projects in several domains: port, accommodation, transport. 
Several projects that had been on hold were thus brought forward or 
relaunched, under the Euromediterranee banner (Le Figaro Magazine, 20 
September 2003). According to Jean-Claude Gaudin, this was an 
"extraordinary opportunity in terms of economic development and 
European and international influence" (Les Echos de /a Ville, 4 April 2003). 
The benefits were clear: the America's Cup and its 1.3 to 1.5 multi-million 
euros spin-off, the thousand of jobs created, its investors and its media 
coverage effects16 were, it was claimed, going to enable the acceleration 
of Marseille's development. 
6.2.2. Means. 
To convince the Swiss to choose Marseille, the city established several 
projects. First of all, the reception of 17 teams - the number desired by 
Bertarelli - would require the clearing of several hectares of space. A site 
was quickly found, with AC Management agreement, the J4 mole on Port 
Authority land. As the project progressed and Marseille went through the 
different "qualifying rounds", a partial redevelopment of the entry to the 
Vieux Port began to take shape. An esplanade for the competition was 
proposed, and in addition an increase of the ports' reception capacities. It 
was thus the Port Authority, through Christophe Piloix and his engineers, 
which took charge of the setting up of the project. Christophe Piloix chose 
16 The America's Cup is the 3rd event in terms of media coverage in the world. 
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an architect to devise the reception space for the boats (Interview with 
Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2003). Local politicians declared that the Vieux 
Port project would still be implemented in slightly modified form even if 
Marseille was not chosen, and the increase of places for boats would be 
effected, whatever the result. On the other hand, this site development 
delayed the construction of the Musee des Civi/isations, which had been 
planned in the same area (Marseille L Hebdo, 15 October 2003; and 
interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005). Priority was thus clearly being 
given to the America's Cup. 
Marseille also began to grapple with a limitation raised by the press: its 
stock of hotel accommodation. To resolve this problem, several hotels 
would be built, notably luxury hotels, by 2005 (La Provence, 2 March 
2003). It was even planned to use cruise boats as hotels on the water 
during the competition (Les Echos, 4 and 5 April 2003; Bid File, sheet 77). 
In relation to this topic, the candidature document announced the building 
of 7 hotels by 2007,4 in the town centre and 3 in the Euromediterranee 
area. The total accommodation available in neighbouring cities was also 
presented, as well as their development projects in this domain. Moreover, 
the creation of a 'brand' label 'Accuei/America Cud was proposed, with an 
inventory of furnished accommodation and bed and breakfast, to facilitate 
reception in Marseille (Bid File, sheet 77). Marseille had also to make 
efforts to find luxury housing. In effect, the America's Cup competitors are 
people with large incomes whose accommodation requirements might not 
be available Marseille. Through the development of these different 
projects, Marseille was able to maintain its bid to organize the America's 
Cup until the very end of the designation process. 
6.2.3. Kind of actors. 
Officially, project actors were spread across several committees: 
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- the steering committee: 'The City of Marseille, the Communaute Urbaine 
Marsei//e-Provence-Metropole, the Port Authority of Marseille and on the 
other hand central government' (Bid File, sheet 58), 17 
- the promoting committee: brought together leading figures who 
supported the candidature, 
- the bid committee: was constituted by 110 members divided into 4 
specialized commissions (Bid File, sheet 52). 
If the Bid File appeared to describe definitively the roles of each entity, 
these roles evolved as the candidature developed and often deviated 
significantly from the 'official' position. In the growth coalition and policy 
networks literature, authors distinguish two levels of actors, primary and 
secondary. '8 In the present case study, three not two levels can be 
distinguished: 
- primary actors, 
- secondary actors, 
- those providing additional symbolic and active support. 
The third level corresponds to people who were not directly involved as 
decision-makers, but who assisted primary and secondary actors in a 
number of ways. 
a). Primary actors: the Steering Committee, from the largest to the 
narrowest. 
The Bid File presents these members as the main actors without referring 
to a "Steering Committee". It was in the regional press that this term first 
appeared (La Provence, 2 June 2003). Gathering public institutions, the 
project is the result of the classical scheme for the organisation of a major 
event held in France. This Committee was led by the City of Marseille, 
represented by Jean-Claude Gondard, General Secretary of the City 
Council, the politician France Gamerre, Deputy Mayor in charge of nautical 
17 It is important to note that the State is differentiated from other institutions by the 
expression "on the other hand". Its implication is thus different from the other three. 
18 In the urban regime literature, both levels are not distinguished, since actors have a 
balance position within the group. 
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and maritime business. The Communaute Urbaine was represented by the 
Director of Economic Development, Olivier Latil D'Albertas, and the Port 
Authority of Marseille by Christophe Piloix, Director of the East Docks. 
Central government was also named, but no specific representative was 
cited. Central government was the least active member among the main 
actors. On the Swiss side, the America's Cup Management was the 
decision-maker. Delegations from each city were in negotiation with this 
group which formalised the competition's terms of reference into 
questions and eliminated cities as the process went on. Even if Ernesto 
Bertarelli was not formally part of this organisation, he had a colleague at 
its Head, and he was to take part in the small committee, which would 
finally select the host city. 
But for the project actors, this Committee was a group of variable- 
geometry composition. Olivier Latil D'Albertas cites Euromediterranee, the 
yachting club and the Office de la Mer (Interview with Olivier Latil 
D'Albertas, 27 June 2005), France Gamerre also cites the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005), 
as groups called on at specific times. Members of the Steering Committee 
could not be clearly recalled by interviewees. The explanation for this is 
perhaps that the Steering Committee was not an official name, and also is 
a reflection of the process itself. In effect, at the beginning of the project, 
the General Secretary had organised a round table with different 
participants (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005). During 
meetings, not all were present, and they were contacted when their 
contribution was needed. Thus it was in an informal way that they were 
called to participate for specific topics for which they had expertise. Olivier 
Latil D'Albertas states that: 
That was my approach. I used it a lot to accelerate things 
when they were going too slow, to ask for additional 
information, to mobilize, to make up the supply... to arbitrate, 
to break deadlocks that were not settled, to define 
approaches or strategies for one thing or another. It was a 
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permanent iterative system (Interview with Olivier Latil 
D'Albertas, 27 June 2005). 
The real Steering Committee was actually made up of four people: Jean- 
Claude Gondard, France Gamerre, Olivier Latil D'Albertas and Christophe 
Piloix. They themselves describe this group as the core team (/'equipe 
restreinte). In addition, this was the terminology used when we ask 
interviewees who were the main actors in the project, or when indicating 
the people to meet'9 who were central to the project. Each of them had 
responsibility for a specific aspect of the project. Jean-Claude Gondard 
dealt with partners, France Gamerre represented the political sector, 
Olivier Latil D'Albertas was in charge of administrative and legal aspects, 
and Christophe Piloix was responsible for technical and logistical parts of 
the project. It was, however, Olivier Latil D'Albertas who appears to have 
been the real project mainspring. This appears to be the case when we 
look at the Communaute Urbainers place in the process: the Communaute 
Urbaine was the project manager whereas the City Council was the 
contracting authority. Even among these four actors, some were in limited 
contact with the others. Thus Christophe Piloix talking about France 
Gamerre: 
And even with her [France Gamerre], we discussed very little. 
Us, we discussed with technicians... With professionals, not 
politicians. What is very important is not to mix roles. We 
were not technical-political, we were technical (Interview with 
Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). 
There was little time wasted in discussion with other people. The time 
pressure did not allow for an increase either in the number of interlocutors 
or of generation of wider ideas. As Christophe Piloix observed: 
It was the strength of Marseille's candidature:... to have two 
interlocutors very clearly organised behind Olivier Latil 
D'Albertas who was doing the whole thing, a legal- 
19 Olivier Latil D'Albertas, Christophe Piloix and France Gamerre cited the name of the 
other three, and also Jean-Claude Gondard, who I was not able to meet. Marc Vincent, 
technical councillor of the general secretariat, who was involved in the project until 
June 
2003, also gave those names. Even though he did not name Christophe Piloix, 
he advised 
me to meet a representative of the Port Authority. 
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administrative interlocutor with the city's lawyers and the 
whole city system; and a technical interlocutor. And so, the 
candidature team, it was a formidably efficient organisation, 
beyond all our hopes. ... It was a team very very narrowly focused... This was the key to success. If we had begun to 
discuss with everybody in Marseille, the project was dead 
(Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). 
Moreover, the interest of the Steering Committee lay in the administrative 
function of actors. Christophe Piloix, Jean-Claude Gondard and Olivier Latil 
D'Albertas had jobs with high levels of responsibility in their institutions. 
'De facto', when these institutions have common projects, these are the 
people who most often represent them. The three of them were used to 
working together. In the press, the spotlight was primarly on France 
Gamerre and Jean-Claude Gondard, the individuals who had overall 
responsibility for the project, issuing media statements and having 
responsibility for lobbying. Olivier Latil D'Albertas and Christophe Piloix 
worked in the background, and were the individuals who really got things 
done on the project, supported by their own teams. 
Among these four major actors, it is important to note that three are civil 
servants and one is an elected politician. Civil servants thus largely 
controlled the project, and had the greatest influence it, particularly on 
other partners, because of their expertise. The Committee exerted strong 
control over the project, and decided who they needed to talk to and 
when to call on them. 
b). Secondary actors. 
Beyond the project set up, partners' involvement in the project takes on 
forms other than direct decision-making. At a financial level, other public 
bodies became participants. Central government declared that it would be 
financially involved, providing 40 million euros at the first stage. 
Subsequently, it agreed to invest more if Marseille were to be selected, 
without indicating the size of the additional contribution. Virtually all 
relevant of ministries were involved in the project providing assurance that 
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the Swiss demands would be met. 20 Central government was thus a major 
decision-maker in respect of the project in terms of its role as a regulator. 
In addition to central government, the usual spectrum of sub-national 
public institutions was involved. In France, decentralized power means 
that the following bodies are relevant: Conseil Regional, Conseil General, 
the City, and in recent years, the wider metropolitan community 
(Communaute Urbaine or Communaute de Communes). For Ma rse ill e's 
candidature, the Conseil Regional PACA and the Conseil General des 
Bauches-du-Rhone joined as financial partners underwriting the project. In 
essence, this was their only role since they had no operational 
competence in relation to the project. 
In terms of the logistical plan, numerous partners were cited in the 
candidature document. These were the bodies whose support is necessary 
for any such event, and include: the Autorite de Regulation des Te%oms, 
the Conseil Superieur de /Audiovisuell the Agence Nationale des 
Frequences Radio, the universities, the SNCF, METEO France, and the 
Tourist Office (Bid File, sheet 58). Notably in terms of logistical support, 
no private companies were cited. 
c). The symbolic support: 
i) The Promoting Committee: Marseille's showcase. 
From April 2003, Jean-Claude Gaudin personally began to lead this 
Committee (La Marsei//aise, 28 April 2003). It incorporated personalities 
from the media, the sport domain, the economic world2' and the arts. The 
role of this Committee, as evident by its name, was to promote the 
project. For professional events, in support of operations, it was 
represented by well known personalities. Included among the 183 public 
20 'Central government (... ) competent in the frame of this project, for all matters in 
relation to: fiscal regulation of companies and private individuals, social regulation, 
customs regulation, immigration conditions, organisation of school and university 
education, national police force, assistance and aid plans, fight against pollution and 
natural disaster, aeronautical regulation, maritime regulation' (Bid File, sheet 58). 
21 Among the 158 personalities, 83 came from national and local economic sectors. 
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figures were: Charles Aznavour, Johnny Halliday, Edmonde Charles Roux, 
and Florence Artaud, individuals who were known both nationally and 
internationally. The representative of the Committee who was mentioned 
most in press articles and interviews was Zinedine Zidane, the 'best 
football player in the world', who is from Marseille, and who was always 
present when the Promoting Committee had to be represented. 
Through this Committee, project holders aimed to show how much these 
public figures were behind Marseille. The message to the Swiss was that 
Marseille's bid was supported well beyond the Mediterranean City's 
boundaries. Some of the most well known people in France believed in 
Marseille's capacity to host the America's Cup and they promoted the 
candidature in France. The most fleeting appearances of Zidane were 
invariably reported in the newspapers, and his presence ensured major 
media coverage. If Bertarelli wanted the America's Cup to become a 
popular event then Marseille's decision-makers were ready to provide the 
media stimulus to make this happen. The Promotion Committee was a tool 
for the communication campaign, targeting the Swiss as well as the 
French public. 
ii). The other forms of symbolic support. 
On the periphery of this first group, were the trade unions. As noted 
earlier in this chapter, Force Ouvriere and CGT were the principal trade 
union voices to make themselves heard. Initially, they intervened in the 
project itself, by warning that the America's Cup could interfere with the 
port activity. Subsequently, after the refuse workers' strike, their 
involvement took another turn. This trade union conflict demonstrated 
how Marseille's image, which was essential to the success of this project, 
could become very negative. This situation was taken up by several 
newspapers and politicians who sought to make trade unions aware of 
their responsibilities in relation to the project as a whole. Furthermore, the 
Swiss highlighted this point, during the major meeting with the city in 
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August 2003. One can conclude that the trade unions had the situation in 
hand from this time. Their support was important to the project holders, 
particularly when FO declared that there would not be social conflicts in 
2007. It seems clear that their rallying to the cause gave them a higher 
standing with the politicians, even though the main actors interviewed, 
and the Bid File entry(sheet 57), tended to minimize their significance 
during the process (Interviews with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005; and 
Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 27 June 2005). Trade unions have a long history in 
their relationship with the City Council. Even though different mayors had 
tried to reduce it, their significance among civil servants employed in 
Marseille has always obliged mayors to deal with them. As a result, town 
hall trade unions had regularly used their support for mayors as a 
bargaining tool. Their commitment is not party political and they have 
often acted counter to the position of their unions nationally. The major 
objective was to get what they wanted. When that was secured, 22 their 
support was absolute, and this is what happened here. In the same vein, 
deputies from the Assemb/ee Nation/e, under the leadership of Guy 
Tessier, signed a motion of support. 
At the highest level of the State, further forms of symbolic support also 
existed, in the form of the President of the Republic, of the Sports 
Minister, and of the Prime Minister (the last being significant for the 
financial support he was able to promise). In the sailing domain, support 
also began to grow, notably from: the Federation Fransaise des Ports de 
Plaisance, director of the Tour de France ä la voile, the twinning 
association of Marseille Sailing Society, with the Yacht Club de France and 
the Yacht Club de Monaco (La Provence, 4 April 2003). 
The City thus had no lack of support. The number and diversity of people 
and institutions, which actively supported the city showed that this aspect 
22 Peraldi, M. and Samson, M. (2005) wrote a chapter about these relationships 
in their 
book ""Gouverner Marseille". 
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of the project was successful. Nevertheless, the intensity of that support 
was not always as expected by the project team. Jean-Claude Gaudin 
admitted to being disappointed by the lack of public involvement of 
Jacques Chirac whose efforts were overshadowed by those of the King of 
Spain. 
But the most significant mobilisation of support came from the Ical 
population. The City established a large scale communication campaign. 
Two poster campaigns were launched, one after the other. The first, 
entitled 'Je soutiens a candidature de Marseille, was located throughout 
the whole city. Subsequently, the "Marseille aime es grands dfs' 
campaign was run, with posters widely displayed in Marseille but also in 
other French cities. Beyond this, support cards to send back to the City 
were available in Marseille shops and other locations such as the Saint 
Charles railway station, the international airport and also the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. People were also able to declare their support on 
the city website or by phone at the call centre "Allo Mairie". Thus, 
Marseille was able to boast of the reception of 121,000 post cards, 200 
internet messages and 'hundreds of e-mails', together with 1,000 
telephone calls on average per day (Bid File, sheet 52). 
Few in Marseille could be unaware that the city was bidding to host the 
America's Cup. The advertising campaign was huge, concentrating minds 
on this and nothing else. Edel Melin explained the aim of this campaign: 
That was a bit underhand. It was, at the same time, to make 
Marseille inhabitants accept that there would be public works 
and there might be a financial cost... It was a means to make 
people accept a lot of things... That is communication, people 
had to be prepared long in advance, people had to be 
motivated, we had to show them that their city was fighting 
with other major cities... It was almost brainwashing. Thus it 
is true that we saw posters everywhere... It is true that we 
tried to get the whole city behind us. The 800,000 Marseille 
inhabitants had to be behind Marseille and it is true that we 
had to show them, we had to tell them, to explain to them... 
So they would see a poster once, they would not see it, and 
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they would see it again. Well... There was an intellectual 
progression that pushed them to support the America's Cup. 
And it is true that the whole of Marseille was disappointed 
when we did not gain the America's Cup. It was a 
communication job, which was done for the America's Cup 
using a communication company (Interview with Edel Melin, 
17 January 2005). 
This demonstrates clearly the approach of the City: Marseille inhabitants 
had to accept the candidature as a first step, and then had to support it 
strongly afterwards. 
Between the promoting committee and the mobilization of the population, 
the City of Marseille responded to the Swiss team's wish to make the 
America's Cup into a popular event. All partners and sectors showed their 
support, demonstrating to the Swiss that if they chose Marseille, they 
would be well received and the event would stimulate popular enthusiasm. 
Very few private sector actors appeared significant at this symbolic level, 
but were rather more evident in forms of active support. 
d). Active support. 
Active support' is the term used to differentiate material action to 
progress the project, from symbolic expressions in favour of the City's bid. 
Active support was largely undertaken within the 'Bid Committee'. This 
was introduced quite late in the process. In effect, the official presentation 
was made on the 1 July, notably by France Gamerre (La Provence, 2 July 
2003). Four specialized commissions were set up by the Town Hall, in 
order to enhance the Marseille project with propositions for innovative 
projects (La Provence, 2 July 2003), and to intensify the mobilisation of 
action around the project (La Provence, 3 July 2003). Their mission was 
officially presented to the Swiss in the following terms: 'Beyond the 
technical work, the aim is to create a consensus by mobilising the whole 
of Marseille around the America's Cup' (Bid File, sheet 55). On the 3 July, 
an article in La Provence revealed the names of the different co-presidents 
of commissions: 
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" Economy : Francis Lemor, PDG de STE-TFE, et Claude Cardella, 
president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Marseille 
Provence and of the Port Authority, 
" Water sport: Jean-Pierre Champion, president of the French Sealing 
Federation and Paul D'Ortoli, president of /'Office de /a Mer. 
" Tourism-communication : Thierry Baudie, director of la Masson de la 
France, and Dominique Vlasto, Deputy Mayor of Marseille, 
responsible for Tourism and Congresses, 
" Reception-Logistics-Infrastructure-Security: Jacques Traurial, 
president of the French Ports Association, and Jean-Louis Genovesi, 
co-organizer of the World Football Cup 1998 (La Provence, 3 July 
2003). 
The choice of Co-presidents seemed to reflect a wish to call on experts. In 
addition, the presence of Jean-Louis Genovesi, a co-organizer of the World 
Football Cup 1998, provided a strong message both for Marseille 
inhabitants and for the Swiss: that one of the organisers of the largest and 
most successful events ever organised in Marseille, would be part of the 
America's Cup organisation. The representativeness of the Co-presidents 
also performed another function: to try to communicate with most 
sections of the population of Marseille inhabitants through the people 
chosen. What was expected from these Commissions also appeared to 
show that they would have a decisive role by giving another dimension to 
the project. However, as soon as the main actors talked in detail about the 
Committee, a different picture of its activities is evident. The implication of 
the Committee was much more a supportive vehicle than one which 
provided practical solutions. 
... it is very 
important to mobilize economic, associations, 
sports, cultural, university, and scientific local interests. It was 
not a production system of practical proposals or answers 
(Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 27 June 2005). 
Members were chosen in regards to their expertise [and], in 
relation to their representativeness... But members were 
essentially representative of groups, let's say of networks 
(Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005). 
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In addition, this Committee is described in the Bid File (sheet 52), sheet 
entitled 'Population support', which also lists the Promoting Committee. It 
is likely that the Committee had two functions, of which only one was 
officially acknowledged. It first demonstrated to the Swiss organizers that 
the local interest groups or infrastructure had been mobilized and was 
ready to welcome them; and secondly, these interest groups were 
involved in the setting up of the project. However, its role in the project 
and in production of ideas, as officially presented, never fully materialised. 
The Steering Commit tee was thus enabled to mobilize a wide ranging 
grouping of the population through the commissions' co-presidents and 
members. However, it transpired that the Bid Committee was much more 
a symbolic support than an active one. 
The active support was really led by several groups within Marseille 
society, which were described in the press and in the Bid File. Four 
categories were specifically introduced in the File: economic actors, 
universities, local sport clubs and associations (Bid File, sheet 19). 
Although the first of these (local business) raised more in terms of 
declarations of intent rather than real active support, universities by 
contrast proposed to put their facilities, laboratories and competences at 
the service of the Swiss (La Provence, 18 March; 25 June 2003). Local 
sport clubs were introduced as facilitators for mobilising the population, 
and yachting clubs were put at the disposal of the Swiss: materials, 
volunteers and professional employees and a place to work would be 
provided. The Associations were to be mobilised 'to receive and facilitate 
the daily life of the Defi teams' (Bid File, sheet 19). The directors of firms 
did create an Association 'Entreprises Marseille America, by the end of the 
process (La Provence, 5 November 2003). In addition to promotional 
support throughout Europe, this Association declared that executives 
would be delegated to help the Swiss in their daily activities, if Marseille 
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were to win. Twenty two firms took part in the association. The table 
below presents their characteristics with regard to the project. 
Table 6.1.: The firms of "Enterprises Marseille America "and 
their main features. 
Number 
Link with Marseille Created in 15 
Created in the 
metropolitan area 
3 
Head office in 2 
Settled in 1 
Settled in the 
metropolitan area 
1 
Sector of activity Services (excluded 
maritime services) 
9 
Banks 3 
Maritime products 
and services 
5 
Other products 4 
Other 1 
Level of activity International 13 
European 1 
National 6 
Regional 2 
We can see that the most important relation to the project is the link the 
firms have with Marseille: 15 of the firms involved were created in the 
City. With regard to their activity domain, most of them appear to have a 
material interest in the project if Marseille was chosen. Services firms were 
likely to benefit from both Swiss competitor and spectators requests, as 
were the maritime firms. The banks were also more concerned with Swiss 
and competitors' needs. Among the firms, which produced goods, 
interests were sometimes less clear. There was a pharmaceutical 
company, for example, which could have some interest in relation to 
Bertarelli, who had become a multi-millionaire because of his involvement 
in the most important pharmaceutical firms in the world. One was 
Eurocopter, producer of helicopters that might interest competitors. The 
remaining two, Pebeo - colour production - and Ricard - alcohol producer - 
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were the hardest to understand in terms of their motivational 
commitment. The participation of Ricard can perhaps be understood as an 
important symbolic support because it was seen as the most important 
firm in Marseille in terms of local connections. It produces Pastis, 
internationally associated with Marseille and the Midi. For Pebeo, however, 
which is more oriented towards the art market, involvement is harder to 
explain. In terms of level of activity, there are dynamic firms, many of 
which are international, indicating to the Swiss, international support for 
the Marseille project. Such commercial involvement is significant in terms 
of the Marseille bid. Yet two questions arise from this reading: why do 
these entities get involved only during the last month of the process, and 
why do they not participate financially? 23 We can find an answer in the 
interviewees' discourses and their view of the private sector (c. f. section 
6.2.5. ). 
As already indicated, the press played an important role, and this is most 
notably the case for La Provence. In addition to its role as a conduit of 
news, this newspaper was a member of "Entreprises Marseille America" 
(La Provence, 5 November 2003). From the outset, it emphasised the 
positive features of the Marseille candidature. A regular column was 
dedicated to interviews with local people - both well known personalities 
and ordinary citizens - about this project. During the 9 months of the 
process, only one interviewee strongly opposed to the project (La 
Provence, 23 May 2003). Other than this, support for the project is 
invariably what emerges from those columns. The newspaper appeared to 
be virtually a communication tool to persuade Marseille and its region that 
the project was well-founded. For the project's principal actors, this was a 
very valuable resource. 
23 According to their press book, their capital range from 16,5 millions euros to 11,7 
multimillion euros, capital which would have enable financial involvement. 
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Although the project appeared to involve people from a wide cross-section 
of Marseille, decision-making and influence appeared to be in the hands of 
just four people, and these are all from the public sector. Although the 
private sector was evident at different stages of the project, it was never 
evident in the role of decision-maker. This project was led and controlled 
solely by public sector figures and bodies, and places left to other partners 
were much less influential. 
6.2.4. Motivations. 
Even if the local elections are not a topic that often appears in the press 
or the commentaries of interviewees, there is some hint of their 
significance. In effect, 2007, the year chosen by Bertarelli, will see the 
staging of municipal elections. This first hint came from the municipal 
opposition in the magazine Marseille Autrement of April 2003, in an article 
dealing with the America's Cup and particularly about the danger for the 
municipal team of things growing too big. The article hints that the 
municipal team may have political motives, seeing it as: "... probably 
blinded by the opportunity to host such an event during the year of... the 
municipal elections. " 
Rene Olmeta engaged in a discourse of this type. He evaluated the city's 
candidature as he did the rest of Jean-Claude Gaudin's policy as being 
more show' than substance. According to Olmeta, from the start of the 
candidature, the question of financing was evident. The municipality, 
however, did not want to answer the question, leaving people with their 
dreams and in effect providing a good advertising campaign. Although 
Olmeta does not refer to the America's Cup bid as an electoral tool, he 
considered the arrival of The Race 2001 in the Vieux Port, a short time 
before the municipal elections, to be part of the electoral campaign 
(Interview with Rene Olmeta, 3 November 2004). 
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In October, Jean-Marie Le Pen, in his favourite role of agitator, argued 
that Marseille would not win because: 
Marseille has just always been a port, lets say of 'internal 
navigation' for the Mediterranean Sea, but has never been a 
port opening up to the world... [and] for those who wish to 
use it as an electoral springboard, their tactic will not work 
(AFP dispatch, 14 October 2003). 
Coming from a politician who is seeking a term of office at regional level, 
this declaration before the end of the process is thought provoking. Le 
Figaro Magazine, on 20 September, had its front page dedicated to 
Marseille's bid for The America's Cup and devoted the entire issue to a 
discussion about related concerns, and it also raised the topic of electoral 
ambitions by asking Jean-Claude Gaudin `What do you answer to those 
that suspect a political manoeuvre [OPA] from your part? ' Even though the 
answer of the mayor denies any political motivation, it demonstrates that 
the political issue is a matter of debate. Effectively, simply organising an 
event like the America's Cup during an electoral year might lead one to 
assume that the Gaudin team may be acting on political motivation. 
Indeed, the way that the project was presented to citizens and to France 
makes it appear like part of a political campaign (Peraldi and Samson 
2005). But this argument might be made for every city, which seeks to 
attract major events. The success of any such campaign could be seen as 
a vehicle for the re-election of the local mayor. Moreover, the year of the 
competition, 2007, was not decided at the beginning of the process. 
Bertarelli hesitated between 2006,2007 and 2008. Thus Gaudin's team 
could not have been motivated by the year of the competition at the 
beginning. It may simply have been that the project generally was viewed 
as likely to have a positive political impact for them regardless of its 
timing. It is more in these terms that the political ambitions of Gaudin's 
team can be seen. But again, they are hardly measurable here. There 
is 
no real evidence of it in the analysis of interviews and media data. 
Civil 
servants might have been motivated by the importance and significance of 
the project. They may have harboured professional, rather than political 
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ambitions. Here again there is little evidence to support this explanation of 
professional motivations. 
It seems clear, however, that one of main motivation of actors was the 
renown engendered by such an event. All the significant actors wanted 
Marseille to be known and acknowledged as an important metropolis, a 
city with the resources to organise major events, to conform to strict 
deadlines, to mobilise key partners and to receive thousands of visitors. 
This is a point of consensus across the data. The city needed to regain a 
dynamic image, as it moved towards economic recovery. Hosting the 
America's Cup would enable the city to engender the international 
dimension, which a metropolis of this size should have. For politicians, the 
key explicit motive finds its origin in this argument. France Gamerre thus 
insisted that city image, promoted through connections to the city and the 
event and its 'international influence', was the key goal. It was a 
continuous process of boosting the image of a Mediterranean city, which 
seemed to be bouncing back after the World Football Cup 1998. Thus 
Marseille should seek to attract investors, improving its tourist activity and 
the living conditions of its inhabitants. The issue of image is what most of 
the principal actors in the project saw as a priority rationale. The city's 
regeneration would be based on renewal in the cited domains (Le Figaro 
Magazine, September, 2003). As Olivier Latil D'Albertas claims, the 
America's Cup bid: 
.. coincided with a will 
from the Communaute Urbaine and 
the city to carry on positioning Marseille on the yachting 
sector. In the same time, it is a tremendous event in terms of 
image, economic impact, issues of every type (Interview with 
Olivier Latil D'albertas, 27th July, 2005). 
The image was also a major motivation for the Port Authority team. It 
sought the public image of a Port competently managed at the technical 
and logistical level which could be generated through the America's 
Cup. 
Such an event required significant resources and capacities to 
be 
demonstrated, which would be of interest to new clients. But this is not 
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the sole motivation of the Port Authority. From a political point of view, 
one motivation was to give concrete expression to the Port Authority's 
new relations with the city, in political as well as urban or sociological 
terms (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). The Port Authority 
wished to ensure that the port no longer 'turned its back' to the city. The 
America's Cup was a way to affirm this, notably by working on a common 
project of this importance with the city authorities. The Port Authority 
team was motivated to support the project because of the potential 
impact on the Port Authority's activity, and because the project fitted with 
the established policy of the institution. Moreover, the Port Authority 
would have the sale of the 34 space as a significant source of income. 
Economic motivations were thus important. We should remember that the 
Port Authority is managed as a private firm, with obligations in terms of 
managing asserts. It is a public establishment but is not a public service 
institution. 
In essence, the three local authorities, the City, the Communaute Urbaine 
and the Port Authority of Marseille shared an interest in terms of image 
issues because of the consequences that a good image would engender 
for the development for all three, even though they are concerned with 
different constituencies: the town for the City, Marseille metropolitan area 
for the Communaute Urbaine, and the port for the Port Authority. 
However, even if their spatial focus was different, there was a common 
concern with development of the city. 
6.2.5. Resources. 
Through the analysis, it is evident that different kinds of resources are 
required to develop the project. Each of these has a different place in the 
project. The first is that of the city's environmental resources. As the 
Mayor and the press regularly reiterated, the city has a natural stadium: 
the sea. Marseille harbour is often put forward as being among the most 
beautiful in the world, offering first class "'terraces" with the Corniche 
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Kennedy and the Digue du Large (Liberation, 4 April 2003). When 
journalists list the strengths and weaknesses of each candidature, these 
natural resources are always cited as one of Marseille's strengths. These 
elements might be influential in the Swiss decision because the event was 
a water sport competition, but they were marginal in terms of the 
resources that project holders could manipulate. 
Another resource used in the project is an intangible, what one might call 
"the History of Marseille". There is the history of the port, founded 2,600 
years ago by Greek sailors, and this is used as an argument to promote 
the maritime capacities of Marseille and its inhabitants in this domain. A 
2,600 years old city would provide a significant backdrop to the America's 
Cup. In relation to more recent history, the quality of organisation of sport 
events, and in particular of sailing events, were also used as arguments. 
In effect, Marseille had already been the location of international sailing 
events: for example, the port arrival of The Race 2001, organised by 
Bruno Peyron, one of the Marseille ambassadors for the America's Cup; 
organisation of the Jeux Mondiaux de la Voile 2002 by the Yachting Club 
Pointe Rouge (La Marsei//wise, 3 March 2003 and Bid File, sheet 36). Other 
lower level competitions were cited in the arguments. According to France 
Gamerre, the history of Marseille is an essential resource of the project: 
the city was the first to organise a regatta in its harbour in the 19th 
century; /'Union Nautique Marsei//aise (Marseille Yachting Union) has 
existed for more than a century; a sailor created the city; and numerous 
water based competitions have taken place in Marseille in recent years. As 
a result, the City was given access to high quality skills and know-how, 
which enabled it to mount a credible bid to host the most prestigious 
yachting competition in the world (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 
2005). 
The organisation of the Football World Cup 1998 is used as reference 
point for the city, as a successful event in terms of the friendly and 
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popular spirit engendered, and the press and the municipal authority 
regularly referred to this. In the document file, reference to the successful 
staging of the World Cup is made on several occasions: in relation to 
urban transport, security and events organisation (Bid File, sheets 36,37, 
74 and 78). The World Cup is thus a legitimator of claims, a trump card, 
which actors use as often as possible. They also point out that it is not 
simply ability to organise a competition which was demonstrated, but also 
the quality / efficiency of catering and tourism provision. With this 
argument, the Marseille bid promoters hoped to demonstrate to the Swiss 
that Marseille was able to meet the requirements of a major event (Bid 
File, sheet 32). The Tour De France, on 15 July 2003, was also used as an 
occasion to demonstrate the City's capabilities. 
This first level of resources serves mostly as background, highlighting the 
city and its competences. In relation to the theoretical framework, these 
are peripheral elements of the category, playing a role in the 
communication campaign. They do not represent resources brought by 
the different actors to fuel the project. They are integral aspects of the 
City and its history, but actors cannot use, exchange or manipulate them. 
They are significant but are not resources provided by the actors involved, 
and hence are not the primary focus. 
In this kind of project, invariably the main resource is financial. There was 
a necessity to establish a financial framework, which would allow 
development of the various requirements of the project. The financial 
commitment raised some questions, notably from the opposition in the 
City Council, but did not dominate debates. There were financial 
'warnings' at the beginning of the process, and these had transformed into 
objections by the end. For Marseille, the global budget was estimated at 
200 million euros, 120 million in capital, 80 million in terms of revenue. 
The State committed 40 million euros - and would provide more if 
Marseille were chosen - the Conseil General agreed to provide 
7.6 million 
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euros (La Provence, 21 June 2003), the Conseil Regional had yet to decide 
an amount. Marseille and the Communaute Urbaine were the largest 
financial investors. The candidature document also cites a capital budget 
of about 120 million euros (Bid File, sheet 58). Despite a lack of a clear 
break-down, central government was, nevertheless, officially to provide 
one third of the capital cost, leaving the remaining two thirds to the other 
local authorities and the Euromediterranee establishment. The distribution 
between local authorities was to be more or less as follows: 1/3 for the 
City, 1/3 for the Communaute Urbaine, 1/3 for the Conseil Regional (Bid 
File, sheet 58). The Conseil Genera/ is not mentioned in this division, 
although it is cited elsewhere as providing 7.6 million euros. 
The finance issue appeared to be a potential handicap, and so the 
government agreed to increase its commitment (La Provence, 12 
November 2003), Jean-Claude Gaudin promoted the idea of a potential 
defeat because of financing issues (La Provence, 22 August 2003), while 
France Gamerre announced the commitment of the national media (La 
Provence, 21 November 2003). Given this concern the absence of the 
private sector may be seen as something of a surprise. The project team 
thought the former would intervene in terms of sponsoring and providing 
technical competence in the second stage of the process, i. e. if Marseille 
had been chosen. According to Olivier Latil D'Albertas, this project could 
only be set up by public sector interests. The private sector did not have 
the capacity to do it. It could not allow itself to become involved in a 
project for which the benefits engendered were uncertain. In the short 
term process, private sector involvement was not even a question, but if 
the time-scale had been greater, private-public partnerships might have 
been conceivable (Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 22 June 
2005). 
The private sector was thus not involved in the decision-making process 
on either the financial or the logistical level. The major actors only saw 
it 
as a symbolic support or an active support. Indeed, the creation of a 
GIP 
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(Groupement d7nterets Publics) was proof of the willingness of the 
various elements to let the public sector take the lead. 
Another resource to emerge from the data is that of the capacity to 
influence. Newspapers and interviewees report the lobbying exercised by 
Marseille actors on Swiss decision-makers. For Marseille, it began in 
February 2003, with two trips to Auckland during the Louis Vuitton Trophy 
and the America's Cup. The aim was at that stage to make contact with 
the Alinghi team, in order to get themselves known and to show interest 
in the event. During this process, key actors from the City approached 
people who might be able to influence Ernesto Bertarelli. They sought to 
influence both the multi-millionaire and the AC Management network. The 
press reported a variety of meetings and visits by the Marseille delegation 
during this process. The comments of Jean-Claude Gaudin about the lack 
of involvement by Jacques Chirac seemed to stem from this period. The 
President of the Republic was accused of failing to use his various 
networks or to play the 'charm' game. The use of lobbying was not, of 
course, limited to Marseille. All the city delegations were playing this 
game. The development of influence as a resource, though important, was 
not going to be of major significance in winning the bid, but bidding cities 
had to seek to develop this since all the other parties were doing so. 
If these three kinds of resources are evident in the first reading of the 
data, the most important with regard to the theoretical framework are the 
least visible. The main resources used by decision-makers relate to Stone's 
(1989) notion of 'power to'. Each member of the Steering Committee 
brought her or his influence to the group to achieve an effective 
mobilisation of resources to mount the bid. The political elite of the City of 
Marseille had the power to initiate the Marseille bid, the Communaute 
Urbaine had the power to set up the project and the Port Authority had 
the power to shape technical and logistical aspects of the project. The 
renovation project of the 34 mole, on Port Authority land was essential to 
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the setting up of a credible facility for the boats. In addition, the Port 
Authority was in charge of technical and logistic aspects of the project. As 
a Port Authority with marine skills it was able to bring these essential 
resources to the other partners. Without the Port Authority, it would have 
been difficult to answer the AC Management demands with any technical 
credibility. It is thus the 'power to' [mobilise resources and actions or not], 
which was perhaps the most important feature of power in this project. All 
partners put together their capacities to enable the project to be 
established. Without any one of the members, it is doubtful that the 
project would ever have passed beyond the first stage. Each member of 
the steering committee was crucial because she or he had the power to 
provide a critical element. 
6.2.6. Kinds of relationship. 
With regard to relationships between actors, two types or levels of 
relationship can be identified, according to the actors' place in the 
decision-making process. The first type was the relationship between main 
and secondary actors according to the institution that they represented. 
Relations between the different local authorities were complicated by 
political conflicts. The Marseille municipality was essentially on the right in 
political terms, whereas Conseils Regional and Genera/ were on the left. 
Even though neither Region nor Departement were against the project, 
they did not officially declare their support for some time. 24 As noted, their 
participation was essentially only financial, involving a relatively modest 
amount for the Departement and a vague commitment for the Region. 
This situation was a direct consequence of the political environment. As 
soon as they were able, all three local authorities sought to take 
advantage of the project in order to demonstrate their political 
significance. The tensions between them were, therefore, taken into 
account by key actors. They are aware that projects controlled by 
24 In the press, there is no real sign of support, even when interviews about the project 
are reported. 
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Marseille City Council are rarely supported enthusiastically by other local 
authorities. Thus, even though both Regional and Departmental councils 
were asked to give support and an official financial request was made, the 
main actors of the Marseille bid did not want to waste time in political 
bargaining with the Region and the Departement. Nothing was expected 
from them (Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 22 June 2005). One 
might have assumed that the official contact had simply been a matter of 
going through the motions. 
With central government, the situation was very different. First of all the 
City and the government were of the same political colour. However, the 
lack of financial support and personal involvement of the President were 
heavily criticized. Though the conflict was little reported in the press 
(Jean-Claude Gaudin could not afford to be too critical of a President for 
whom he was a Minister), interviewees noted the strong level of private 
criticism. The project promoters had to press their case with the 
government to gain the effective participation of the State. The discussion 
below of reasons for the failure of the Marseille bid considers actors' 
observations about this aspect. 
Within the Municipal Council, the decision on 24 March 2003 to bid was 
unanimous. The validation vote for the contracts with AC Management on 
14 November 2003 was less consensual, with some parties voting against 
the acceptance of the contracts. This kind of situation is perhaps not 
unusual. A town councillor could not decently be seen to vote against a 
project, which would create jobs, boost urban development and improve 
city image. However, as the project formalised, gasps appeared. The 
Communist Party and les Vents were opposed to the project for the Vieux 
Port such as it was presented. The Socialists were in favour of the project, 
but only in the context of the America's Cup; they would not accept it if 
Marseille was not successful in its bid (La Provence, 15 November 2003). 
Three elements were thus under debate: municipal finances, central 
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government participation and the Vieux Port project. All parties agreed on 
the participation of Marseille in the America's Cup, but some groups 
contested the content of plans and the actions proposed. 
Agreements also occurred after the process. All agreed to the need to take 
advantage of the impetus provided by the project, but again, not about 
the way to do it. For example, the Communists wished to use financial 
resources dedicated to this project for other purposes, such as to restore 
primary schools and municipal cafeterias, whereas others talked about the 
need to invest to enhance Marseille's image (La Provence, 27 November 
2003). Nevertheless, despite all such political conflicts, there was never a 
risk that the project would be rejected. There was thus an overall 
consensus about the orientation - support for the candidature - but not 
on the actions and the project management associated with it. 
The second level of relationship concerns the main actors. Between the 
four project promoters there was a consensus on both orientation and 
action. They trusted each other in terms of capacities and competences, 
with each being the lead and the expert in the domain for which she / he 
is responsible, and none of them even considered alternative cases or 
actions other than that recommended by their partners (Interviews with 
Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 22 June 2005; and Christophe Piloix, 27 July 2005). 
The public servants in this group were also accustomed to working 
together, which facilitated the work. An internal hierarchy, therefore, 
existed, which was dominated by the City Council, but which intervened 
only in final decisions, and not during the process. The City had the 
last 
word because it was effectively a City project and it also had democratic 
accountability. Otherwise, this hierarchy was simply accepted and 
had no 
need to impose itself. Resources brought by each members of 
the 
Steering Committee lead to this consensus. None of them would have 
been able to dominate others. They had different tasks and 
different 
competences which, in essence, obliged them to work in a consensual 
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relationship. The view of these actors was that it worked very well and 
gave a specific dynamic to the group. 
6.2.7. The candidature consequences. 
a). Marseille reaches the final. 
Even though Marseille was not chosen as the site for the America's Cup, it 
had yet to reach the end of the process, as it went through the different 
qualification rounds. The City's ambition for renewal had been seen by the 
outside world. It had shown that it was able to mobilise its forces to 
develop a high quality project. It was able to draw on existing 
infrastructure, in particular for transport, which was essential to the 
hosting of this kind of event. With its port, its motorway network, the 
international airport at Marignane and, from 2001, the TGV, Marseille has 
excellent external communication links. Its internal transport network, 
however, is still limited, and the impetus provided by the America's Cup 
would have permitted the city to accelerate the building of an 
infrastructure project which would have greatly enhanced transport in the 
city. 
The America's Cup project also allowed the City to demonstrate its 
organisational and human capacities. The City managed to mount a strong 
project in a limited amount of time, showing that it was capable of 
creativity. The organisational approach adopted was demonstrably 
efficient, especially in relation to the work of the public services 
concerned. Although they did not announce this, France Gamerre and 
Christophe Piloix were surprised by the efficiency of the Marseille team. It 
seems that even these leading figures had had doubts about entering so 
late into the process (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005; and 
Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). 
The experience also provided a new dynamism between the teams from 
the different organisational elements. For these teams, it was an 
185 
Chapter 6: Marseilles bid to host the Americas Cup. 
opportunity to gain recognition for the work they carry out behind the 
scenes. And as some commentators pointed out, it permitted 'the City of 
Pastis and siesta' to show Paris just what it was capable of achieving. 
Marseille was able to demonstrate that it had unsuspected 
skills and finally had the last laugh on Paris, on France, on the 
government, on every one that had not believed that yes, 
effectively, and without a lot of central support, we were able 
to get through things and to be selected for the final 
(Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). 
The City was able to show its determination to go it alone if its partners 
let it down. The City Council, the Communaute Urbaine and the Port 
Authority wanted to demonstrate that they could represent strength of 
purpose and of action. The local authorities thus managed to achieve 
some success virtually on their own. 
b). Candidature issues. 
The first issue to be raised relates to the impact of Marseille's organisation 
of the first round of the Louis Vuitton Trophy in 2004, which had few 
economic and tourist effects (Interview with Marc Vincent, 28 June 
2005). 25 In relation to the bidding project itself, the first significant issue is 
that of media coverage. During the nine month bidding process, Marseille 
was the subject of numerous press articles and some TV reports. Its 
coastline, its image, as well as its meteorological and sailing conditions 
were under the spotlight. External economic operators still talk about the 
project when they meet their Marseille colleagues (Interview with 
Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005; and Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 27 June 2005). 
This candidature was a major asset for city leaders in Marseille in that the 
efficiency and professionalism of the city had now been demonstrated. As 
a result, links were created with partners that had begun to realise the 
city's potential, notably in the yachting domain. Thus, Marseille was 
approached by the Chinese to assist in the construction of yachting 
centres in China (Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005). 
25 He uses data from an internal document of the town hall, which he was not allowed to 
communicate. 
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For the Port Authority, even though there were no direct economic 
consequences, it achieved its goal in strengthening its relationship with 
the City Council (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). Working 
together on the project demonstrated to Marseille citizens that the City 
and the Port Authority could operate cohesively to achieve common aims. 
In effect, the City Council and the Port Authority had often been in direct 
conflict, unable to agree on a common political orientation. According to 
Christophe Piloix, following the arrival of Mr. Brassart at the head of the 
Port Authority in 1999, the Port Authority renewed its dialogue with the 
City authorities and a number of common projects began to emerge, 
which were not solely economic in nature. The America's Cup thus 
provided an excellent opportunity to officially celebrate this new 
relationship. 
According to the project's four main actors, these nine months of the 
bidding process also gave Marseille citizens a new found confidence in 
their own city. The candidature was in fact a major promotional campaign 
mobilising the population to create a dynamic behind the candidature, and 
most importantly, to send out the message that the City Council was 
active and dynamic. It also provided great advertising for the city, raising 
its profile all around the world. The positive image had then to be '... built 
up in the long term... [to attract] offices, executives to work in Marseille, 
more private investments and so on' (Interview with Christophe Piloix, 22 
July 2005). 
At the end of the process, Marseille had the opportunity to take advantage 
of the positive impetus generated by the America's Cup project. 
c). The reasons for failure. 
The common view among the inhabitants of Marseille was that Valencia 
won the right to host the America's Cup because the King of Spain had a 
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passion for sailing and because Spain was willing to sign the biggest 
cheque. The four principal proponents of the bid, though making 
reference to the first argument, used the second to explain why they lost. 
They claimed that they lost because the budget had been insufficient, and 
for this they blamed central government. For them, the lack of financial 
commitment from the State was the only reason for the failure. France 
Gamerre referred briefly to this, but Olivier Latil D'Albertas and Christophe 
Piloix were more forceful. They both highlighted the lack of support from 
the State as significant, but for different reasons. For the former, a lack of 
ambition and of global vision lay at the heart of central government's 
attitude: 
The most difficult point was the relationship with the State 
when we had to talk about the significant finance needed... 
There I think the State did not always live up to its 
responsibilities. They [the Spanish] really pulled out all the 
stops and did the things the Spanish really do well, that is 
with the region and a major event, they pulled out all the 
stops, they took advantage of it, they pushed the whole 
region to the top. There was a real vision in terms of 
development for the area, which our unapologetic 
'Colbertisme [protectionism] did not provide... Then if it was 
something to do with Paris, the Olympic Games for example, 
then yes... The State would have said -especially since it had 
already put money into Euromediterranee and so on - they 
would have said 'we are going to use this as a lever and we 
are going to pull out all the stops, we are going to change the 
nature of things in the PACA region, and in Marseille, in the 
Marseille urban area'. The Spanish did this for Valencia, 
though the French government did not manage to do it 
(Interview with Olivier Latil D'Albertas, 27 June 2005). 
However, Spain already had experience in these matters. The Universal 
Exposition in Seville and the Olympics Games in Barcelona had allowed 
Catalonia to reposition itself at the international level, to boost its 
economy and to reverse the process of regional decline. According to 
Christophe Piloix, the hosting of the America's Cup in Marseille was not 
given sufficient priority because other projects were judged more 
important by central government: 
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I am not really sure that the government of the time gave 
everything to support Marseille. And that ... It calculated that we should not have the America's Cup in Marseille if it 
handicapped the Olympic Games 2012 bid in Paris,... it was a 
calculation that was made somewhere by some Ministers and 
so on... I remember that during the inter-ministry meeting, it 
was the Ministry in charge of the port of Marseille that was 
the most motivated, the Ministry responsible for maritime 
facilities, more than the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and of 
course, than the Ministry of Finance... (Interview with 
Christophe Piloix, 22 July 2005). 
What emerges from the discourse of these major figures is the familiar 
feeling of competition with the Capital, the feeling of being sidelined for 
the sake of Paris. 
However, the City Council capitalised on the link with central government 
finance. Jean-Claude Gaudin was thus able to show to his citizens that 
despite his major ambitions for the city, he was concerned with the cost to 
the local population. The Mayor placed the question of finance in the 
hands of the State when he argued that the City could go no further 
because it did not have the financial means. Gaudin thus defended himself 
from criticism, in case of either victory or defeat. Subsequently, one reads, 
for example in La Provence, that if the Swiss thought that the financial 
commitment made by the City and its partners was not sufficient, then it 
was just too bad for them, the City of Marseille, according to the 
newspaper, had made a good choice (La Provence, 27 November 2003). 26 
Gaudin was thus seen as a reasonable' mayor. His political strategy had 
worked well. However, it was also evident that his political weight at the 
national level had declined. Even though he was effective in competing 
with other French candidates cities at the beginning of the process (La 
Provence de /'Economie, 4 March 2003), his personal networks were less 
effective than his political strategy. Furthermore, the declaration by France 
Gamerre concerning the lack of financial support from commercial 
26 Edel Melin, interviewed 15 January 2005 and France Gamerre, interviewed 31 May 
2005 also make reference to the intelligence of the Mayor in this project. 
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companies (La Provence, 21 November 2003) confirmed that the City had 
identified this issue as a handicap. 
Another argument suggested in local discussions to explain the failure of 
the bid was the refuse workers' strike in June, during a visit by the Swiss 
delegation to Marseille. Again, although the four major figures 
acknowledged that the situation was not improved by the strike, they 
minimized its consequences in the project documentation (Bid File, sheet 
57) because Marseille had reached the final selection after the strike had 
taken place. Furthermore, if Marseille was under the threat of strikes, 
Valencia was at risk from a more significant threat from terrorism by ETA. 
In terms of Marseille's candidature, the threat of strikes was largely 
nullified and although financing was in effect insufficient, it was, 
nevertheless, difficult to pinpoint the real reasons for the bid's failure. The 
effect of the lack of lobbying by the President for example is difficult to 
assess. The importance of lobbying is acknowledged in similar 
circumstances with the Paris bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games, 
newspapers, media, the general public and the leaders of the Paris bid all 
claimed that it was the lack of lobbying, which led Paris to defeat. For the 
Marseille project, and for the whole process, things are less clear, and 
such claims are much less strongly asserted. 
The technical aspects of the proposal are never cited as a reason for 
failure. On the contrary, the principal figures assert that the Marseille 
project was technically the best. Edel Melin was the sole interviewee to 
argue that the Valencia project was technically superior to that of 
Marseille, and that this was why Valencia was chosen. 
27 
The problem of identifying factors, which account for Marseille's failure to 
be selected is exacerbated by the fact that a group of three individuals 
27 Edel Melin had not taken part directly in the project. That might explain why she 
is the 
only person to 'objectively' argue that the reason for the failure was primarily 
technical. 
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made the final choice, and did so in secrecy. In such circumstances, even 
if a rigorous project had been submitted, the outcome was outside the 
realms of public debate. AC Management had simply asked questions of 
candidate cities throughout the nine months bidding process, and did not 
say what they expected, and criteria for success could only be guessed at. 
It was left to the cities to identify the factors they felt led to the best 
conditions to host the America's Cup. Of the four cities which were still 
competing in the last straight, the differences between them were few. AC 
Management had subjected each city to such costs in this process that it 
became difficult to eliminate those that appeared to be too weak. After 
the process, AC Management did not explain its choice nor did it explain 
the weaknesses in the bids of the cities, which were not selected. It is 
thus difficult to assert with any conviction what the real reasons for failure 
and / or success were. 
We can also conclude, following Olivier Latil D'Albertas, that: 
What is new is that this city should have been candidate in an 
international event of this calibre, in a competition between 
cities of this calibre, negotiating an international contract of this 
calibre and should make it to the final cut... It is a good image, 
a good symbol of the economic evolution and of the clarity of 
Marseille. The fact that we did not succeed is an indication of 
the ground we still have to cover (interview with Olivier Latil 
D'Albertas, 27 June 2005). 
6.3. Conclusion : results with regard to the concepts of 
growth coalition, policy network and urban regime. 
Clearly the nature of the America's Cup case differs along a range of 
dimensions from that of the Football World Cup. The process was city 
based and international rather than a competition between French cities, 
as was the case with the Football World Cup. The range of actors, sources 
of finance, and other competitive factors were also very different. 
The 
point to consider within the context of theoretical interests is whether 
these different configurations of actors, resources, and circumstances 
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mask any continuities between the two bids, and more specifically 
whether such continuities might constitute evidence of a policy network, 
growth coalition or urban regime. It is to these issues that we turn our 
attention in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7: Understanding Mega-sport Event 
Policy in Marseille 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the accounts of policy decision-making 
as seen through the documentary analysis, media accounts and interview 
transcripts relating to both cases discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In 
essence the decision-making process is 'modelled' (see figures 7.1 and 
7.2), key actors are identified and their principal objectives, resources, 
types of interaction and centrality to decision-making outlined (see Tables 
7.1 to 7.7), in order to go on to consider the extent to which the decision- 
making process thus outlined provides evidence of conforming to the 
three models identified in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 2, the concepts of policy network, growth coalition and urban 
regime were introduced, as reflecting the leading approaches to 
explanation of urban policy in the Anglo-Saxon literature. These 
approaches developed in the context of British and North American local 
governance systems, have, as noted earlier, begun to be applied to a 
range of new western (and indeed French) contexts (Levine 1994; Le 
Gales 1995; 2001; Henry and Nassis 1999; Paramio-Salcines 2000; John 
and Cole 1999,2000; Benz and Furst 2002; Di Gaetano and Strom 2003; 
Thomas 2003; Gissendanner 2004; Kulscar and Domokos 2005; Nicholls 
2005; Sellers 2005; Kantor 2006; Silva and Syrett 2006), as well as non- 
western and even developing economies (Low 1994; Henry and Uchiumi 
2001; Silk 2002; Swart and Bob 2004). This growing application of such 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks to novel contexts has, however, 
been subject to challenge, resulting in criticisms of 'concept stretching' 
and ethnocentrism (Sartori 1991). 
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On the basis of the schematised description produced of the decision- 
making process, we will go on to consider the extent to which the 
characterisations of urban policy evident in the three theoretical 
frameworks are evidenced in the policy process in the cases of the 
Football World Cup, and the America's Cup. The extension to new 
contexts of the characterisations of local urban governance, as described 
in the policy network, growth coalition, and urban regime literature, is 
clearly part of the movement to describe such developments as aspects of 
globalisation. However, the claims that globalisation implies growing 
homogeneity are increasingly dismissed as simplistic. In relation to 
sporting phenomena Maguire (1999) drawing on the work of Elias (1982) 
and extending the chronology of Robertson (1994), refers to the notion of 
increasing varieties and diminishing contrasts, while Robertson himself 
coined the term 'glocalisation'. Both authors in effect are referring to 
situations in which local actors, while subject to common non-local 
phenomena, both constraining and enabling, are located in different local 
structures, and have different access to resources by which to respond to 
non-local pressure / opportunities. 
One aspect of the local' which is absolutely patent in the French context, 
and which provides a less evident resource in the US (or even the UK 
context) is the role and power of the State. The form and nature of the 
State is a product of historical battles. In the French case we can look to 
particular points in history - in particular in the era of modernity the 
establishing of the Napoleonic code in the early 19th century, and in 'late' 
modernity the development of decentralisation legislation steared through, 
and associated with, the dominant figure of post-war Marseille politics, 
Gaston Defferre. A strong central State, and ironically, a powerful 
regional, departmental, metropolitan district and city government, 
constitute a structural context, which permits the emergence of actors of 
influence in the local scene from the public sector. Such a context might 
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also be seen as militating against the emergence of influential figures 
from the commercial and voluntary sectors. 
In the earlier discussions of the three theoretical frameworks employed 
we sought to identify key indicators which might be employed to 
differentiate between the three types of explanation / description 
promoted by the three theoretical frameworks (see table 2.3). After 
discussing the modelled descriptions of policy in the two cases, we will go 
on to consider (employing the set of indicators) the extent to which either 
or both of the two case studies lend themselves to a particular theoretical 
account, or whether by contrast, locally / culturally specific accounts of 
the policy process are required. 
7.2. The decision-making process for the Football World 
Cup project 
The analysis conducted, through the common indicators developed earlier, 
provides an interesting reading of the decision-making process for the 
Football World Cup project in Marseille. As noted, there are two phases in 
the project, which correspond to two periods under different local political 
leadership: that of Robert Vigouroux and Jean-Claude Gaudin in their 
respective periods as Mayor of the City. These periods represent stages 
one and two (under Vigouroux) and three and four under Gaudin (see 
Figure 7.1) 
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Table 7,1; Decision-making in the Case of the Football World Cup in Marseille - Stage 1: Decision to Bid 
Primary Resources Type of Centrality Actors Objectives Interaction 
City Council To renovate the Political Co-operation High / leader 
Politicians: stadium, to (except with 
Vigouroux. please local Tapie) 
inhabitants 
Central Govt. Promoting Political / Co-operation High 
(Min. of France financial 
Finance; 
Youth & 
Sport) 
French Football Promoting Sporting Co-operation High 
Federation French football legitimacy 
Bernard Tapie To demonstrate Sporting Conflict (with Low 
his political legitimacy Vigouroux) 
influence (O. M. ) but low 
political 
legitimacy 
In the first stage of the project (see Table 7.1), the central actors were: 
the Vigouroux team, predominantly its political members; central 
government through the involvement of the Ministry of Youth and Sports; 
the French Football Federation which was evaluating all cities to be 
incorporated in the French bid; and Bernard Tapie, the President of O. M. 
As noted earlier, objectives for Vigouroux were two-fold: the hosting of 
the World Football Cup would give the opportunity to renovate the 
stadium, which was needed, and would also be an opportunity to please 
local inhabitants / electors. For both the central government and the FFF, 
the hosting of the event represented a promotional opportunity, 
promoting France for the former, promoting French football for the latter. 
These first principal sets of actors were central at this stage, given their 
respective resources. Vigouroux shared his political resources in order to 
progress the project; central government had political resources but was 
also able to commit itself to participate financially in the building of the 
project; the French Federation of Football used its legitimacy to contact 
cities interested in hosting the event, thus contributing to the 
building of 
the French bid. Bernard Tapie was also a (marginal) actor at this stage 
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since, as noted earlier, he threatened to build his own stadium outside the 
city and was thus trying to demonstrate that Vigouroux was an 
unimportant figure in the world of football (and by implication lacking 
political force). By this time, Tapie was a potential candidate for municipal 
elections, and was seen by local politicians, particularly by Vigouroux, as a 
dangerous threat to their political careers. Actors were thus largely co- 
operating with one another at this point, - except, that is, with Tapie - 
and there was a general consensus that the City should bid. 
Table 7,2; Decision-making in the Case of the Football World Cup 
in Marseille - Stage 2; Decision on Planned Stadium Extension 
Primary Resources Type of Centrality 
Actors Objectives Interaction 
City Council Securing Political / Co-operation / High / leader 
Politicians: Marseille as a financial political conflict 
Vigouroux, venue, the with Conseils 
Olmeta. hosting of a Regional and 
semi-final De artemental 
Central Govt. Promoting Political Co-operation High 
(Min. of France and legitimacy / 
Finance; Youth French sporting financial 
& Sport) culture support 
Conseil Regional Demonstrate its Financial Political conflict Moderate 
influence with the City 
Council 
Conseil General Demonstrate its Financial Political conflict Moderate 
influence with the City 
Council 
FIFA Establishing the Right holders Contractors for High 
best available services 
conditions to 
host matches 
Comite d'Interets To serve local Democratic Co-operation Low 
de Quartier interests legitimacy 
LOW 
Residents of the To maintain Political voice Pressure group Low 
stadium their daily lives (small) activities 
neighbourhood quality 
In the second stage (see Table 7.2), the decision to bid was made, but the 
hosting of a semi-final would require the extension of the stadium. This 
stage thus corresponds to the planning of the stadium extension, notably 
to the financial plan to support the project. The City Council, under the 
leadership of Vigouroux, was again the key actor in terms of decision- 
198 
Chapter 7: Understanding Mega sport Event Policy in Marseille 
making, but with a latent objective: to demonstrate its supremacy over 
the other local authorities, which were controlled by potential political 
rivals. The second stage was the moment of the arrival in the decision- 
making arena of the Conseil Departemental and the Conseil Regional, 
which were asked to share the financial burden but were not offered the 
opportunity to contribute to decision-making in any other way. This 
marked the beginning of conflict between the different local authorities. In 
relation to the football bodies, FIFA was much more involved in this stage 
since it provided the terms of reference for host stadia. As with the FFF 
and the newly established French Organisation Committee, FIFA was the 
institution, which definitively legitimated the process in sporting terms. In 
relation to central government, more ministries became involved, since the 
stadium extension plan needed the intervention of the Ministries of 
Finance, of Youth and Sports, and of Internal Affairs. Again, resources of 
the central government were its capacity to provide political legitimacy, 
and financial support for the project. One group of actors to appear at this 
stage, though in the margins, was the residents of the stadium 
neighbourhood. They expressed the view that the project would have 
negative consequences for their daily lives. Another set of local actors also 
appearing at the margin, but playing an important legitimating role as 
support for the main decision-makers, was the Comites d7nterets de 
Quartiers (CIQs), in the sense that they were the means by which citizen 
consultation was demonstrated. 
Interactions between those actors took on different forms: as we noted 
above, conflict dominated interaction between local authorities, whereas 
the rest of the actors was co-operating in what can be characterised as a 
network (rather than in a hierarchical manner). 
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Table 7,3: Decision-making in the Case of the Football World Cup 
in Marseille - Stage 3; Delivery of Infrastructural Changes 
Actors Primary Resources Type of Centrality 
Objectives Interaction 
City Council The Political Co-operation High / leader 
Politicians: development of 
Gaudin, Villani Marseille 
City Council The Technical Co-operation High / leader 
Technicians: development of legitimacy 
Vincent, Marseille 
Gondard 
Regional Org. Organisation of Technical Co-operation High 
Committee the event competences 
(COR): 
Genovesi 
Central Govt. Looking at the Technical Co-operation High 
bodies (Min. of stadium legitimacy 
Youth & Sport, delivery 
of Finance, 
DR)S 
Supporters Influence the Legitimacy Conflict (with all Low 
(opposing choice of the (stadium users) the above) 
changes) stadium design 
At the third stage (see Table 7.3), it was Gaudin who led the city, with 
only one headline concern at that time: the choice of the stadium design 
and its realisation. As the event drew closer, the City Council ceded its 
leading role to the Regional Organising Committee of the World Cup. With 
the arrival of Gaudin, the role of public servants or 'technical experts' 
grew. They appeared in the press, in particular Marc Vincent, 'Mister 
World Cup' and Jean-Claude Gondard (General Secretary of the City 
Council). With these new actors and with the Gaudin style for 
communicating on policy, the objective of staging the event was more 
overtly oriented towards the development of Marseille. Nevertheless, 
Gaudin gave little explanation about how or why the Football World 
Cup 
would be an opportunity for city development. Central government was 
still present as a major actor, but with a much more devolved action with 
for example the role of the Direction Regionale de /a Jeunesse et 
des 
Sports (DRJS, the regional branch of the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports) for 
both the preparation of the event and the stadium evaluation. 
As in the 
previous stage, governmental bodies at sub-national levels were using 
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their capacity to legitimate the project and the realisations linked to the 
project. The situation was the same for the football bodies, with the 
implementation of a sub-national level in the organisation (CRO, the 
Regional Organisation Committee for the World Cup), which had 
responsibility for coordinating the organisation of the competition. The 
objective for these latter actors was to create the best conditions to host 
the event. Thus, co-operation was the most evident kind of interaction 
between institutions. The sole overt conflict during this stage was with the 
O. M. supporters, a body of whom objected to the design of the stadium. 
This stage thus represented the realisation of the projects (stadium 
extension etc) and evaluation of the projects by key partners, namely the 
CRO and DRJS. 
The fourth stage (see Table 7.4) involved decisions and actions taken 
around the delivery of the event. Here the central actor was the Regional 
Organisation Committee (CRO). In terms of delivery, two distinct elements 
existed: delivery of the matches 'per se', and delivery of animations 
events. In terms of the former, actors involved were mostly the CRO and 
governmental bodies. For the latter, the central actors were the City 
Council, the local football associations and a group, which had been 
almost invisible until then, the commercial sector. In terms of resources, 
the voluntary sector shared its legitimacy and competences in the 
organisation of football animation events, whereas the commercial sector 
was only called on to provide financial resources. The City Council 
provided technical competence in the staging of animation events. 
Although for the delivery of matches, alliances were in a sense an obliged' 
form of interaction, and it was more a co-operation network that linked 
actors for the delivery of animations. As with the two previous stages, 
conflict appeared with marginal actors, who were not directly linked to the 
project but who were important in the city, notably commercial traders in 
the centre of the city, concerned about spectator violence during the 
event. Both the Conseil Regional and the Conseil Genera/ were also 
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marginal actors at this stage, supporting the programme of animations, 
with financial and human resources, but again without being able to 
participate in decision-making. 
Table 7,4; Decision-making in the Case of the Football World Cup 
in Marseille - Stage 4; Delivery of the Event 
Actors Primary Resources Type of Centrality 
Objectives Interaction 
Regional Org. 
Committee (COR): 
i) operational i) delivery of i) technical i) co-operation i) high / leader 
section: Genovesi the event competencies / alliance with ii) moderate 
ii) public ii)delivery of ii) governmental 
consultation animation, promotional / bodies 
section: Vincent, improvement dialogue ii) co-operation 
Latil D'Albertas, of the competencies 
Villani... hosting of 
s ectators 
Football bodies Delivery of Sporting Co-operation Low 
(local, animations legitimacy 
departmental and events, 
regional) football 
events for 
young people 
City Council Delivery of Technical Co-operation High 
Technicians animations, competencies 
(animation the 
events): Vincent, development 
Gondard of the City 
Commercial To promote Financial Co-operation Low 
sponsors their image 
(animation events) 
Central Delivery of Technical Co-operation / High 
government bodies security, competencies alliance with 
(ministries, and matches / the CR0 
their departmental contribution 
offices) to animation 
events 
Local traders of To benefit Economic Pressure group Moderate 
city centre from the activity 
event 
Thus, the Football World Cup project was a product of public sector 
leadership, using partners having significant resources to help the project. 
Even if the orientation of the project was different under the leadership of 
the two mayors, both sought to use partners only in support of their own 
aims. Decision-making was clearly led by the City Council, until the final 
202 
Chapter 7: Understanding Mega sport Event Policy in Marseille 
stage of the project. While in the early stages to maintain control though 
challenged by the Departement and the Region, Vigouroux in particular 
used a form of political brinkmanship to coerce or embarrass the Region 
and the Departement into funding the project. After this, the City Council 
sought to develop a 'cooperative network' of actors to achieve its shared 
goals. 
The America's Cup was however the result of a different process, because 
the City Council sought to guide the project from beginning to the end, in 
a cooperative process, which reflected shared goals between the various 
entities. 
7.3. The decision-making process for the America's Cup 
project 
The decision to promote the bid to host the America's Cup was the result 
of only one set of institutional actors, the politicians and technicians of the 
City Council (see Figure 7.2). The initiative to think about bidding came 
first from Marc Vincent, supported by Jean-Claude Gondard, the General 
Secretary of the City Council. They convinced politicians about the 
significance of the opportunity to bid. In relation to their roles in the city, 
they aimed to use the America's Cup as a lever to boost city development 
(see Table 7.5). Informed by the experience of the Football World Cup, 
politicians also shared this objective. At this first stage of the project, the 
resources employed were predominantly ideological: political legitimacy on 
the part of politicians; and technical legitimacy in relation to the expertise 
of the technicians. In terms of interaction between actors, this first stage 
of the process can be characterised as "in-house' co-operation between 
members since the bidding process had not really begun. 
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Table 7,5; Decision-making in the Case of the Americas Cup in 
Marseille - Stage 1; Decision to Promote a Bid 
Actors Primary 
objectives 
Resources Type of 
Interaction 
Centrality 
City Council The boosting of Political Co-operation High 
Politicians: Gaudin, city development 
France Gamerre 
City Council The boosting of Technical Co-operation High 
Technicians: city development legitimacy 
Vincent (Technical 
Advisor); Gondard 
(City Council 
General 
Secrets 
Table 7,6; Decision-making in the Case of the Americas Cup in 
Marseille - Stage 2: Engagement of Partners for the Bid 
Actors Primary Resources Type of Centrality 
Objectives Interaction 
City Council The boosting of Political / High 
Politicians: city financial 
Gaudin, development 
Gamerre 
City Council The boosting of Technical High 
Technicians: city competencies 
Marc Vincent development 
(sport); J-C 
Gondard (City 
Council Gen 
Sec. ) Alliance 
Communaute The boosting of Financial / High 
Urbaine : Latil development in territories 
D'Albertas the greater legitimacy for 
Marseille area actions in 
greater 
Marseille area 
Port Authority : The boosting of Technical High 
Piloix the Port area competencies / 
territorial 
competencies 
for actions in 
the port 
Central Being seen to Financial / Co-operation Moderate 
government meet administrative 
obligations to legitimacy 
support booster 
events 
Americas Cup To organise Right holder / Contractor of High 
Management and promote sporting services 
the Americas legitimacy 
Cu 
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Table 7,7; Decision-making in the Case of the Americas Cup in 
Marseille - Stage 3; Decisions on Infrastructure Projects 
Actors Primary 
j 
Resources Type of Centrality 
Ob ectives Interaction 
City Council To succeed in the Political / Alliance / High 
Politicians: Gaud in, bid financial conflict with 
Gamerre Central 
Government 
City Council To succeed in the Legitimacy Alliance High 
Technicians: bid 
Gondard (City 
Council Gen Sec. ) 
Communaute To succeed in the Technical Alliance High 
Urbaine: Latil bid competencies / 
D'Albertas financial 
Port Authority: To succeed in the Technical Alliance High 
Piloix bid competencies 
Central To succeed in the Political / Conflict with Moderate 
Government bid without too legitimacy / City Council 
(Mins. Of much investment financial politicians 
Infrastructure, 
Finance, Youth 
and Sport) 
Chirac, Raffarin 
Local Commercial To promote the Professional Co-operation Low 
Sector Association bid ima e 
Local Sailing To host the Legitimacy Co-operation Low 
Clubs oldest sailing 
event in the 
world 
Americas Cup To organise and Sporting Co-operation High 
Management promote the legitimacy 
Americas Cup 
Supporting 
committees 
i) promoting i) to promote the i) image of i) co-operation i) low 
committee bid major 
(personalities) personalities / ii) co-operation ii) low 
ii) bid ii) to improve committee 
committee : hosting projects members for 
Genovesi... promotional 
purposes 
ii) professional 
reputation of 
members 
Conseil General Being seen to Financial Co-operation Low 
Conseil Regional meet obligations Financial Co-operation Low 
to support 
booster events 
Local trade unions To defend local Political voice opposition, and Low 
workers (moderate) later co- 
o eration 
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The second stage (see Table 7.6) thus corresponds to the stage at which 
the bidding process became a reality, when the Swiss effectively gained 
the right to be the next America's Cup organiser. The City Council needed 
to gather the relevant partners to build its bid. The key actors at this stage 
were the Communaute Urbaine, involved because of its legitimacy to lead 
this type of project, which went beyond the bounds of the City into 
Greater Marseille; the Port Authority, since it was the institution with the 
competences, physical resources and legitimacy related to such a large 
scale maritime event; and AC Management, the company set up to 
negotiate the bid from the Swiss side. Objectives for the City Council and 
the Communaute Urbaine related to the development of the city and 
Greater Marseille; and the development and consolidation of the city 
image. For the Port Authority, objectives related to port development in a 
time of changing maritime business, which was also linked to city image 
and infrastructure change. There was a strong alliance between those 
three entities (more significant than mere cooperation) committed to 
succeeding with the bid. AC Management was a main actor and 
interlocutor rather than a decision-maker in the Marseille project. 
Effectively AC Management had to be convinced of the efficiency and 
attractiveness of the project. Thus, interactions between central actors 
and AC Management involved negotiation and consultation. 
The third stage in the America's Cup process (see Table 7.7) was the bid 
construction. We can argue that primary objectives had changed at this 
stage for the three core institutions, with the focus on the success of 
the 
bid, as the means to achieve other broader goals. The central actors were 
seeking adequate partners to construct the bid. 
Central government was 
one of the peripheral actors, sought because of 
its political and financial 
resources. However, relations between the central actors 
and central 
government were evidently conflictual, visible, and more 
or less officially 
acknowledged. The commercial sector appeared 
in a cooperative role only 
at this stage. The objectives of the commercial 
sector actors were to 
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promote their association with the event, and to be seen to promote 
Marseille and its bid. As noted in Chapter 6, the commercial sector was 
seen rather more as being in an active support role rather than as a 
decision-making partner. Its involvement in the bid relied on its capacity 
to influence the economic world, and also to some extent on its financial 
resources (in particular media firms). Both the Conseil Regional and the 
Consel General were also requested to take part in the process because 
of their financial resources, but with no further significant contribution. At 
this stage, both Councils did not really declare objectives for bidding, but 
politically appeared to have little choice but to get involved in the project. 
They could not afford to be seen to damage the project by a lack of 
enthusiasm for support. In terms of peripheral actors, there were also the 
yachting clubs, bringing their competences and a degree of sporting 
legitimacy to the project. Except for the Maritime Affairs Service of the 
City Council, the local sailing group was the sole representative of the 
sports domain, and this group's primary objective was simply to host the 
oldest yachting competition in the world. When we look at interactions, 
the City Council, the Communaute Urbaine and the Port Authority were 
effectively a tight alliance; conflict dominated relations with central 
government; and network co-operation was the main interaction with the 
peripheral partners. There was little opposition to the project at local 
level, except for the usual political opposition (left / right) among the City 
Council, and local trade unions. As noted in Chapter 6, the trade unions 
finally supported the project after a demonstration of their potential to 
impact upon the project (through strike action). 
In these two examples, we therefore, see some important continuities, or 
learning processes taking place between events. However, there are in 
addition significant elements of difference. Perhaps the first point to make 
is that the political context at the outset for the development of the two 
projects was very different. Political competition between the 
local 
government entities in the case of the World Cup, simply was not a 
factor 
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for the America's Cup. A tight alliance was evident from stage two of the 
America's Cup project. That alliance was partly made possible by the links 
within the City Council across departments, developed during the Football 
World Cup project. Key senior figures knew each other and could work 
together. 
The second point to emphasise is that with the success of the World Cup 
project it was much easier for key figures to make the argument that 
investment in major sporting events could make a difference to the city. 
The conviction that sporting profile could contribute to a change in the 
city's reputation had gone beyond sports professionals to individuals such 
as J-C Gondard, General Secretary of the City Council who were making 
the case for the second project. In Patrick Dunleavy's (1980) terms, 
ideological corporatism was evident in the conviction across professional 
and sectoral boundaries, that sports events image strategies can achieve 
shared goals for city promotion. 
The two events were very different in nature. The first was effectively a 
national competition focused around a relatively simple but high profile 
stadium project, to secure a role in an international event which had 
already been won for France. The second was a high profile international 
competition with a more complex set of infrastructural plans and 
requirements, and with potentially more far reaching impacts on the 
physical (as well as economic and social) context of the city. In 
organisational terms this project was more clearly led by those with the 
technical expertise to plan and deliver the infrastructural requirements. 
Finally, what is perhaps remarkable is the lack of strong conflict 
characterising each of the projects. Sport seems to be an area which can 
engage cross-party political support (few politicians are willing to be seen 
as 'kill-joys' at least at the outset). Large-scale investment attracted little 
overt objection - though the local Communists did raise objections to 
the 
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spending proposals for the Velodrome, nevertheless, they could not bring 
themselves to vote against it. Local residents in the neighbourhood of the 
stadium, supporters objecting to the stadium design, and commercial 
interests objecting to the animation projects, give rare glimpses of 
relatively ineffectual and short-lived opposition. 
A point raised earlier and emphasised here is that the research approach 
adopted focuses attention on decisions taken, as in the classic pluralist, 
growth coalition, and urban regime studies, rather than on non-decisions 
as illustrated in Bachrach and Baratz's (1970) approach. Evidence of non- 
decisions or suppressed conflict was sought in interviews, but is 
notoriously difficult to identify. Thus it should be recognised that there 
may be unacknowledged sources of conflict in terms of either what was 
done or proposed (the impact of infrastructural projects or proposals) or in 
terms of what was not done because of expenditure of resource on these 
projects (the opportunity costs of developing these proposals). 
Having developed a characterisation of the two projects we now turn to 
the issue of the extent to which this can lend support to one or other of 
the key theoretical positions identified earlier in the thesis. 
7.4. Analysing Marseille decision-making processes in 
mega-sport event policy using common indicators 
Table 7.8 below provides a summary of the dimensions against which 
urban policy approaches might be evaluated to determine the extent to 
which they constitute examples of policy communities, growth coalitions or 
urban regimes. This table reproduces Table 2.3 but is included again 
here 
for ease of access for the reader. In the methodological discussions 
(Chapter 3) a (modified) critical realist position was outlined, and 
in 
essence the discussion, which follows, seeks to uncover` whether the real 
underlying structures of urban sports event policy in Marseille, conform 
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with, or depart from, these descriptions of policy from Anglo-Saxon 
contexts, which might be regarded as ideal-typical in this context. Thus 
below we deal with each dimension / indicator for each theory in relation 
to both projects before going on to form a set of general conclusions 
about the adequacy of such accounts to the Marseille context. 
« nie '. o: uroan govern ance Framework 
Growth coalition Policy network Urban regime 
Objectives Economic growth of the Constellation of Depends on type of 
city and 'personal' interests. regime (growth, 
economic gain. symbolic change etc). 
_ Means Large scale property Shaping of policy A range of projects 
development projects. agenda, projects over an extended 
and delive period. 
Kind of actors: Land owners, property Local, regional, Local, regional, 
- primary developers national national governments 
Private firms 
- secondary Banks, government, 
, 
associations, all with aI 
universities, associations Actors sharing the shared vision for the 
(actors who indirectly same ideology, city. 
have benefits representatives of 
participating to the governmental and 
project) non-governmental 
associations 
Motivations To enhance capital To maintain / To promote the shared 
values, personal wealth strengthen position vision for the city 
gain. in the policy through a variety of 
system. measures 
Resources Financial power and Influence of actors Power to' do things 
property ownership. in the policy 
system; 'power 
over' 
Kinds of Constant bargaining, Internal hierarchy Consensus in the 
relations subordination of politics within an overall orientation and the 
between by economics network action 
actors 
Stability Low: limited to the life of Medium: often Strong: over 
the project linked to elections at least 10 ears 
7.4.1. Objectives of sports event policy 
The distinction between the three types of theoretical framework in terms 
of goals is not necessarily clear. For a growth coalition, one anticipates 
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emphasis on economic growth with opportunities for private profit. Urban 
regimes may be focused on growth, on social regeneration, or on symbolic 
change. Policy networks imply a constellation of interests, which may or 
may not be around issues of sport as a vehicle for example of economic 
development, sport as a means of reimaging the city, or both. In the case 
of the two projects described, there is little evidence of concern for private 
commercial gain. Competitive politics characterises the early stages of the 
Football World Cup but this grows into a common concern to use sport for 
image promotion, which might be seen as either promoting the existence 
of shared values in a policy community or of a nascent symbolic regime. 
7.4.2. Means employed to achieve objectives 
Under this heading also, a distinction can be made between short-lived 
support for a large scale property development (growth coalition), the 
development of a range of projects over time (urban regime) and the 
shaping of policy agenda to reflect the values / world views of the 
dominant policy actors (policy network). The two projects considered here 
were the most significant in a programme of events (such as Beach Volley 
Ball event, Wind Surfing tournaments etc), which were developed over 
time in Marseille, and there was also evidence of policy agenda-shaping by 
significant actors. Although significant infrastructural developments were 
evident, the role of property development was minimal. 
7.4.3. Actors involved in the process. 
Here again public rather than private or third sector actors predominated. 
This lack of evident voluntary or commercial sector activity undermines 
any claim to characterise this as either a growth coalition or an urban 
regime. CIQs were consulted although how seriously is open to question. 
Similarly yachting clubs and the commercial interests were involved in the 
latter stages of the America's Cup and the World Cup respectively, but this 
involvement was peripheral. Within local government circles, actors from 
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political and technical roles did share an ideological commitment to the 
policy of city promotion through sport. 
7.4.4. Motivations of actors. 
The absence of commercial self interest here is very marked, while the 
growing momentum for the shared vision of the (post) modern 
Mediterranean city is also clear. The concerns of actors to strengthen their 
position and that of those who share similar views is only implied. Thus 
motivations lend some support to the explanations of policy consistent 
with the 'policy network' and urban regime' literature. 
7.4.5. Resources employed 
The financial resources employed in the realisation of the projects were 
almost wholly sourced from the public sector. Thus, the growth coalition 
and urban regime accounts are undermined. The nature of power evident 
in the promotion of policy was a mixture of power to mobilise the public, 
and to some extent the voluntary sector, to sign up to the goals of the 
projects and the means by which to achieve those goals. This kind of 
ideological corporatism is consistent with a growing policy network, in 
which policy actors' influence is evidenced by the spread of their particular 
'world view'. 
7.4.6. Types of relations between actors 
The consensual nature of much of the interaction in both cases might well 
'fit' the notion of a strong consensus. Conflict is limited and relatively 
ineffective in achieving change. A cooperative network developed during 
the first event, is more fully extended with new actors in the second. 
Certainly there is little, which might be described as the subordination of 
political to economic end. Whether the consensus on goals incorporates 
the commercial sector is less evident, since its involvement was only late 
in the first project and it limited overall. 
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7.4.7. Stability over time 
What is evident in reviewing these two events is that the policy of using 
sports events to promote positive (re)imaging of the city has remained 
intact across the period, and if anything is more readily accepted in the 
second case because of the positive evaluation of the experience of 
hosting the World Cup. This is more than a one-off, short term 
experience, and seems indeed to be part of a wider programme of 
promotional events. Again this lends evidence to both medium to long- 
term ideological corporatism, and to the consensual approach of regime 
building (though the commercial sector may be absent from this 
consensual group). The value position shared over time by public servants 
thus suggests something of a policy community. 
7.5. Drawing conclusions about applicability of each of 
the theoretical frameworks 
Having reviewed the two cases and indicators employed to operationalise 
the three theoretical frameworks, what conclusions may be drawn about 
how useful each of the frameworks is in terms of characterising the two 
policy cases? Each of the perspectives is considered below in turn. 
7.5.1. The absence of a growth coalition. 
The weakest of the three perspectives reviewed in explaining the case 
studies of sports events policy in Marseille is that of the growth coalition. 
The limitations of a growth coalition account were clear. Neither of the 
two projects was oriented towards private capital growth or personal 
economic gain. The absence of key actors (e. g. property developers, 
banks, etc) and of private finance as a resource, reinforces this point. 
There is no evidence of political goals being subordinated to 
(private) 
economic gain, and the policy goals show some continuity and stability 
across time. Thus on virtually all indicators the growth coalition 
is 
inappropriate. 
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7.5.2, A modified urban regime? 
The two projects taken together illustrate certain features of an urban 
regime. As noted in Chapter 2, Stone defines an urban regime as 
an informal yet relatively stable group with access to 
institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions (Stone 1989: 4). 
The links between the individuals involved in promoting the projects were 
informal, there was stability in goals / values / beliefs from one event to 
the second even though the membership of the groups involved varied. In 
addition the identification by Stoker and Mossberger (1994) of a symbolic 
regime captures some of the world view of the groups promoting both 
events. Consensus over the actions to be taken and the power to mobilise 
support (rather than to defeat opposition) are also generally evident 
features (with the exception of the politically charged climate of stages 
one and two of the Football World Cup project). 
However, the key feature of the urban regime as a concept is its 
incorporation of transversal links across commercial, voluntary and public 
sector groups and this is clearly lacking. The etatiste / dirigiste tradition of 
French politics and policy systems is such that it is unsurprising to 
conclude that the policy consensus, which develops is public sector-led. 
The use of the term urban regime to describe a mode of urban 
governance, which is networked across sectors means that attempts to 
apply this to public sector dominated networks would leave us open to 
criticism. 
7.5.3. Aspects of the development of a policy network? 
As already noted, both projects were led by a core group of public sector 
actors and institutions, which incorporated others as and when they were 
needed to contribute to the achievement of projects. The way that the 
projects were promoted was for an officer to identify an opportunity and 
to contact others who might lend technical and / or political support. Thus 
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the City's Technical Advisor spotted the opportunity to participate in 
certain major events, and recruited the support of other actors. This was 
the approach taken when the city bid for the America's Cup and the Rugby 
World Cup 2007 (Interview with Marc Vincent, 8 June 2005). In the case 
of the America's Cup, the Director of Economic Development was one of 
the first to be contacted, followed by the politician with responsibility for 
the maritime domain. Each of the actors could thus bring a set of relevant 
competences, knowledge, or financial, political or technical skills. 
The limited and "ad hoc" nature of the interaction of these actors between 
projects might be suggestive of an issue network (Marsh and Rhodes 1992 
- see Table 2.1 in this thesis). However, the small number of actors, the 
strong sense of shared values, the evidently relatively even spread of 
resources, and the notion of power as a positive sum game where all 
would benefit from the success of the project, lends support to 
characterising this as a developing policy community, though the policy 
domain for such a network might be urban economic development rather 
than sports policy 'per se'. 
7.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have sought to develop our account of mega-event 
sports policy in Marseille in ways which would allow us to address the 
extent to which the above theoretical frameworks might prove adequate 
for conceptualising such an account. Our conclusion is that while these 
'ideal typical' accounts of policy theory capture some aspects (in the case 
of urban regimes, and policy communities) there are some significant 
limitations to such accounts. Having outlined these limitations we are 
faced with the question of how such an analysis can inform our thinking in 
relation to sport and local governance in the French context, and this issue 
is addressed in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions to be drawn and their 
theoretical and methodological implications 
8.1. Introduction 
In this final chapter, we will evaluate the contribution of the thesis in the 
light of the empirical findings, theoretical conclusions, and implications for 
future work. The aim of a thesis is to contribute to knowledge through 
original work and / or analysis. The work presented here has aimed to 
enhance understanding of the decision-making processes in sport events 
policy in Marseille, from the organisation of the Football World Cup 1998 
to the bid to host the America's Cup 2007. Our addressing of the three 
major perspectives in the Anglo-Saxon literature leads us on the broader 
issue of urban governance, identified in the opening chapter of this thesis 
namely: 
" How might our findings in relation to the two events identified 
inform the way in which we characterise urban governance in the 
Marseille context? 
We discuss this more general concern in the sections which follow. 
8.2. Theoretical contributions 
The principal contribution of this thesis might be said to be two-fold: 
theoretical and methodological. The theoretical implications of analysis 
relate to the fact that the ideal typical' accounts of policy derived from 
Anglo-Saxon (North American) policy contexts do not provide a convincing 
'fit' in the French context. In effect, we concluded that Anglo-Saxon 
theories at the urban level are too specific to embrace this French urban 
case study. Nevertheless, the decision-making as described in this 
thesis is 
a mode of governance (rather than simply local government activity), 
in 
the sense that local government, though it led the projects 
for the most 
part, was not able to stage projects by itself and requested 
the support of 
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partners from the wider public sector and to some extent from the 
voluntary and private sector. The dispersal of power, especially for the 
America's Cup project, demonstrates that the traditional forms of power 
(top down) are no longer dominant (Merrien 1998). 
This leads to consideration of the kinds of governance implemented in the 
context of sports events policy in Marseille for which Janet Newman's 
(2001) work on forms of governance provides a useful framework to 
adopt for the discussion. Newman outlines four modes of governance, 
namely hierarchy', 'rational goal', open systems' and 'self-governance'. 
The principal characteristics of each of these forms are provided in Figure 
8.1. Newman makes the claim that although she is able to detect in the 
British context (through her analysis of public discourse on such matters) 
tendencies towards different types of governance and tensions between 
such competing tendencies, it is not a matter of a new regime of 
governance replacing an older one but rather a mixture of continuities 
and breaks, the result of tensions between several modes of governance. 
As Newman argues: 
Institutional change tends not to occur through some organic 
and evolutionary process by which one regime is steadily 
displaced by another. More typically, old and emergent 
regimes interact, with different elements of the new and old 
being packaged and repackaged, producing tensions and 
disjuncture as different sets of norms and assumptions are 
overlaid on each other (2001: 26). 
In the French context, the traditional adhesion to the hierarchical model 
is still evident, and this has been considerably greater for France than 
that for the UK and especially for a federal system of government such as 
the US (Schmidt 1990). In the French context, even in a policy area such 
as sport, which to the Anglo-Saxon tradition is in many respects a clear 
candidate for subsidiarity, it is hard to imagine Central Government 
completely relinquishing its role. Thus, the hierarchy model as being the 
expression of "bureaucratic power and vertical patterns of relationships 
flowing up and down hierarchies" (Newman 2001: 33) captures 
the 
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6z tatiste tradition of the French State and its historical adherence to the 
tradition of the Napoleonic code. However, the governability crisis can be 
seen in Marseille to lead to moves away from this strong model. For the 
America's Cup project, for example, the dispersal of power between the 
City Council, the Communaute Urbaine and the Port Authority, and their 
strong alliance might be said to reflect a feature of the 'rational goal 
model' governance, since this collaboration represented a pragmatic and 
efficient (though not always participative and accountable) means to 
compete (Newman 2001: 35) with other bidding cities. 
Because core decision-makers and their organisations adapted 
themselves during the course of each event to changing circumstances, 
governance also exhibited aspects of the open systems model. The 
challenges posed by each project required an attitude of adaptability from 
decision-makers, notably in regards to their capacity to identify and 
recruit appropriate partners at specific moments. The development and 
expansion of the policy community were a result of this type of 
governance tendency. 
Finally, the urban regime-like elements of the decision-making process in 
this case study relate to what Newman calls the self-governance model. 
In effect, the wish to demonstrate that civil society was involved in the 
process and was supporting the projects reflect this trend. 
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Chapter 8. " Conclusions to be drawn 
Hence what is seen in the unfolding of the case study is evidence of the 
tensions between different governance tendencies as identified by 
Newman (2001). These tensions are between: 
" In terms of service delivery: innovation, flexibility (Open Systems 
Model) and cultural change, capacity building (Self Governance 
Model) on the one hand, and government regulation and 
accountability (Hierarchy Model) and maximisation, monitoring and 
regulation of outputs (Rational Model); 
" In terms of partnership development: between strengthening the 
role of commercial and voluntary sectors (Open Systems), network 
building (Self Governance) and compromising of political goals 
(Rational Goal) and demonstrating effectiveness through 
organisational procedures (Hierarchy Model); 
" And in terms of democratic innovation and public participation: 
between delegation of powers to self-managing groups (Self 
Governance), democratic innovation and flexible forms of interest 
representation (open Systems) and traditional representative 
democracy (Hierarchy) and managerialist faming of participation 
(Rational Goal). 
It is not that in the French case we do not see such tensions but rather 
that while there is evidence of these, the 'mix' in the French context 
differs from that implied for the UK. As Jessop (2000) has argued in the 
context of his strategic relations approach to explaining the state, state 
forms are the outcomes of historical struggles, as well as providing the 
strategic context for contemporary policy. Thus, the particular mix of 
tensions and structures in the French context generally and in the specific 
case of Marseille are a product of the national and local context (as 
outlined in Chapter 4). 
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Thus, the decision-making process in Marseille for sports event policy is 
the product of a complex system of interaction. Global pressures exerted 
on the city prompted a local or `glocal' (Robertson 1994) response. 
In terms of issues of power, the case studies provide a useful means for 
considering the exercise of power in changing contexts. The focus on 
decisions (as opposed to non-decisions) provides evidence of the overt 
use of power over'. Vigouroux for example is able to call the bluff of the 
Departement and the Region when they delay committing additional 
financial resources. The local residents, the OM supporters and the 
commercial traders in the area of the Vieux Port, all at one stage or 
another lose out in power struggles. 
Given that non-decisions are not dealt with directly in the analysis, and 
analysis of whose interests are promoted by the policy changes reviewed 
are also not directly addressed (largely because of the problematic notion 
of non-expressed interests: Giddens 1979), the case studies might be said 
to exhibit two other elements of power. The first is Stone's (1989) notion 
of power as social production. The ability of key actors to mobilise 
support around the notion of sport as a vehicle for re-imaging the city is 
very evident, and relates to the concept of ideological corporatism. The 
vehicle for achieving this social production is in large part discourse, the 
promotion of a shared ideological programme communicated discursively 
in newspaper articles and official reports. Such a discourse legitimises the 
roles of public servants in promoting these events. Power is thus a 
producer of, and a product of, social interaction. The thesis thus draws on 
and reflects a range of concepts of power, which are complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive. 
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8.3. Methodological contributions 
As noted in Chapter 3, this work was based on critical realist assumptions. 
Following a literature review based on urban policy, the data analysis drew 
on two types of data: documentary analysis (policy, technical documents, 
reports, political speeches and press coverage) and interview data, in 
order to understand the context of decision-making and to analyse how 
actors interpret it. The ethnographic content analysis conducted was 
clearly informed by the literature review, which preceded it as well as 
drawing on actors' own accounts and explanations. 
This methodological approach might be said to make a number of 
contributions, with perhaps the most obvious relating to the development 
and application of the set of common indicators against which to review 
the application of the theoretical frameworks of the growth coalition, 
policy network and the urban regime. These provide a theory-informed, 
operational basis for research on urban policy, and point to aspects of 
decision-making to which researchers may usefully address themselves, 
representing a starting point for research questions and analysis. This 
methodological frame is one which may be adapted for other such case 
studies of urban policy. 
Secondly, the focus on two major sport events in the same city is unusual 
for a case study approach to major sport events. Usually, researchers 
focus on decision-making related to a sole major sport event. This 
situation in Marseille allows an analysis of policy-making over a longer 
period of time, a highly salient point in claiming with, for example, urban 
regime theory, which focuses on policy in the longer term. The thesis, 
therefore permits longitudinal work on one aspect of a policy domain over 
a period of more than ten years (1991-2003). 
The qualitative research approach permits the emergence of the actors' 
understanding of the context. The analysis of the actors' discourses gives 
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account of the interviewees' social construction of phenomena. In critical 
realist ontological terms, from the Football World Cup 1998 to the bid to 
host the America's Cup 2007, the study of reflexive agents' discourses 
enabled understanding of how they construct the reality of their policy 
world. Public servants constructed the sport policy events as a lever to 
develop the city. This social construction of the raison d'etre of major 
sport events became dominant with the passing of time from one event to 
the next. 
In term of methodological approach adopted, Henry et al. (2005) have 
proposed a typology for comparative sports policy studies. According to 
these authors, there are four types of approaches that have been 
developed in comparative policy studies: 'seeking similarities', a positivist 
approach seeking generalization; 'describing differences', an idealist 
approach seeking specificity; 'theorizing the transnational', a critical realist 
approach seeking local and global levels of explanation; and 'defining 
discourse', a relativist approach analysing policy discourses as constructing 
the reality of policy. The approach adopted in this thesis cannot be wholly 
encompassed by one of the four types, but rather it reflects aspects of the 
three latter types. It reflects the second type, 'describing differences', 
since it is based on theoretical accounts of urban level policy, and because 
it seeks to develop critical description of a French case study in sport 
policy. The third type, 'theorizing the transnational', reflects the 
methodological approach of this thesis since we compare Anglo-Saxon 
concepts to the decision-making process in Marseille for sport events 
policy, and despite the differences existing between the national contexts, 
we find strong similarities in the issues addressed through sport events 
used for urban regeneration (Gratton et al. 2005) and on the development 
of the symbolic urban regime that Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) 
describe in Sheffield in the 1990s. In other words, this thesis seeks "to 
accommodate the global and local structural context (... ) and the 
local 
nature of agency within this structural context (... )" (Henry et al. 
2005). 
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The fourth type of approach to comparative analysis, 'defining discourse', 
can also to some extent characterise the methodological approach 
adopted in this thesis. Even though the thesis did not adopt a post- 
structuralist ontology, the interviewees' discourse was analysed to 
understand how actors construct their policy world. 
Thus, the typology proposed by Henry et al. (2005) while useful as it 
describes ideal-types of methodological approaches adopted in 
comparative sport policy studies, nevertheless is itself an ideal-type 
construction and thus limited in its generalisability. 
8.4. Methodological limitations 
As with any thesis, there are particular limitations resulting from the 
choice of method or from the practical operationalisation of that method. 
There were in particular two such limitations, which need to be 
acknowledged here. The first is by virtue of the approach adopted, which 
focuses on decision and by implication, therefore, limits the opportunity to 
identify and to analyse non-decision making processes. The voices of 
marginal groups may thus be underplayed in an account such as this 
which focuses on overt action and discussion / interaction. We have 
sought where possible to identify absences in interactions and indeed 
incorporated in interviews' questions about groups whose concerns do not 
reach the public agenda but the responses to such lines of enquiry is 
invariably weak. 
While this first limitation is a product of the approach adopted, the second 
relates to operational difficulties in implementing method in the case 
study. Access to interviewees from the commercial sector was ultimately 
very difficult to achieve. As indicated in Chapter 3, initial agreement on the 
part of some representatives of the commercial sector was not translated 
into reality with interviewees failing to arrive for appointments, and 
subsequently failing to respond to communications, or simply 
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subsequently declining to be interviewed. In addition access to one set of 
files (the World Cup Bid File) was refused by the City Council. Thus in both 
cases, the commercial sector activity and the nature of City official 
commitments as indicated in the Bid File, these had to be viewed through 
the accounts of those who were involved with these parties, and through 
media accounts. 
8.5. Future Research 
The approach adopted in this thesis opens up the possibility for further 
work on related aspects on at least three levels. The first is local. No 
studies to date in the French or indeed the Anglo-Saxon literature have 
been identified as having adopted a long-term longitudinal approach to 
the study of urban sport policy. Marseille in addition to the two events on 
which this thesis focuses, is part of a successful bid to stage the 2007 
Rugby World Cup, and has staged a range of lesser yet internationally 
high profile sorting events. While we have identified key features of the 
local sports policy system, it is clear that the system continues to evolve. 
The second level for further work is the national. The analysis of Marseille 
invites the question of the extent to which some of the specificities of the 
policy system identified are specific to Marseille rather than to the French 
policy system. 
The third level at which research might be conducted is cross-national, for 
example comparing decision-making processes in other cities bidding for 
the same events. It would be potentially informative for example to 
consider the nature of the policy system in Valencia and how that shaped 
and was shaped by, the successful bid to stage the America's Cup. 
At all three levels, there is potential to employ the framework of 
comparators developed in this thesis. Furthermore, any such research 
could also usefully focus on further analysis of discourse 
in sports events 
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policy as a legitimating resource for the promotion of particular policy 
approaches. Finally one might consider widening the theoretical domain 
from that of urban political economy (broadly the field addressed in this 
thesis) to incorporate theoretical frameworks from, for example, policy 
analysis. 
In the context of late modernity / and post-modern uncertainties, where 
definitive answers to research problematics are increasingly discounted, if 
this thesis can contribute to stimulate, or promote such research 
developments then it might be said to have contributed to the furtherance 
of this field of research. 
227 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
1. Interview with Raymond Mallet, 18 october 2004, 
Director of the Departemental Direction for the Youth 
and Sports 
Parcours professionnel dans le domaine du sport 
Alors dans le milieu du sport, bon. Ma vie professionnelle a ete partagee 
en deux : un premier temps au benefice de ('education nationale 
essentiellement avec un parcours... Jai commence ma carriere comme 
instit, j'ai ete donc prof et jai termine inspecteur de ('education nationale. 
Et je me suis pris d'amour, j'etais, j'etais amoureux depuis longtemps du 
domaine du domaine de ('education physique, et j'ai, et du sport et donc 
ga ma conduit a mi-parcours de ma carriere a passer le concours pour 
titre inspecteur de la jeunesse et des sports... Qui ma permis de devenir 
inspecteur principal en terme de grade, poste de directeur, directeur 
regional, directeur departemental. Yai le bonheur, parce que ca fait partie 
des bonheurs, mais on nest pas plus intelligent en en sortant, d'avoir ete 
conseiller technique d'un ministre (rire) , mais, ca c'est, on en sort pas 
plus intelligent. On en sort peut-titre. D'abord on a quelques stigmates, 
pour des raisons diverses et variees et puis on sort un peu plus prudent 
par rapport a certaines choses. Pour finir ici, donc, jai ete sollicite pour 
travailler au conseil general pour reflechir a une politique sportive dans la 
direction regionale jusque 'la et ensuite je suis alle au conseil ge, regional 
oü le president m'a demande de mettre avec lui en place des idees a 
propos dune politique sportive les premieres annees oü il a ete elu, 
Vauzelles, donc au cabinet, pour terminer d'avec un grade dans le cadre 
de la mise en place dune politique de controle des services et devaluation 
de ('ensemble des systemes des politiques publiques. Donc un poste 
d'instructeur general a la direction... pas a la direction, dans le cadre des 
services du Conseil regional. Et puls je me commets aujourd'hui a 
accompagner tout cela de, participer pour partie donc a la vie 
universitaire, ici, et puls aussi sur l'institut de management public d'Aix. 
Voila. 
D'accord. Donc, pour attaquer sur le sujet on va dire, quels sont selon 
vous, les grands evenements sportifs qui ont marque Marseille sur, on va 
dire les deux dernieres decennies ? 
Alors, pour remonter aux deux dernieres decennies, je crois que, sans 
titre 
un veritable evenement, mais parce que c'est retenu par beaucoup encore 
aujourd'hui comme etant cette partie de la memoire collective qui rend 
les 
peaux sensibles et les coeurs encore plus sensibles, c'est cette 
epoque 
forte a Marseille oü on a constitue une equipe marseillaise en football avec 
uniquement ceux que l'on a appele et qu'on appelle les minots. 
C'est-ä- 
dire ces hommes venus du terroir, forme par le terroir et qui ont abouti 
a 
is dimension sportive que l'on connait a savoir jusqu'au professionnalisme 
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avec des personnels d'encadrement qui tous etaient de la maison, la 
maison terroir marseillais. Ca, ga me parait titre un, un des evenements 
importants sur le territoire marseillais, le football etant omnipresent pour 
ne pas dire omnipotent. On aura pour deuxieme element de ce parcours 
probablement, meme si ga peut titre entache de certaines choses 
aujourd'hui, cette immensite qu'a represente le titre de, de champion 
d'Europe. Quand, la Coupe d'Europe avec ('ere... donc un petit peu 
brillante je dirais, beaucoup de brillant. Apres it faut regarder... d'un 
president qui s'appelait Tapie, Bernard en ('occurrence et puis toute sa 
cohorte de plaisir, de grands plaisirs, de sublimation et puis derriere, les 
difficultes que I'on connait. Ben le troisieme grand evenement, parce que 
ga je crois que les marseillais sen souviendront, je crois que ce sera a 
mettre, mais pas avec 'les memes, les memes racines, c'est la Coupe du 
Monde de football, bien entendu, qui represente pour les marseillais la 
reconnaissance de ce qu'ils sont clans le football, la reconnaissance de leur 
savoir-faire, en tant que homme aussi de la cite si je puls dire puisqu'il y 
avait tout le probleme de I'accueil, tout le probleme de refaire les 
installations. Donc ga c'est 3 evenements qui me paraissent titre 
importants. Its ne sont pas de meme nature tous les 3, mais ils sont 
quelque part ceux qui a mon avis sont au plus profond de la memoire des 
marseillais. II est beaucoup d'autres evenements, mais j'aurai la faiblesse 
et en meme temps I'honnetete de dire, parce que je crois qu'il faut titre 
honnete, que le football etant tellement present, it me parait presque 
indecent de dire a l'instant qu'il est d'autres evenements qui couvrent les 3 
que je viens de citer. L'un d'eux est tres, le premier est a la fois 
anecdotique et puls tres, comment dirai-je, tres interieur a chacune des 
pensees du marseillais a I'egard du football. Si, a un moment donne, il y 
avait une, un gros evenement negatif dans le coeur des marseillais a 
propos du football, ('operation refuge, c'est pas la coupe du monde, 
('operation refuge c'est pas la coupe d'Europe, ('operation refuge c'est 
cette periode des minots. Quand, dans ('ere Tapie, les grosses difficultes 
se sont, se sont presentees, tout le monde a parler, quand Marseille est 
retombee en deuxieme division, de c'est bien on va enfin peut-titre revivre 
('ere des minots. Ca veut dire des choses. C'est donc la memoire 
collective, probablement plus fortement et plus naturellement dans la 
culture du marseillais que d'autres, d'autres, d'autres, evenements. Voila. 
D'accord. Et moi en fait je vais vous parler surtout justement de la Coupe 
du Monde. Donc en fait la decision de proposer Marseille comme ville 
candidate, ga s'est fait en mai 1991. Est-ce que vous savez qui est 
a 
l'origine du dossier ? 
Alors. II est plusieurs villes qui ont candidate a I'epoque, sur 
la base 
d'intentions d'abord politiques, nul ne peut candidater si la mairie nest 
pas quelque part partie prenante, c'est-ä-dire le champ politique. 
Mais en 
amont de tout cela, c'est qu'une Coupe Du Monde ayant 
lieu en France, 
tout un chacun savait quatre ans a I'avance quelle aurait 
lieu et tout un 
chacun savait les conditions clans lesquelles les procedures allaient se 
mettre en place. C'est donc une volonte commune des acteurs 
du sport, 
des acteurs economiques, de, j'ai envie de dire 
des organisateurs de 
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I'amenagement, des amenageurs, en quelque sorte de la ville, avec les politiques pour tendre vers cet evenement. Cet evenement a fait donc ('objet du depot d'un dossier, lequel dossier parmi d'autre etait, etait un bon dossier. Un, un, un bon dossier en tant que tel, avec des 
engagements d'ordre politique projetant des engagements financiers, et donc quelque part, organisationnel, technique, administrative etc. Mais it etait surtout un bon dossier par le fait que Marseille est quand meme la deuxieme ville de France, et que, it eut ete inconvenant a I'egard des 
marseillais pour la raison simple, d'abord Zeme ville de France ensuite ville du football s'il en est une, qu'il n'y est pas dans ce, sur ce territoire, non 
seulement une partie de la Coupe du Monde mais la meilleure partie en dehors de Paris. II ya donc eu un privilege, a priori, pour le dossier, mais 
un privilege qui etait simplement borde, soutenu et verrouille par la 
culture marseillaise, la preparation qui avait eu lieu, it faut le dire, la 
volonte politique bien arrete des autorites, des autorites de I'epoque de le 
mener a bien. Et un oeil, en meme temps qu'une oreille tres attentive, un 
oeil tres comment dirai-je, un oeil tres attentif une oreille tres attentive a, 
au depot de dossier. Et le dossier contenait quelque chose de specifique, 
c'est en gros c'etait presque conditionnel sans titre une, ('expression est 
peut-titre un petit peu trop forte, nous voulons la coupe du monde, nous y 
participerons, mais nous voulons une partie des matches importants, c'est- 
a-dire que nous voulons une demi-finale. Plus etc. etc. Ca voulait dire : 
deuxieme lieu avec Paris oü vraiment le football sera roi pendant un 
certain nombre de jour avec un nombre de matches importants, avec tout 
ce que cela entrainait. Donc ce, ce dossier est le resultat de la 
convergence d'un certain nombre d'acteur et quelque part d'une, dune 
enorme impatience des marseillais a pouvoir recevoir en quelque sorte en 
retour le message de reconnaissance a propos du football. Je crois que 
l'on peut ('analyser comme tel. Et puis, une deuxieme dimension : la 
culture marseillaise est une culture d'exception mais d'exces aussi. Et donc 
quelque part c'est aussi pour le marseillais qui aime le football, mais qui 
regarde aussi son territoire autrement que par le football, de dire cette 
ville regoit un message qui la valorise en ayant la coupe de football, par 
dela ('evenement lui-meme. Quelque part, qu'un ensemble aussi disparate 
que le football et que la dimension politique et administrative qui a 
conduit donc a ce que la coupe du monde soit ici, puisse dire on choisit 
Marseille comme ca, ga veut dire que quelque part on reconnait les 
marseillais comme etant des gens censes, pas simplement sur le plan du 
football. Donc je pense que c'est ga qui effectivement est a retenir comme 
dimension de Ia, du positionnement de ce dossier. 
D'accord. Et quel etait le but en fait, on va dire politique pour la 
municipalite de cette candidature ? 
Je crois qu'il faut titre tres, tres, tres clair lä dessus. Ya pas, ya pas hors 
les difficultes budgetaires que cela peut poser, mais dans I'ambition 
politique on a envie de dire de temps en temps que I'elu decide et 
('ambition suit et l'intendance aussi. Bon c'est un petit probleme tout 
simple, aussi simple que ca. Donc en fait, derriere ('ambition footbalistique 
etc., il ya ('ambition politique, c'est une certitude. L'ambition politique qui 
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n'elimine pas, n'ignore pas toute la partie culturelle qui est derriere, n'est- 
ce pas ? Donc en fait c'est une ambition politique naturelle, c'etait, en 91, Vigouroux qui etait maire de Marseille, son successeur, Jean-Claude 
Gaudin, a poursuivi une oeuvre qui etait dejä largement entamee, et a 
construit un dossier et un projet a une dimension plus, alors j'ai envie de dire que Jean-Claude Gaudin ya ajoute le, la valeur locale. C'est-ä-dire 
quelque part une dimension, j'existe, j'apporte mon, mon accord politique 
mais ga va me permettre de redimensionner ca ca et ca. C'est-ä-dire que le projet est devenu un projet un peu plus important que celui du depart, 
donc it ya avait le stade, mais le stade demeurait quelque chose de co- 
financer par la federation, I'Etat etc., la region et le departement et au- 
dela it y avait tout 1'environnement. L'environnement c'est tout ce qui 
entourait le stade, c'etait l'idee de couvrir ou pas couvrir une ou deux 
tribunes, c'etait l'idee de, de reamenager autour etc. etc. Donc c'est bien 
une ambition politique qui a porte le dossier dans sa derniere, dans la 
derniere partie du parcours. Une ambition politique forte exprimee comme 
teile par Jean-Claude Gaudin, probablement avec des differences tres 
fortes sur la meme expression politique portee par Vigouroux. Alors je fais 
pas de difference de Ia, de Ia, d'ordre politique, Tune ayant du sens et 
I'autre pas, je dis simplement que les temporalites dans lesquelles ils se 
sont inscrits n'etaient pas les memes : je pose le dossier, et puis toi tu as 
dejä le dossier, it est dejä accepte, tu poursuis maintenant la construction 
du projet mais en termes, en termes concrets et ce n'est pas du tout la 
meme dimension donc la politique de, pour Jean-Claude Gaudin a pu 
s'exprimer plus facilement parce que le dossier etait accepte, parce que 
c'etait bien a Marseille, alors on pouvait etendre i'ambition au-dela. Voila. 
Je crois que c'est ca. 
D'accord. 
Donc ambition politique oui. 
D'accord. 
Franchement, dans tous les cas d'especes. Tous les cas d'especes. On 
peut pas dire, on ne peut pas non plus dire, je vais faire une comparaison, 
la volonte politique de Paris d'avoir les Jeux Olympiques en 2012 est une 
volonte politique de la France, c'est une union sacree autour de i'idee des 
Jeux Olympiques de 2012, Marseille s'associe a Paris, il ya deux 
dimensions politiques differentes mais on salt depasser ce cadre-la, donc iI %ya bien une ambition politique nationale et derriere si Marseille s'associe a 
Paris c'est parce que Marseille espere ainsi, ce qui est tout a fait naturel, 
comprehensible et qui ne peut qu'etre soutenu d'avoir une part du marche 
Olympique si 2012 est en France, s'imposait a Marseille. 
Et queues etaient en fait les attentes de ce projet, de ce dossier ? 
Au niveau des marseillais ? 
Oui, ou on va dire de la municipalite. 
Alors les attentes, les attentes c'etait d'abord de refaire le terrain perdu 
a 
propos de l'image de Marseille. L'image de Marseille ville de football, ville 
d'exces mais ville qu'on disait orgueilleuse, comment dirai-je, tres peu 
ponderee clans certains domaines, quelque part une ville sans projet 
d'avenir, confinee sur son passe, dont eile 
etait quelque part, 
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profondement jalouse. C'etait refaire donc quelque part le chemin pour 
aller jusqu'a montrer que Marseille etait une ville qui avait autant de 
potentiel que d'autres, simplement le potentiel n'avait pas ete peut-titre 
comment dirai-je, regarde avec le regard qui devait exister et que finalement c'etait une autre ville que celle que l'on percevait. C'etait aussi 
et je crois que c'est pas depasse le cadre de mon propos de l'instant ou de 
ma competence, je crois que c'etait aussi dans l'idee des politiques de I'epoque, pour avoir partage quelques instants avec eux alors que j'etais dans des responsabilites administratives, au titre de I'Etat, l'idee que ce dossier etait le meilleur dossier possible pour promouvoir Marseille au dela 
des frontieres. Et ainsi demontrer que Marseille pouvait se promouvoir par 
eile-meme sur des projets exterieurs comme la coupe du monde qui vient 
mais sur des projets consignes sur I'aire marseillaise mais construit par les 
marseillais eux-memes, teiles par exemple les dimensions a propos la 
volonte d'avoir, d'avoir la competition de voile, nest-ce pas hein, la Coupe 
de L'America, ou d'autres aspects de ce type, par exemple le, on peut 
estimer que l'une des retombees de ce bon parcours sur la Coupe du 
Monde de football a la fois par la premiere municipalite et la suivante, 
conduit a ce qu'en 2007 ii y aura la Coupe du Monde de Rugby, ce qui 
conduit qu'une partie de la Coupe de ('America sous des formes adaptees 
certes puisque la Coupe en tant que teile n'aura pas lieu ici, ont eu lieu 
ces derniers temps, d'autres auront lieu encore, que l'idee de re, de 
rehabiliter quelque part le littoral au benefice de pratiques de voile de tres 
haut niveau suit son cours, et que tout ceci se sont les effets induits et 
directs de cette volonte politique d'etre dans la Coupe Du Monde. 
Remontons au dela, au dela de 91 et regardons les evenements 
internationaux qui, de ce niveau lä ou d'un niveau moindre, ont eu lieu a 
Marseille : aucun. Donc on est bien clans quelque chose qui est lä, le point 
de depart dune nouvelle volonte politique, peut-titre incertaine au depart, 
participer etait une necessite quasiment au depart a Marseille, participer a 
la competition pour que le dossier soit accepte, et au dela, je crois que 
c'est devenu quelque chose qui a convaincu que c'etait un excellent levier 
pour demontrer aux marseillais qu'on pouvait aller plus loin, que Marseille 
etait digne de ca, que Marseille etait capable de ca, et qu'ensemble on 
pouvait faire beaucoup de choses. Je crois que c'est ca. En tout cas c'est 
ce qui, dans les effets induits d'aujourd'hui, tres concrets que j'ai citais en 
amont, Von constate. 
Et donc, vous justement en tant que personne d'une part et en tant que 
representant dune institution d'autre part, est-ce que vous avez ete 
concerto, on va dire sur le dossier de la Coupe du Monde ? 
Oh combien ! Parce que dans Ia, dans la structure actuelle et la structure 
de I'epoque de, de, administrative et politique de la France, une direction 
regionale et departementale est le lieu approprie oü viennent se poser 
les 
intentions politiques qu'elles soient nationales ou qu'elles soient locales 
a 
propos de la construction de ('ensemble des demarches puisque 
le mandat 
a ete donne tres rapidement par le ministre de la jeunesse et des sports et 
donc par le comite national d'organisation de la Coupe 
du Monde aux 
directions departementales et regionales du chef-lieu concerne, donc 
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Marseille, d'avoir a remplir un certains nombre de mission, qui etaient des 
missions d'expertise, des missions d'accompagnement, des missions de 
concertation, des missions d'evaluation a propos de la Coupe du Monde. 
Aussi bien sur le dossier technique en liaison avec les differents ingenieurs 
qui etaient partie prenante du dossier, que la municipalite sur une serie de, d'element concernant le futur projet d'organisation, que le mouvement 
sportif sur une question recurrente chaque fois qu'il ya une grande 
manifestation : oui le football mais nous a cote quest-ce que, qu'est-ce 
qui se passe pour nous pendant la coupe de football, en quoi cette coupe de football va-t-elle titre un benefice general pour le sport ou exclusif pour le football. Enfin, par dela tout ca, c'est d'avoir participe es qualite, a ce 
vaste mouvement pour valoriser I'image de Marseille aupres de ('ensemble 
des partenaires qui dans ce territoire, ce territoire frangais ('Europe et au 
dela, etaient partie prenante de la Coupe du Monde. Et donc a un moment 
ou a un autre etaient des gens qui se retrouvaient en tant qu'acteurs de la 
Coupe du Monde, les pays qui participaient a la Coupe du Monde comme 
sur un plan beaucoup plus economique qui s'appelle le tourisme, comment 
allait se traiter I'enorme probleme de la billetterie, qui est un probleme 
organisationnel essentiel donc Sa implique tout de suite un regard au dela 
du stade et au dela du seul, de la seule ligue de football ou le comite 
departemental, pour regarder le tourisme, pour regarder I'hotellerie, pour 
regarder les differentes infrastructures d'accueil, se projeter sur des 
dimensions aussi, comment dirai-je, eloignees du sport mais qui en font 
partie qui est la securite, les problemes de securite pendant la Coupe du 
Monde, les problemes que j'appellerai d'ordre diplomatique puisque les 
visites de consuls, les visites d'ambassadeurs, les visites de ministres de, 
representants des pays amis participant a' la Coupe du Monde ont fait 
('objet de tout un tas de moment precis sur Marseille. Donc c'est un vaste 
programme sur lequel en tant que directeur, j'ai ete sollicite et je dirai 
qu'on ne peut pas echapper a la sollicitation en tant qu'homme. Si on vit 
une ville, on peut la vivre professionnellement et ensuite penser que tout 
ce qui se passe autour ne concerne pas, ne nous concerne pas, ne, on ne 
peut pas quand on est face a un evenement comme la Coupe du Monde, 
ne pas etre aussi present sur ce qui est la partie rencontre conviviale, sur 
ce qui est la partie dialogue, comment dirai-je, d'interet commun en 
quelque sorte, que l'on a pu avoir avec les uns et les autres. Ca a ete un 
moment d'intense activite professionnelle, avec beaucoup de, comment 
dirai-je beaucoup de, de necessite d'appels a is rigueur, d'appel a la 
mesure, mais, aussi une extreme richesse dans la rencontre des hommes 
et des femmes inconnus hier et devenant quelque part des partenaires. Et 
puls ensuite sur le plan purement convivial, quelque part la rencontre de 
groupes de gens, marseillais, hors Marseille, sur cette, sur ce pole qui 
etait 
un pole du futur, qui etait ('organisation de la Coupe du Monde. Donc la, a 
etee une periode tres exigeante du point de vue professionnel mais tres 
faste du point de vue du rapport aux hommes et quelque part dune sorte 
d'humanisme dont le sport peut etre porteur. 
Et justement quels etaient les differents partenaires impliques dans 
le 
dossier ? 
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Alors, etaient impliquees en tant qu'institutions politiques, la mairie, le conseil general, le conseil regional, I'etat. Bon, c'est donc deja d'une 
maniere consequente les 4, les 4 dimensions de ('organisation politique de 
notre pays. Etaient impliques ensuite sur le plan purement technique, les 
services de la ville, a la fois qui soient service de I'equipement, tout le pole des ingenieurs, des architectes, tous les services appeles quelque part a 
avoir, a Bonner leur avis sur tel et tel partie d'abord de la construction du 
stade, la reconstruction du stade, I'amenagement du stade. Puis ensuite 
sur les parties exterieures, les problemes de comment dirai-je, d'acces au 
stade, en terme, en terme de voirie, les problemes de securite. Donc si je disais ce qu'a ete mon quotidien, c'est d'abord en priorite pendant la 
periode, la premiere periode en dehors des visites exterieures pour voir le 
site et je vais employer un terme, ficeler le dossier technique avant les decisions finales de financement, ca a ete ensuite de cohabiter, presque 
au quotidien avec les architectes qui avaient ete designes, plus les 
techniciens de la ville et les techniciens donc de nos services, a nous, donc 
un ensemble d'operateurs representants les services de I'Etat et 
representant la ville, quelque fois, aussi, meme s'il n'y avait que le 
financement pour eux, le conseil general et le conseil regional. Et puls 
ensuite, ga a ete d'entretenir dans un cadre purement hierarchique, un 
rapport quotidien tres etroit avec Paris :1 le ministere de la jeunesse et 
des sports, 2 le comite national d'organisation qui avait la main mise sur 
une bonne partie du decisionnel. Et que donc nous etions en prise directe, 
j'ai envie de dire en comment dirai-je, en communication directe au 
quotidien avec ('ensemble de ces acteurs au niveau national. Et que tout 
ce qui se faisait au lendemain ou a' I'heure suivante decoule de ce rapport 
qu'on etablissait avec Paris. Donc, id, successivement les autorites 
politiques, les autorites tres techniques, ensuite les dimensions un petit 
peu plus economique, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, et enfln, toute la partie 
tres tres importante qui porte un petit peu la parole du public qui est le 
mouvement associatif clans lequel le mouvement sportif avait une grande 
importance. Apres ce sont poses des proiblemes tels que des rapports 
etroits avec le monde du travail, avec le monde economique, a la fois pour 
des questions de support de communication, de sponsoring, etc. etc. Mais 
aussi quelque chose qui a ete tres important pendant cette periode, c'est, 
vu le nombre de poste qu'il fallait satisfaire, quelle etait effectivement la 
nature de la demarche que I'on devait accomplir et la forme a propos du 
recrutement des gens. Qui en avait la main mise, qui initiait la publicite lä 
dessus, qui selectionnait, comment les Bens allaient titre pris en compte, 
defrayes, alors que on attendait la coupe du monde, ils n'etaient pas dans 
('action. Doric de ce point de vue le comite d'organisation de la coupe du 
monde a Marseille puisqu'il ya eu designation d'un comite avec, avec la 
designation dun president du comite de la part du comite national qui a 
designe donc quelqu'un ici, qui a lui-meme fait les recrutements des vrais 
techniciens dont il avait besoins, sans se cacher que la dedans il y avait 
une partie des regards de la ville de Marseille qui entrait avec le, certains 
techniciens, c'est une certitude. Mais je ne vois pas comment on pourrait 
faire autrement. Ensuite it ya eu donc le developpement des recrutements 
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multiples et varies, et puis petit a petit, on est arrive a faire, a relier les liens entre toutes les situations. Mais ga veut dire qu'on a travaille tout au long de cette periode de deux, de deux bonnes annees deux bonnes 
annees, oui, de maniere tres intense avec toute cette hierarchie, et que 
nous avions nous, en tant que direction regionale et departementale, Ia 
charge premiere de valider de maniere deleguer, en etant delegue du 
pouvoir du ministre, de valider un certain nombre de, un certain nombre 
de situation a propos autant des installations sportives qu'ä propos d'un 
tas de dossiers annexes. Donc c'etait quand meme tres tres exigeant du 
point de vue professionnel. 
D'accord. Donc le secteur prive etait aussi present clans le dossier... 
Le secteur prive etait present clans le dossier, it etait present, j'ai envie de 
dire en deuxieme rideau, comme on dirait en matiere sportive, mais it etait 
tres tres present. Parce que c'etait un des acteurs sur lequel reposait pour 
beaucoup Ia partie, si je puis dire non sportive de Ia Coupe du Monde. La 
partie sportive eile est ce qu'elle est, ce sont des equipes qui se 
rencontrent, mais it y avait une partie economique, j'ai envie de dire un 
pari economique, qui se jouait derriere. Et it y avait donc, effectivement, 
besoin de le reussir, et de le gagner. Donc il y avait le monde economique 
qui etait tres present, le monde economique, c'etait les entreprises du 
secteur, c'etait certains operateurs nationaux qui avaient pignons sur rue a 
Marseille, c'etait clans certains cas meme tout le probleme, tout le 
probleme des differents marches qui ont ete passes a propos par exempla 
sur le plan des telecommunications comment ga allait se passer etc. Donc 
it y avait aussi des operateurs strangers qui etaient candidats. Donc tous 
ces dossiers-lä ont fait que, ont fait que les relations ont depasse le cadre 
strict de Marseille a certains moments, pour verser au niveau de ('Europe 
et meme au dela. 
D'accord. Et donc on va dire, en tant que, en terme de personnes, qui 
etaient les personnes on va dire source du dossier, ou qui portaient le 
dossier, qui etaient... 
Alors, sur le, sur le plan de ('installation elle-meme, c'etait Paris, le comite 
national d'organisation et le ministere de Ia jeunesse et des sports, qui 
etaient parties prenantes des choix definitifs en matiere d'installation. 
Pourquoi ? Parce que, it _y 
avait une implication forte de I'Etat, suivie de 
('implication tout aussi importante de Ia ville, plus importante meme, mais 
sur le plan reglementaire et sur le plan du droit c'etait a Paris que se 
decider en fait Ia reponse a propos du, dun probleme comme par exemple 
on couvre ou on couvre pas une tribune de plus. La reponse fut negative 
parce que c'etait pas clans Ia vision qu'en avait a' I'epoque le ministere et 
les agents qui travaillaient avec lui et chez lui, sur ce plan Ia. Donc, ca a 
ete les techniciens du ministere, le dossier a ete valide mais, par Paris, 
mais au fur et a mesure oü les grands axes des, de Ia construction 
prenaient forme, c'etait de plus en plus Ia ville de Marseille qui 
jouait Ia 
carte de I'affinement du dossier en terme, en terme de construction. Paris parce Autrement dit, toute une serie de chose, ont ete traduites a 
que les, les ingenieurs, les techniciens, les architectes 
du batiment et 
autre que Ion a pu avoir ici parce que je pense par exemple 
a Ia pelouse, 
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qui est un point important pour une Coupe du Monde, tout ceci a fait ('objet d'un travail intense avec ces personnages, les architectes. Donc, 
I'affinement definitif du dossier, juste avant ('habilitation definitive et I'agrement des differents operateurs, donc le marche lui-meme, c'est Paris 
et le corps des ingenieurs d'ici et des architectes, avec toujours Ia double 
dimension politique de Ia ville et du, et du, et de Paris. Bien que, a 
certains moments, pour des raisons tout simplement de participation au financement, le Conseil General et le Conseil General, Le Conseil Regional 
et le Conseil General aient ete informes, ont ete informes, de I'Etat 
d'avancement du dossier. Alors a ('evidence, lä on est, on croise toute Ia 
difficulte de Ia gestion, aujourd'hui, des rapports avec les operateurs 
quand it ya des credits croises. Ceest-ä-dire quand on a, on fait appel a4 
entites comme i'Etat, la ville, le departement et Ia region. On est face a 
Sa, que le mouvement sportif, rencontre en permanence. Donc c'est cette, 
cette, gestion Iä qui a dü titre mise en place et pour laquelle on a eu 
beaucoup de, beaucoup de moment de difficulte mais aussi beaucoup de 
moment de satisfaction parce que, parce qu'il ya eu veritablement, je 
voudrais dire, lä, a ('instant, toute Ia... pugnacite, vraiment, 
professionnelle des architectes qui avaient charge de gerer le dossier en 
tant qu'architectes commis par Ia ville de Marseille, au nom de cette ville 
de Marseille sur ce dossier-Ia. Parce qu'ils ont fait un travail de technicien 
d'un niveau tres tres eleve pour convaincre quelque part, sur certaines 
parties du dossier, que ca pouvait pas titre autrement. Que 
techniquement... Donc quelque part, il ya une pugnacite, ils auraient tres 
bien pu dire, bon, que Paris na qu'ä decider, non c'etait quelque chose, ca 
pouvait pas titre autrement techniquement ca pouvait pas titre autrement 
donc ils le disaient et ils defendaient Ia these. 
D'accord. Et est-ce que on va dire, officieusement, certaines personnes 
avaient de l'influence sur le dossier, sur les decisions qui etaient prises ? 
Soyons objectif. II y avait, it ya eu en permanence une influence politique. 
Elle a ete faire heureusement dans cette periode-lä, beaucoup plus de Ia 
convergence des politiques locaux que de Ia divergence, et it y avait une 
influence tres tres forte, jai envie de dire que le stade au bout d'un 
moment, sur le dossier lui-meme, ('installation, c'etait presque ä I'identique 
de ce que avec le respect des normes, de ce que peut titre une maison 
d'architectes. Donc quelque part, ii y avait Ia touche, it y avait Ia patte, 
quelque part, donc it y avait ('influence de I'architecte. Parce que 
I'architecte voyait les choses, le paysage, Ia culture ici qui, peut-titre 
pouvait titre incluse, bon etc. Donc it ya Ia touche des politiques et it ya 
Ia touche des techniciens. Tres franchement, en matiere d'influence, mise 
a part les politiques et les techniciens qui ont portes dune certaine facon 
('installation et au delä les annexes de l'installation, tout le reste n'est que 
de ('influence de seconde zone et de seconde valeur. Ce n'est pas le 
mouvement sportif qui a pu influencer de maniere signifiante 
('organisation de Ia Coupe du Monde, pas plus que les services de l'Etat 
n'ont pu le faire. Les services de I'Etat ont ete I'oeil qui rapportait 
a Paris 
ce qui posait probleme et I'idee de Ia fagon dont it fallait le resoudre mais 
un directeur comme moi ne peut pas dire d'avoir une opinion technicienne 
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sur un element d'architecture sans s'inspirer de ce que I'architecte vient de lui dire. Donc ('influence, c'est pas la mienne, ('influence c'est celle de I'architecte avec peut-titre quelques comment dirai-je, quelques 
observations parce qu'on a un petit peu ('habitude de voir ces dossiers-lä 
et de savoir comment it faut les presenter a Paris. Mais pas plus. 
D'accord. Et est-ce que le, enfin, vous avez dejä un peu repondu a ma 
question mais dans quelle mesure le mouvement sportif a-t-il ete concerte 
et pris en compte dans ce dossier ? 
II ya eu d'abord dans la partie anterieure, au moment oü it ya eu 
I'organisation ici, le comite a ete mis en place, le comite d'organisation 
local. Dans cette partie qui a precedee, les relations avec le mouvement 
sportif ont ete entretenu avec le comite olympique departemental, ont ete 
entretenu avec le comite olympique regional, ont entretenu avec bien sur 
le comite departemental de football et la ligue de football au plan regional 
mais aussi avec le vaste mouvement des autres disciplines a propos de la 
place de ce mouvement pour tirer profit de cet evenement. Donc le 
mouvement sportif a ete informe, concerte, comment dirai-je, co-acteur 
de la reflexion pendant toute Ia periode qui est allee en gros de 80... allez 
soyons objectif de 93,14,94 jusque 98 on depasse donc, la derriere 
annee est une annee de mise en place, d'amenagement, donc de 94 
jusqu'ä 97. Pendant 3 annees, il ya eu des va et vient de concertation, de 
cooperation, de, mettant en place une co-participation en quelque sorte, 
entre le mouvement sportif en general, le football en particulier et puls 
toutes les autorites qui avaient peu ou prou la responsabilite. A partir du 
moment oü en 97, s'installe le comite local, quasiment tous les tiroirs ont 
ete visite tous les, tous les volets de la, de la manifestation ont ete 
comment dirai-je valides et on est Bans quelque chose qui est maintenant 
on verse a T-12 mois, T-1 mois, on verse sur la manifestation. Et lä, plus 
de discussion. Lä, lä c'est simplement, j'ai envie de dire, la chaIne qui se 
met en place et it ya un retro planning qui fait qu'elle dolt titre respectee. 
Et pour revenir au politique, quelle a ete on va dire, ('implication et le role 
de Rene Olmeta dans ce dossier ? 
Alors a I'epoque Rene Olmeta dans sa premiere, dans la premiere pantie 
du dossier, ii etait responsable aux sports, adjoint aux sports. II a donc, le 
plus naturellement du monde etait celui qui a en tant qu'acteur de la ville 
de Marseille, regu le message parisien de l'intention, donc quelque part 
d'titre candidat a la coupe du monde. Puis ensuite simplement la ville de 
Marseille est questionnee : est-elle partie prenante dans la coupe 
du 
monde? Donc, au titre de ce mandat il a effectivement eu lui, 
la 
responsabilite de porter le message politique de la ville, le message 
politique au sens de on est d'accord et au sens de quelque part voila 
(es 
grands choix que ('on souhaiterait qu'il soit fait pour la ville de Marseille. 
Donc Rene Olmeta a joue un role, un role important dans ce moment-lä, 
a 
la comment dirai-je, au diapason de sa responsabilite politique. 
Avec 
quelque chose, j'ai envie de dire de lui qu'il a dü jouer, plus qu'un adjoint 
aux sports joue naturellement parce que, tout en 
etant partisan de cette 
manifestation, le presid, le maire de Marseille, Vigouroux aI epoque, 
n'etait absolument pas celui qui au quotidien transparaissait comme 
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porteur du dossier politiquement. Donc quelque part Rene a eu et a su 
porte a I'avant le message de la ville de Marseille. Bon, en homme averti 
qu'il est du sport, et en homme averti qu'il etait aussi du fonctionnement 
politique sur la ville de Marseille. Donc it a joue un role important. Son role 
s'est termine en 95, on etait encore a deux ans, on etait dans la partie la 
plus, dans la partie montante des choses. Et donc disons, son role a ete 
un role important pour en gros faire en sorte que le dossier marseillais 
prenne forme en deuxieme dossier de I'accueil de la coupe du monde, 
c'est-ä-dire apres Paris. Ca c'est certain parce que toute une serie 
d'ambitions qui prefiguraient le dossier definitif ne peuvent venir que de la 
periode Vigouroux, donc de sa periode lä, hein. Apres, la periode Gaudin 
a, le dossier a pris une teile forme que ga aura lieu a Marseille, on a, on a 
dejä le sentiment que ce qui sera valide ce sera une presence forte de la 
coupe du monde a Marseille. Et pugs ensuite it ya toutes les annexes du 
dossier marseillais que Gaudin a mis en avant a savoir la fagon, pousser 
au plus la demande de financement d'aide de I'Etat, provoquant quelque 
part des reactions, provoquant quelque part la mise a I'etude par les 
architectes de certaines novations, de certains aspects, par exemple les 
parvis, dont on a, qui sont d'un cote comme de I'autre, sont quand meme 
des choses qui avaient ete dimensionnees pour le roller. Donc it y avait 
quand meme des ambitions tres precises. Ca c'est Gaudin qui le porte. Ca 
c'est Gaudin qui le porte parce que c'est la Zeme partie, c'est la partie je 
vais avoir la coupe du monde, quest-ce que je mets en plus de la coupe 
du monde. Voila. Donc Rene Olmeta a joue ce role-la premier, 
probablement de jouer le role a la fois de I'elu, aux sports, et puis quelque 
part de celui qui peut porter is parole du maire. 
Donc ('implication de Vigouroux a ete relativement faible, on va dire, sur le 
dossier... 
Disons qu'elle a ete a l'image de la presence politique de Vigouroux a 
I'epoque qui etait une presence forte mais dont les echos etaient peut-titre 
si vous vouiez bon, insuffisants pour penser qu'il etait entendu de partout. 
Donc quelque part, ne mettons pas en cause son role de maire, it I'a 
rempli, a sa fagon, avec sa dimension politique et it a eu sur ce dossier-lä 
le relais, le vrai relais de force ga a ete Rene Olmeta. Jusqu'ä, jusqu'en 
gros disons 94, debut 95, apres c'etait la campagne electorale. N'oublions 
pas tout de meme que, dans la periode qui suit comment dirai-je, qui 
precede I'evenement de 95, qui est ('election ici de la municipalite it est 
des ruptures profondes qui se font a propos justement, dans I'equipe 
Vigouroux en direction du futur. Et que donc la derniere annee 94-95 est 
une annee blanche, de ce point de vue. Si ce n'est dans certain cas, une 
annee oü des freins ont ete poses qui auraient pu titre 
evites s'il n'y avait 
pas eu de conflit politique. Donc on est oblige de temperer un petit peu, 
la 
perception que I'on peut avoir du message politique, oui it existait mais 
it 
etait surtout re'laye. 
Et quelles etaient les personnes ressources on va dire de Rene 
Olmeta par 
rapport a ce dossier ? Est-ce qu'il y avait des personnes sur 
lesquelles it 
s'appuyait ? 
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Le directeur des sports de I'epoque, le directeur des sports de I'epoque, les services. J'ai envie de dire que Rene Olmeta s'appuyait sur toutes les 
potentialites qui lui paraissaient titre bonne pour que le dossier avance. La direction departementale et regionale de la jeunesse et des sports, etaient 
celles vers lesquelles it s'est souvent tourne, it se tournait vers les 
autorites de la prefecture car it avait droit de cite si je puls dire a ce 
niveau-lä, it s'est appuye sur toutes les autorites qui pouvaient compenser le manque en gros de, de charisme du discours politique quelque part, qui faisait que it avait, it a su utiliser les potentialites locales pour pouvoir 
demarcher correctement un dossier qui etait un dossier difficile, donc c'est 
comme ga qu'il sen est sorti. Donc, tous les services, parce qu'il a su les 
mettre en avant. Le directeur des sports, certes, qui a ete, qui a ete 
quelqu'un de tres positif sur ce dossier-lä, parce que lui-meme avait une 
vision precise des choses, mais... Vous savez, la ville eile etait pas, eile 
etait pas equipee en technicien au niveau du sport pour dire qu'elle etait 
que c'est les techniciens du sport qui ont menage tous les espaces pour 
que la coupe du monde arrive, se mette en place, et soit un succes. C'est 
parce que quelque part, it ya eu une conviction profonde de tous les 
services d'aller dans le meme sens. Et quand je dis tous les services, oui, 
tous les services, parce qu'il ya les problemes d'environnement, it ya des 
problemes de voirie, it ya des problemes, it ya des problemes de securite, 
it ya des problemes de sport proprement dit, it ya des problemes 
comment dirai-je de communication etc. Tout ga fait que tous les services 
ont contribue a ga. 
Et au niveau de la population, est-ce que la population a ete concerte sur 
le dossier ? 
Bien entendu. En premier, la population qui a ete concertee c'est celle qui 
etait dans les abords du stade, pour des raisons des raisons de, j'ai envie 
de dire de parasitages obligatoires de la vie des habitants par un 
evenement de ce type. Au premier chef le fait que la voirie a ete a ete a 
ete modifiee et que tout un tas de dispositif qui existait ont ete amenages 
voire profondement modifies. Donc la population a ete concertee. Ensuite 
it y avait toute la problematique de voir avec cette population de 
proximite, comment eile pouvait titre un element important en disant un 
certain nombre de choses a I'organisateur a' propos de la fagon dont eile, 
eile percevait cette organisation, surtout qu'elle avait ('experience de 
('ensemble des matches de I'O. M., et ('on sait qu'ils sont quand meme 
exemplaires du point de vue a la fois des aspects positifs comme des 
aspects negatifs. Donc, la proximite. Ensuite, les marseillais ont ete 
consultes par differentes, differents reseaux et par differentes operations 
de questionnement sur la vision qu'ils avaient de la coupe du monde. 
Donc quand I'autorite politique, qu'elle soit nationale ou qu'elle soit locale, 
ont eu quelque part a dire leur choix, elles font elles font fait avec, it faut 
le dire avec force, une opinion des habitants, suffisamment exprimees 
pour que quelque part ga reponde vraiment a ce qu'ils souhaitaient. Donc, 
consultation des habitants, au premier chef les plus proches et ensuite 
bon, par comment dirai-je, par cercles successifs au plus loin au plus 
loin. 
Car it faut quand meme savoir qu'il y avait plusieurs zones de securite 
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pour la coupe du monde et que donc de Castellane a I'Obelisque et en allant sur les autres bords, c'est quand meme, allez je vais dire, en gros, une bonne moitie, entre 40 et 50% de la population marseillaise qui etait concernee par tout simplement la presence de la coupe du monde. En terme, au quotidien, 24 heures sur 24. Donc il ya quand meme eu la 
concertation. Au dela, il y avait des problemes par les reseaux habituels, il 
y avait des problemes d'image portees par Marseille, il y avait des 
problemes de, de, comment dirai-je, il y avait des problemes de 
circulation, a poser, il y avait des problemes d'emploi, il y avait des 
problemes de timing precis, par rapport a I'hotellerie, par rapport aux 
commerces. Bon. Donc il ya eu consultation. De chacun, j'ai envie de dire, 
de chacune des entites representatives de la vie marseillaise. Oui. Sous 
des formes, critiquees par certains reseaux, par certaines filieres mais 
sous des formes suffisamment apparentes pour que tout un chacun sacke 
que ga a eu lieu et que ga a bien eu lieu. Alors, la concertation, eile est 
sujette a caution. Quand on se concerte avec les tetes de reseaux, c'est 
un type de concertation. Quand on se concerte avec une population plus 
large il faut que celle-ci vienne participer. C'est une autre, c'est une autre, 
comment dirai-je une autre ambition. Elle est pas toujours satisfaite 
autant. Donc ga a ete I'alternance entre la volonte de concerter le 
maximum et puls quelque part de s'en tenir aux reponses des tetes de 
reseaux porteurs de parole. 
Et les totes de reseaux justement, c'etait, c'etait, c'etait qui ? 
D'abord les CIQ ont ete consultes en premier lieu puisque c'est un outil de 
dialogue bon, a l'interieur de Marseille, le les representations associatives 
ont ete consultees, pas simplement sportives, donc queique part les, au 
niveau des usagers, au niveau des utilisateurs de ca, au niveau de ... Donc le monde associatif, porteur de la parole du citoyen a ete consulte, ensuite 
les structures purement representatives du monde economique ont ete 
consultees, les structures qui etaient la et qui pouvaient porter la 
communication de Marseille. Donc c'est a la fois la mairie mais ce sont des 
prestataires exterieurs. Donc tres largement tous les volets de la vie 
sociale, economique, culturelle sportive et politique de Marseille ont ete 
consultes sur ce plan-lä, peu ou prou, dans des conditions qui peuvent 
titre critiquees, mais it y avait une question de retro planning qui faisait 
qu'ä tel moment il fallait que la reponse soit donnee. Et donc a un 
moment donne, la concertation large qui attend que chacun est donne son 
opinion, eile est loin eile est loin d'etre atteinte hein, donc on fait quand 
meme. Mais les CIQ ont ete un relais important. Its le sont au naturel. 
Et en ce qui concerne le conseil general et le conseil regional, donc hormis 
leur implication financiere, economique, quelle a ete leur implication ? 
En dehors de cela, ils ont ete sollicites sur les elements techniques du 
dossier, parce qu'il ya des territoires partages, sur le plan des 
equipements et des competences partagees aux equipements, sur les 
problemes d'accueil touristique, sur les problemes de securite, meme, sur 
les problemes d'amenagement du territoire par le fait que des reseaux ... 
Donc ils ont ete concertos, sur tout, pratiquement, en tant qu'operateurs 
qui quelque part etaient sollicites pas simplement pour le financement 
de 
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la structure mais au delä sur les soutiens financiers a d'autres choses. Lä 
oü ils n'ont pas ete sollicites es qualite car c'est pas de leur ressort, c'est sur la structure elle-meme d'accueil. C'est-ä-dire sur le stade, sur les dimensions de, sur tout ce qui releve de I'equipement. C'etait la ville de Marseille qui avait donc, son potentiel, son pole de technicien sur ce plan- lä, la consultation de la region et du departement c'etait pour comment dirai-je, permettre le succes des operations, fussent-elles des operations initiees uniquement par Marseille. Donc voila. Alors c'est vrai que, c'est de to convergence des opinions quest nee effectivement la possibilite de 
mettre un certain nombre de chose en place. Je dis des opinions. Cela ne 
veut pas dire que ce sont des accords complets, pour certaines choses 
c'est beaucoup plus le consensus, manifestement un excellent outil a 
I'epoque, dans ce genre de manifestations qui a gagne la partie, plus 
qu'autre chose. Donc, les collectivites territoriales de par leur pouvoir reel 
sur le territoire de la ville n'ont ete que des operateurs financiers d'abord, 
sollicites disons de maniere tres superficielle sur les elements techniques, 
par contre sollicitees aussi sur la participation dun certain nombre 
d'operateurs economiques, d'operateurs notamment sur le tourisme et 
autre, a la valorisation de ('operation et a la participation justement a la 
bonne organisation de l'operation. Et pas plus. 
Mais, enfin, d'apres ce que j'ai lu dans la presse et dans les documents, ils 
ont quand meme mis, que ce soit le conseil general et le conseil regional 
environ un an et demi a deux ans a donner leur accord pour le, pour le 
finan, le financement du stade. 
J'ai envie de dire que moi qui etait au coeur du dispositif, c'etait quasiment 
prevu clans le, clans I'enchainement du systeme, de maniere naturelle et 
de maniere particuliere a Paris, euh a Marseille. Au motif premier que 
quand on est uniquement un operateur financier sur une operation initiee 
nationalement dont la retombee est sur une ville laquelle a I'autonomie de 
sujet, on est toujours comment dirai-je, on a un comportement attentiste 
a propos de la premiere, de la reponse financiere. Le deuxieme element 
qu'il ne faut pas oublier c'est que dans la mise en oeuvre definitive des 
financements, on etait passe d'une situation d'une ville de Marseille, et il 
faut le noter, dirigee par un maire qui avait eu une election sur la base 
d'une politique posee a gauche, et qu'on avait une municipalite avec une 
vision d'avenir de la ville posee sur une declaration politique de droite. 
Que I'on avait, que I'on avait au conseil general une politique de gauche. 
Et que, par vole de consequence, it ne pouvait y avoir que un certain 
nombre de hiatus et un certain nombre de dysfonctionnements. Au conseil 
regional, le sujet etait simple puisque c'etait encore Gaudin, qui etait 
president de region. Mais pour lui il y avait un besoin de faire penser et de 
faire voir, c'est tout naturel, que qu'il ne se servait pas de la region pour 
reussir sa, son, son operation au niveau de la ville de Marseille qui 
etait 
porteuse du projet. D'autant plus que Gaudin savait tres bien, intelligence 
politique et puls des systemes, que la coupe du monde avait lieu 
la meme 
annee oü etait pose le renouvellement du conseil general, regional, et 
du 
conseil general. Et que par consequent it fallait qu'il ait une 
distance 
suffisamment grande et qu'il reponde, non pas avant, non pas apres non 
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plus mais en meme temps que le conseil general a un financement, parce 
que sinon sa demarche de retard ou d'avance aurait ete qualifiee de, 
d'electoraliste ou au contraire de frein parce que I'autre avait donne son 
accord. Donc Iä on est, excusez-moi de le dire mais dans quelque chose 
qui s'appelle Ia cuisine politique. C'est tout. Voila. 
D'accord. Donc en 1995, donc changement de municipalite, donc donc 
Villani et Gaudin recuperent le dossier : queiles ont ete les principaux 
changements ? Vous m'avez dit tout ce qui concerne le pourtour du stade, 
quels ont ete les changements au niveau des orientations aussi ? 
Faire du stade un point central du developpement dun certain nombre de 
pratiques sportives populaires. C'est-ä-dire, une immense, une immense, 
un immense espace, valorise par le fait que si le stade etait ferme alors 
qu'il etait pas ferme avant, donc it y avait une retenue pour demain, tous 
ces espaces lä etaient a disposition de i'ensemble des marseillais pour des 
pratiques adaptes sur ce lieu, sur ces endroits-lä. La perspective avait ete 
un moment evoquee, d'y installer ce qu'on appelait a I'epoque des 3- 
Sports, c'est-ä-dire des lieux de pratiques type basket, n'est-ce pas, que 
j'ai bien connu puisque j'etais au ministere a I'epoque, ga na pas abouti 
parce que, parce que ga necessitait une organisation tres structuree pour 
eviter que, en faisant bien, on ait plus de difficultes que en laissant les 
gens de cote parce que le probleme c'est que quand on met des centaines 
de jeunes a un endroit, il faut qu'il y est une organisation qui impose Ia 
securite et l'education etc. etc. Et que donc on a prefere cette immense 
espace libere de fagon a ce que ce soit le lieu de rencontre de ceux qui 
pouvaient effectivement faire du sport lä. On peut... des families et des 
gens en individuels. Donc c'est cela, c'est aussi de I'autre cote le lien etroit 
avec le palais des sports dans cet espace libre qui va etre rehabilite 
maintenant dune autre fagon. Donc quelque part c'est cette intention de 
faire que le stade eclaire une volonte de dire Marseille est une ville 
ouverte a ses habitants et que toute installation sportive nest pas 
('exclusive et I'exclusivite de Ia discipline mais que Ia ville pense gu'elle a 
des pratiquants autres que le football, et que c'est aussi un lieu populaire. 
Donc cette dimension a ete longtemps discutee, tres tres tres longtemps 
discutee puisque la ville voulait qu'il y est vraiment des installations 
populaires lä, donc it ya eu apres des prob'lemes de niveau de 
financement et le determinant ga a ete effectivement que le dossier 
etait 
trop cher par rapport a ce que Ia ville devait investir sur le stade 
lui- 
meme, et que donc on est reste a un niveau quand meme de concept tres 
interessant. C'est quand meme interessant d'avoir un stade ouvert dans Ia 
partie qui est fermee regulierement oü les gens peuvent aller 
faire du 
roller etc. etc. C'etait surtout sur les sports je dirai de glisse, que 
les 
choses se posaient, ensuite faire les J-Sports lä, ga posait beaucoup 
trop 
de probleme pour I'avenir. Donc c'est vela, c'est aussi c'est aussi puisque 
c'etait une neecessite, valoriser et renover un certain nombre 
d'autres 
stades puisqu'il etait evident que les participants 
a Ia coupe du monde 
avaient besoin de lieu d'entrainement. C'est donc quelque part, non 
seulement sur Marseille mais de Marseille en liaison avec 
d'autres villes 
comme Aubagne et puis et puls et puls La Penne sur 
Huveaune, et puls 
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voyons Martigues que, ont ete mis en place des Iieux d'accueil des equipes 
participant a la coupe du monde pour qu'ils aient des lieux bon, 
completement securises, a eux pour I'entrainement de leurs joueurs. Donc 
Sa c'est la dimension exterieure, avec le fait que, dans le meme temps oü la coupe du monde developpait sa demarche au niveau des constructions 
et donc de ces espaces-lä, la ville a investi fortement cette annee-lä sur I'aide au mouvement sportif pour que it y ait sentiment que effectivement 
it y avait un lien de cause a effet entre, entre la ville et puls, entre 
I'evenement, la ville et puls le mouvement sportif de maniere genorale. 
Mais ('intention politique ca a ete de faire de ce lieu-lä, un lieu 
d'environnement ouvert sur la ville, je pense que c'est dans une certaine 
mesure, une reussite. Puisque, c'est un lieu de, de, c'est un lieu de vie. II 
suffit d'y aller aujourd'hui et de voir que c'est un lieu de vie, c'est un lieu 
symbolique et c'est aussi un lieu de vie. Ya pas que, c'est le lieu de I'OM a 
certain moment et c'est le lieu de tout le monde a d'autres moments. 
L'utilisation du stade : ca a ete de dire que le stade etait footbalistique 
mais etait aussi ouvert a d'autres competitions qui peuvent avoir. C'est 
I'idee, cette idee-Iä qui a regu concretisation des fors que l'on a vu un 
certain nombre de matches de la, soit du tournoi des cinq nations soit des 
pre-lap du tournoi des 5 nations avoir lieu soit des tests matches avoir 
lieu, de rugby avoir lieu sur Marseille. C'est quand meme evenementiel, 
tellement evenementiel que I'un des effets induits que je citais dans mon 
premier propos, c'est que la coupe du monde de foot, de rugby aura lieu 
en 2007 ici. 
Et quel a ete, enfin, quelles ont ete ('implication d'un cote de Jean-Claude 
Gaudin et de I'autre de Robert Villani, sur ce dossier ? 
Alors, Jean-Claude Gaudin en tant que maire de Marseille et dans sa 
conception du role a ete I'homme cle des moments officiels oü se, oü se 
formalisent et se concluent les grands dossiers. Sur tous les moments oü il 
fallait qu'il y est la parole du maire, la parole de la ville, politique, Gaudin 
etait lä, Jean-Claude Gaudin etait la. Ca a donc ete un accompagnement 
politiquement vrai, je juge donc pas la du contenu, je juge essentiellement 
de l'existant. Deuxiemement ga a ete un accompagnement humain par la 
personnalite du maire, qui a eu, qui a marque le terrain, c'est une 
certitude, et a cote de lui, et au plus large tout au long des mois qui ont 
precede I'evenement, ga a ete une participation vraie de Robert Villani, 
avec les moyens de ses services, c'est-a-dire quelque part des moyens 
tres inferieurs, en puissance, a ceux que representaient par exemple les 
services techniques autres que celui des sports. Mais le, la parole sportive 
de la ville de Marseille a ete relaye et sportivement et politiquement par 
Robert Villani en en suivi de Jean-Claude Gaudin qui etait le porteur de la 
vraie parole politique avec les conditions un peu comment dirai-je, un peu 
culturelle qui sont les siennes lorsqu'il s'adresse au public. Donc il ya eu, 
lä, un duo, effectivement, un duo, ni a minima, ni a maxima, un 
duo 
naturel qui s'est cree avec, on peut le dire, probablement, une certaine 
difficulte du cote de Robert Villani parce que ses services sont, etaient 
des 
services qui ont grandit depuis mais qui n'etaient pas 
a I'epoque des 
services enormes. 
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Est-ce que les services des sports etaient differents sous Olmeta et sous Villani ? 
Ben c'est-ä-dire que, c'est-ä-dire que le nombre, le nombre, le nombre de personnes qui depuis ont etee partie prenante du service des sports, rattache au service des sports, a grandi pour raisons tenant ä des 
politiques plus expansives en matiere d'equipement, en matiere de soutien 
et developpement de manifestation, en matiere de soutien et developpement des pratiques sportives de maniere generale. Le service des sports de la ville de Marseille est numeriquement plus important en 2004 qu'il n'etait en 98. C'est une certitude. Donc Rene Olmeta etait, avec 
un service respectable mais qui n'etait pas celui qui est aujourd'hui en 
place, et qui etait en place en 98. 
D'accord. Donc en terme de resultats on va dire, entre guillemets, est-ce 
que vous pensez que les objectifs ont ete, ont ete atteints ? 
Alors, si j'etais purement administratif et technicien, je dirai voila : vous 
prenez les comptes de la coupe du monde, et dans la repartition, au 
niveau national, it ya eu un benefice. Un benefice, si je ne me trompe qui 
est de I'ordre de 1 milliard de francs. Donc it ya quelque part une 
retombee, importante, quand je dis un milliard de francs c'est parce que, 
a I'epoque, le fond national du developpement du sport qui est donc une 
une dimension de I'aide au sport a partir du national par le pre-compte sur 
le PMU et sur le loto, etait de I'ordre d'1 milliard 2, annuellement. Ce qui 
montre bien la, Ia, ('importance des retombees sur le mouvement sportif. 
Donc succes si je men tenais a ca. Ca c'est pas essentiel. C'est, je vais 
pas dire que c'est pas non plus accessoire et anecdotique, bien au 
contraire. Ce qui est important c'est la facon dont a ete apprehends la 
coupe du monde, je vous en ai pane giobalement, et la fawn dont eile a 
tits conduite en terme d'ac, en tant qu'accompagnement de la dimension 
sportive et comment eile a ete terminee. Parce qu'il est toujours difficile, 
de mon point de vue, pour une collectivite territoriale ou une entite 
politique de bien terminer quelque chose qui est clans son emprise au 
quotidien. Et la ville de Marseille a su le faire car eile a decants de la 
coupe du monde, sans oublier un certain nombre d'engagement qu'elle 
avait pu prendre a propos de la coupe du monde. Globalement, et parce 
qu'il y avait un comite d'organisation mais aussi que la ville a tits 
attentive, on peut estimer que, sur le plan de la communication de la ville 
de Marseille, sur le plan de ('organisation proprement dite et de ses 
capacites a organiser une manifestation de niveau national et 
international, sur sa capacite de bonne gestion des rapports avec sa 
population a propos de cet evenement, donc c'est important. C'est a la 
fois capte la parole en amont et titre capable de faire ce que la parole 
populaire souhaite et rendre compte que ca a tits fait dans de bonnes 
conditions et qu'il y est pas de debat autour de la coupe du monde. 
Ensuite, sur le plan purement de ('image du sport dans Marseille, succes % aussi, et sur le plan de ('image de Marseille, on peut estimer que le succes 
reel, parce qu'il ya eu des evenements dramatiques, souvenons-nous de 
ce qui passer pendant la coupe du monde dans la region lilloise, it n'y a eu 
aucun incident majeur, mis a part un evenement le premier ou le 
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deuxieme jour sur le Vieux Port avec des supporters hollandais, avec lesquels it ya eu effectivement des gros deboires. C'est vrai que les 
commergants proches du Vieux Port ont ete soumis a contrainte tres tres 
fortes et que ils ont plus souvent eu a fermer leurs leurs echoppes et puls leurs etablissements qu'ä les ouvrir, mais comparativement a ce qu'il a pu 
se passer ä d'autres endroits, c'est pas un evenement exceptionnel dans Ia 
coupe du monde, malheureusement hein, je dis malheureusement, mais 
c'est pas non plus le, I'evenement de Marseille n'est pas le premier des evenements negatifs de Ia coupe du monde, sur ce plan-la. Donc 
globalement, Ia coupe du monde a ete, peut titre inscrite comme ayant 
ete un vrai succes pour Ia ville de Marseille, au travers de ce qu'elle avait 
entrepris et son ambition lui a servi. Voila ce que je veux dire. 
Quels sont, Iä je vais vous parler un peu plus de Ia politique sportive on va 
dire municipale en general, quelles sont les principales differences que 
vous pouvez faire entre Ia politique de Rene Olmeta et Ia politique de 
Robert Villani en terme de dossier prioritaire, on va dire en terme d'axe 
politique, quelles sont les principales differences, ce qu'ils ont en commun 
aussi ? 
Alors je crois que ce que I'on doit mettre au benefice de Rene Olmeta, 
c'est une excellente capacite a bien, a rentrer dans les dossiers, a les 
connaltre et a Ia maitriser, a Ia fois sur le plan conceptuel, sur le plan 
politique et sur le plan technique. Et jai envie de dire quelque part sur Ia 
projection sportive qui peut en titre faite. Je crois que ce n'est pas faire 
insulte que de dire que Robert Villani, du moins dans ses premiers pas, 
n'avait pas Ia, les qualifications dont je viens de parler que Rene Olmeta 
possedait. A Ia difference de Rene Olmeta, Robert Villani peut s'appuyer 
sur du propos politique porte et demultiplie quant aux intentions de 
politique sportive de Ia ville de Marseille quand celle-ci a ('intention de 
mettre en place une politique sportive. Car je veux noter que, daps Ia 
periode qui a precede Ia coupe du monde pour des raisons budgetaires et 
qui a suivi Ia coupe du monde pour des raisons budgetaires, le nombre, 
('ambition de Ia ville de Marseille en matiere de sport, sportive, locale, pris 
au sens local du terme a ete quand meme particulierement limitee. Ce qui 
n'a pas ete le cas, qui n'etait pas encore le cas pour Rene Olmeta qui avait 
les mains beaucoup plus libre parce qu'il y avait pas ces coupes sombres 
necessaires ou ces limites budgetaires. Nonobstant ce moment-lä qui est 
un moment de dimension politique avec des decisions qui ont ete prises, il 
ya eu ensuite Ia, le discours politique a propos dun certain nombre 
d'action qui devait titre menees et d'operation dans le domaine sportif 
hors coupe du monde portees politiquement donc connues du public et 
concretisees par des projets portes par Robert Villani. II est certes vrai que 
Ia critique peut titre portee sur une periode relativement noire oü 
('absence de credit conduit a I'absence de propositions dans le, 
de 
propositions majeures, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, renover, entretenir 
des 
gymnases ou des stades, ga n'est pas avoir une politique sportive, c'est 
Ia 
politique naturelle d'une d'une collectivite a I'egard de ces, 
de ces 
ressortissants. Donc on est aujourd'hui dans Ia phase ascendante qui est 
celle de (coupure entretien telephonique). Oui je voulais poursuivre en 
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disant que on va aujourd'hui vers une amplification des declarations 
politiques consignees par des actes precis. On arrive, aujourd'hui, a avoir une lisibilite du schema politique choisi par Ia ville de Marseille a propos du sport pour demain. Mais on est dans une periode qui suit une periode de 3 ou 4 ans pendant laquelle on etait dans Ia notion des vaches maigres. Alors, ces 4 ans ont vraisemblablement conduit Robert Villani a 
avoir une plus grande maitrise de ('ensemble des dossiers hormis le champ 
politique et d'avoir donc une proximite avec Ia decision un petit peu plus tout a' fait differente du passe, et certainement quelque chose de plus 
concret. Nous sommes dans, veritablement, je pense pour Marseille, tous les effets de Ia coupe du monde ayant ete tout a I'heure evoques, un 
certain nombre des principaux, nous sommes probablement dans une 
periode oü si je puis dire, le laboureur va devoir labourer sur son champ, 
sans que personne d'autre que lui-meme ne decide de de des objectifs du labour et des conditions dans lesquelles il va labourer. Donc on est 
vraiment, Iä, dans I'acte un d'une politique sportive sur Marseille plus que 
dans I'acte deux. Mais pour des raisons que je voudrais expliquer. Elles 
sont, je veux demeurer objectif et il faut I'etre en pareil cas, c'est parce 
qu'il ya eu cette coupe du monde qui a eu des effets favorables mais qui 
a aussi quelque peu malmene Ia, Ia dimension budgetaire de Ia politique 
sportive. 
Et alors quelle difference faites-vous, toujours entre ces deux 
municipalites on va dire, sur Ia prise en compte du mouvement sportif ? 
Alors, sur, sur Ia dimension relationnelle, celle de recevoir, celle d'ecouter, 
celle d'aller a Ia proximite du mouvement sportif, peu de difference. 
Parlant des hommes qui ont charge, en tant qu'adjoint, de conduire Ia 
politique sportive, les personnalites se sont affirmees de maniere 
differentes mais chacun deux etant d'abord marseillais, ce sont a peu pres 
aa ('equivalent, les discours les discours etant differents, bien sür. La Ia 
relation que Rene Olmeta entretenait avec le sport etait une relation qui 
meritait le qualificatif de de de, de transparence. C'est-a-dire que quelque 
part, je crois pas qu'on puisse le taxer de grandes annonces intempestives 
qui. Bien. En revanche, en tant que technicien avere de Ia politique, il 
apparait comme etant tout en etant tres competent, comme celui qui sait, 
parce qu'iI se le dolt en tant que politique ne reveler que ce qui lui portera 
j'ai envie de dire, le bien plus que le mal. Donc par consequent, il ya dans 
Ia partie discours, quelque chose de tres selectif. II ya quelque chose 
d'opportun, il ya quelque chose de de tier a ce qu'iI sait du point de vue 
de ses capacites et de ce qu'iI sait aussi d'etre les pretentions du monde 
sportif. Donc c'est le grand equilibre. Je voudrais dire que si je prends 
Robert Villani, il est moins dans ces subtilites. Et il est davantage dans un 
un, un comportement qui est celui de demeurer silencieux et 
politiquement et techniquement quand ii salt qu'il n'a pas les moyens de, 
du discours, et d'etre par contre tres percutant quand il salt qu'iI va avoir 
les, les, les elements. C'est-ä-dire que lui, a Ia difference de Rene Olmeta, 
pourrait titre qualifie de personne qui prend des risques sur son futur 
parce qu'iI se tait ou il ne dit rien dont quelque part il peut titre suppose 
devoir cacher mais en contrepartie on pourrait aussi considerer, deuxieme, 
246 
APPENDIX 
deuxieme phase de la medaille, qu'il soit quelqu'un de plus, comment dirai-je, honnete, au sens de discours, que Rene Olmeta qui lui ficelle un discours en permanence mais le conjugue a tout un tas d'alternatives dont 
it salt qu'elles seront devant lui et qu'elles sont devant lui. Donc quelque 
part, it ya deux personnages politiques tout a fait differents I'un de I'autre 
sur deux periodes completement differentes. Sur deux ambitions de 
Marseille completement differentes et j'ai envie de dire deux 
positionnements de Marseille differents. Marseille de 2004 n'est pas Marseille de 92-95 ou de 90-95. C'est completement different du point de 
vue du positionnement international, national, de l'image, du 
developpement, du developpement urbain, de la requalification de certains 
quartiers, etc. etc. On est sur un autre espace avec un support 
economique puissant. C'etait pas le cas a l'epoque de Rene Olmeta, c'etait 
pas le cas parce que, au niveau de, national, ('image de Marseille n'etait 
pas ('image que Marseille a su gagner depuis les annees, clans les annees 
90. Donc on est ailleurs. Et parce qu'on est ailleurs, je vais a tätons sur le 
jugement de 2 hommes ayant vecus deux periodes completement 
differentes. Meme si, quelque part, je me risque a les qualifier d'hommes 
completement differents du point de vue de leur comportement politique 
non pas au nom de la politique qu'ils portent mais au nom de ce qu'ils 
veulent faire pour le sport. Donc lä on est vraiment clans quelque chose 
d'un petit peu subtil mais it faut connaitre les hommes pour, pour, et les 
systemes pour pouvoir, bon, moi, meme s'ils etaient lä je le dirai avec 
autant de facilite, autant de de de, de rigueur que je veux avoir clans le, 
dans ('analyse, c'est simple, meme si moi je peux avoir mes opinions un 
petit peu plus personnelles sur ces choses-lä. Je parlais lä un regard de 
quelqu'un qui se sent en phase avec la dimension sportive et qui par le 
metier qui a ete le mien, et par le savoir qu'on ma donne, se dit un petit 
peu qualifie pour juger. Voila. 
Et quelle eetait la place et ('importance donc justement on va dire, de 
I'OMS, ('office municipal des sports et du service des sports, sous ces deux 
municipalites ? Quel etait leur role et leur importance ? 
Alors sous le, sous le regne, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, de Rene Olmeta, 
la dimension de I'OMS etait une une une dimension relativement, 
comment dire, reduite. Pourquoi ? Parce que la sollicitation de l'OMS avait 
ete remise en cause par toute une serie d'evenements anterieurs 
a propos 
des de la place que I'OMS pouvait tenir etc. ('office des sports, parce qu'il y 
avait eu des evenements un petit peu troubles autour de la dimension 
de 
I'OMS sur les connexions politiques ou politico-ad ministrative-financieres, 
ga avait ete tres trouble dans une periode anterieure d'ailleurs 
a, comment 
s'appelle-t-il, a Vigouroux, donc l'OMS etait une entite 
finalement qui 
la dimension du n'avait pas d'importance par rapport a, par rapport a 
sport. En revanche, si ('entite en tant que teile ne I'avait pas, 
les hommes 
et les femmes qui pouvaient porter le message d'une OMS 
bis, etaient tres 
presents autour de Rene Olmeta et tres sollicites. C'est-ä-dire que 
les 
hommes et les femmes qualifies pour parler du sport, Rene 
Olmeta savait 
qui ils etaient, qui elles etaient, et allait vers. Donc on 
eeait dans quelque 
chose qui etait pas comment dirai-je, institution naIise, mais qui 
etait 
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quelque chose de tout aussi important. Depuis que, depuis que Villani est devenu, it ya eu la periode premiere o' aujourd'hui, comment s'appelait- 
il, qui a ete president de I'OMS, jai oublie le nom, qui est un chercheur de 
I'Universite de Marseille sur le plan des maladies tropicales, Raoux ! 
Monsieur Raoux a donne une impulsion tres tres forte a TOMS, avec une 
dimension qui se voulait titre tres politique. Ce qui a pose une serie de 
probleme au mouvement sportif participant a I'OMS, et quelque part un 
certain nombre de dissensions, qui ont fait que Ia, la sollicitation de I'OMS 
par Robert Villani a ete temperee a mon avis au simple motif que cette 
institution par la personnalite de Raoux et ses engagements politiques 
apparaissait comme etant probablement davantage en puissance, d'etre la 
puissance politique sportive de Marseille que ne pouvait titre ne pouvait 
I'etre I'adjoint. Donc quelque part, dans les deux cas, pour deux raisons 
differentes, la place de I'OMS n'a pas ete ce qu'on peut penser, qu'on 
aurait pu penser qu'elle puisse titre, et gu'elle aurait dü titre, aussi bien 
sous l'autorite de Rene Olmeta que de euh Robert Villani. On peut penser, 
que dans sa dimension actuelle, meme si le, le propos de I'OMS est 
aujourd'hui certainement couvert par tout un tas de choses car on en 
entend peu parler, sur la ville de Marseille, on peut penser que dans une 
etape aussi importante que celle qui semble s'ouvrir sur la ville de 
Marseille en matiere d'installations sportives, en matiere de manifestation 
sportive, et en matiere de developpement du sport, I'OMS redevienne un 
partenaire important. Mais a cela, et pour conclure sur ce sujet, je dirai 
que dans tous les cas d'especes, le probleme des OMS se pose en France 
de la meme fagon. Est-ce que, quelle est la limite a partir de laquelle une 
OMS devient un vecteur de la politique du, de la mairie, au sens politique 
j'entends, c'est-a-dire partisane et donc quelque part un outil soumis a, et 
% a quel moment, ä ('inverse, par sa presence politique au sens de declarer 
des choses qui ont un sens politique, cette OMS devient le deuxieme 
facteur de dissension parce que c'est ('opposition non, quelque fois dans 
un accord total. La personnalite de Raoux a amene a ce qu'il y est des, 
une ombre sur Villani alors que Villani etait premier adjoint, 
etait I'adjoint. 
Donc quelque part c'est de, c'est en quelque sorte sans le vouloir le calife 
qui veut titre calife a la place du vrai. Donc on est la vraiment 
dans 
quelque chose de tres classique. Donc aujourd'hui, on peut penser qu'il y 
aura toujours cette dualite puisque c'est le propre des OMS. La 
federation 
nationale des OMS nest rien d'autre que le poll a grafter 
de toutes les, de 
toutes les villes de France et de Navarre a propos du sport. Et que c'est, 
quelque part, dans son organisation federee, c'est une puissance 
politique... vraie. J'ai envie de dire meme, excusez-moi, mais un syndicat 
politique du sport. Parce que c'est comme tel, parce que 
les OMS sont 
aussi des personnels, ce sont aussi quelque part 
des entites 
t 
administratives qui sont derriere. Donc il est tres clair que 
la on est devant 
quelque chose de redoutable et la conversation, a plus 
forte raiso 
cooperation et la conjugaison des efforts c'est toujours quelque 
chose de 
tres, ou superficiel, ou alors tres difficile si on veut conjuguer 
1 'ensemble. 
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2. Interview with France Gamerre, 31 May 2005, Deputy 
Mayor responsible for Maritme Affairs. 
Donc la premiere chose que je voulais savoir c'etait comment est nee en fait I'idee de proposer Marseille comme ville euh 
Oui et bien euh 
Candidate 
En tant qu'adjointe aux affaires maritimes si vous voulez je suivais la la Coupe de I'America en tant que et euh euh au mois de novembre decembre 2003 euh jai vu que les le les la coupe Louis Vuitton etait pas 
encore terminee mais les suisses ont montre des qualites euh assez 
impressionnantes ainsi que leur bateau. Donc euh euh j'ai pense qu'ils 
pouvaient gagner et la Louis Vuitton et I'America's Cup. Donc euh j'ai a la 
rentree de janvier j'ai fait la la Louis Vuitton etait pas finie d'ailleurs j'ai fait 
un une note euh une lettre au maire en lui disant voila je pense que euh 
les suisses ont des ont les capacites de gagner le et la Louis Vuitton et 
I'America's Cup et euh ils n'ont pas la mer chez eux, la charte de 
I'America's Cup dit qu'il faut de I'eau salee, donc pourquoi pas Marseille, 
avec tous les avantages qu'apres on a decoule. Donc euh j'ai fait 2 notes 
au maire et puis euh j'ai propose de partir euh ils ont gagne la Louis 
Vuitton et j'ai propose de partir euh voir les voir euh leur presenter 
Marseille donc euh je suis partie avec un coureur et je suis avec un 
skipper et je suis partie avec un marin donc et un ingenieur parce qu'il ya 
des installations c'est tres technique et et moi-meme. Donc on est parti a 
(rire) a Auckland avec un montage euh euh audio etc etc des cadeaux, 
des livres sur Marseille, enfin tout ce qu'il fallait pour seduire les suisses, 
et en fait la strategie j'ai voulu y aller si vous voulez entre la la Louis 
Vuitton et I'America's Cup euh parce qu'ils etaient plus euh plus 
abordables. Apres une fois qu'ils etaient dans I'America's Cup c'etait bon je 
pensais qu'ils devaient etre tres tres tendus. Donc euh on a passe euh huit 
jours la bas et euh tout betement ! J'ai appele les suisses (rire) j'ai appele 
j'ai dit voila je suis euh adjointe au maire j'appelais d'ici de Marseille je 
souhaite venir voir etc ga c'est passe vraiment tres tres tres tres detendu, 
hein. Et donc on est parti la bas, on est reste huit jours, on a rencontre 
des gens, on a rencontre des responsables, on a rencontre des sportifs 
enfin... On a rencontre les autres equipes aussi. On a on a j'ai beaucoup 
observe clans la ville comment les choses se passaient j'ai rencontre des 
des gens de Auckland euh la j'ai vu les consequences, les retombees 
a Ia 
fois euh sociales economiques sportives qu'il y avait sur Auckland qui 
etaient euh qui etaient tres importantes puisqu'ils avaient eu la Coupe en 
2000 deja. 
Oui 
Voila. Donc euh ils avaient recolte plus de plus de 1 milliard euh de 
dollars 
euh entre les deux euh a la premiere, et la autant pour la deuxieme 
donc 
euh plus toutes les constructions qui avaient 
ete faites et les 
amenagements donc euh je suis revenue. Euh j'ai euh j'ai vu 
le maire, je 
lui ai explique ce que j'avais vu, je lui ai euh et je lui ai 
dit je repars (rire) 
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alors il me dit ah bon. Yai dit oui parce que euh c'est important de pleurer sur I'epaule de d'Ernesto quand il va gagner (rire). L'emotion p lie les etres. Donc euh je en fait je voulais voir une coupe. En fait j'ai ete tres degue parce que je suis repartie donc je suis restee dix jours ici je suis repartie euh Ernesto est le seul homme pour qui j'ai fait le tour du monde deux fois en un mois hein 
D'accord 
(rire) Ah oui oul oui (rires) Deux fois le tour du monde (rire) pas une fois deux fois. Et donc euh euh je en fait j'ai j'ai donc pas j'ai j'etais sur le bateau de d'Ernesto j'etais invitee, j'ai suivie une regate et la derniere 
regate avait ete retardee parce qu'il n'y avait pas de vent, et euh la nuit 
oii j'etais clans I'avion pour Los Angeles, ils ont gagne. (... ) J'etais pas sur 
place mais bon. On avait quand meme pas mal parle, j'ai connu tous les 
marins, les skippers, les equipes techniques, parce que c'est tres c'est 
impressionnant les les salles de les salles de meteo ou les salles de enfin 
c'est c'est la NASA une base hein. Vous avez la ce que les gens voient puis 
apres vous avez I'arriere boutique qui est fermee. C'est... c'est la NASA, 
tout marche avec des computers, des calculs, des enfin etc Et puis apres y 
aya tout le sportif euh et toute la maintenance enfin c'est c'est des 
ingenieurs qui sont Ia euh. A la fois sur le plan technologie, euh a Ia fois 
sur le plan meteo sur le plan des vents enfin voila. C'est tres tres 
complexe comme euh une equipe c'est quelque chose de tres complexe 
un team. Voila. Donc apres ben ben apres ils ont fait un appel euh donc 
on est revenu on a fait voter le principe de de participer, puisqu'on est 
une municipalite qu'on dolt des comptes a (... ) nos concitoyens, donc on a 
fait voter, on a fait un un comite de un comite de pilotage si vous voulez, 
avec les clubs enfin assez large et euh on a pose notre premiere 
candidature. Euh qui etait alors y avait pas de euh si vous voulez c'etait 
tres vaste c'etait un une candidature spontanee. Donc on a fait un premier 
document, comme on le comme on comme moi je le sentais apres ce que 
j'avais vu, bon alors apres its en ont selectionne la dessus je crois qu'on 
etait plus de 70. Bon apres on a eu donc des questions 
Oui 
Donc la on a repondu, encore, il y avait un nombre de pages limite, vous 
savez tres tres anglo-saxon : tant de pages pour teile question, tant de 
lignes pour Sa etc. Alors on a travaille avec les les clubs nautiques, avec le 
port autonome, euh avec les les avec le Ia communaute urbaine enfin 
vraiment ga a ete quelque chose de qui a cree une dynamique je dirais 
aussi euh entre les differents partenaires, entre les differents acteurs de la 
ville ca c'est tres important. Et donc on a ete selectionne apres dans 
les 
euh euh je me rappelle plus combien ils en avaient selectionne 7 je crois 
Huit il me semble 
Huit voila. Euh et puls apres y en avait plus que quatre, alors on a remis 
encore un dossier plus que quatre et Ia on a signe alors 
la c'etait un 
dossier je i'ai chez moi je le garderai en souvenir il est epais comme Sa y 
en a un par la. Et la donc on repondait en fait on a toutes 
les quatre nous 
avons signe le contrat, comme si nous I'avions. 
Oui. 
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Puisque euh si quand ils ont dit c'est c'est I'Espagne, bon le contrat etait 
signe dejä. S'ils avaient dit c'est la France, bon le contrat etait signe. Donc 
on a on a signe un contrat. On a travaille avec des cabinets d'avocats, 
avec des ingenieurs, meteo France enfin je voudrais oublier personne je 
sais pas si vous avez vu tout ga mais on a travaille vraiment euh d'une 
fagon tres tres large, et on a repondu a toute leurs demandes, et on avait 
des reunions euh avec le secretaire general de la ville, euh moi-meme euh 
le secretaire general pilotait I'aspect euh je dirais administratif, technique 
bon moi-meme sur le plan euh global et donc on avait des reunions 
plusieurs fois par semaine euh avec apres ya eu tout le contrat alors y 
avait les suisses d'un cote nous de l'autre avec nos avocats respectifs, et 
on a negocie le contrat point par point hein ! Euh parce que c'etait 
beaucoup d'argent. Et puls et puis et puis ben on a rendu le contrat dans 
les temps on I'a porte on I'a mene on I'a porte a Geneve (rire)le contrat. 
On a porte le contrat a Geneve et euh... et puis je suis allee moi 
accompagnee d'une euh d'un directeur general euh je suis allee (coupure) 
bon donc et et nous avons euh euh je suis allee donc on etait que deux 
bon alors j'avais deux discours : un on a la coupe, un on I'a pas (rire). 
Voila en fait bon on n'a pas on n'a pas on n'a on na on na on n'a pas eu 
donc euh et bon ben on on a dit euh c'etait on etait un peu triste quand 
ý meme. 
Oui j'imagine 
Mais ga a cree une tres grande dynamique pour le nautisme et surtout si 
vous voulez que ce soit tant le maire que moi-meme que que tous tous, 
tous nos partenaires, on a, a travers toutes les etudes qu'on a fait le 
travail de recherche qu'on a fait de mesures, de de, de et puls on s'est 
projete, je vous donnerai un exemple tout a I'heure qu'est-ce qu'on peut 
faire, quest-ce qu'on peut propose de nouveau etc, on a ete tres creatif. 
Et par exemple I'idee de creer un pole nautique a I'Estaque euh c'est sorti 
de mes bureaux On a dit mais ya une digue qui a euh qui est permeable 
euh et qui sert a rien, si on la repousse de... 100 metres ou 150 metres, 
on peut creer un magnifique pole nautique euh qui fait un equilibre au 
pole sud de euh et avec le euh le losange le Frioul le euh le pole sud avec 
le centre du Vieux Port et on cr on developpe un pole nautique qui existe 
dejä mais qui est... limite, a I'Estaque. Donc voyez on a on a il a germe 
tout plein de de on avait prevu toutes sortes de choses euh d'equipements 
donc nouveaux, d'idees nouvelles de developpement qui qui sont sortis 
de 
ce dossier. 
D'accord. 
Parce que on a vraiment, on voulait etre les plus originaux, 
les plus 
affütes, les les les, les moins chers (rire) on a fait et puis c'etait 
tres 
important sur le plan retombees euh economiques et sociales pour 
la ville. 
Parce que c'etait des creations d'emplois, euh de 
des des activites 
d'entreprises euh enfin Et puis c'etait avoir la la la plus grande euh 
la plus 
grande euh competition regates euh qui existe euh au monde 
hein. Avec 
tout ce que ga amene derriere. Voila. 
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Et justement alors donc en fait les attentes au depart vous, que vous avez par rapport a ce dossier, donc ce sont des attentes euh economiques 
sociales 
Sportives ! 
Sportives. 
L'image de Marseille, de communication, euh euh si vous voulez et puls de 
rayonnement de Ia ville. Et surtout de de reamenagement de Ia ville. Parce que euh faire des reame des amenagements et des 
reamenagements, vous savez que c'est tres long parce que les procedures d'appel d'etudes, d'appel d'offre sont tres longues bon. Euh lä on avait 
comme pour les jeux olympiques Ia possibilite de passer dans des 
procedures les memes mais accelerees. Donc ca veut dire ce que nous 
allons faire euh dans dix ans sur dix ans a Marseille, on le faisait en quatre 
ans. 
Ouais, ouais ouais. 
Hein euh. Donc on avait des procedures accelerees euh qui sont les 
memes, qui prennent les memes garanties mais qui au lieu de s'etendre 
euh sur de de longues periodes euh sont plus condensees. Voila. 
Oui, d'accord. Et euh... 
Pour notre ville c'etait aussi comment dire, sur le plan sportif, je veux dire 
c'est vraiment d'ailleurs on I'a vu pour les pre-regates euh on le voit pour 
le match racing que j'organise euh chaque annee je veux dire on cette 
annee il y avait 5 equipages America's Cup. Y avait euh Million Bird, Chris 
Dickson, les meilleurs etaient la. D'ailleurs il dit on comprend pas qu'on 
soit pas Marseille. Its adorent Marseille maintenant. Ah oui, les americains, 
les les les les neo-zelandais tout Sa sont ils sont tous venus pour le pour le 
match racing. Euh y avait 5 equipages qui etaient la. D'ailleurs c'est Ed 
Bird qui a gagne (rire). 
D'accord. Et euh donc euh dans je sail si Ia question va etre tres claire 
mais dans quel contexte vous avez pris euh Ia decision de euh de 
proposer Marseille comme ville candidate. Est-ce que c'etait euh y avait 
euh une dynamique dejä qui etait en place et qui vous a dit tiens pourquoi 
pas euh. 
Vous savez c'est pas, c'est pas venu voila c'etait c'est pas venu il ya 
plusieurs facteurs. D'abord c'est pas venu tout seul. Bon. Euh d'abord 
Marseille a une histoire maritime tres importante. Vous savez que 
Marseille est une des premieres villes a avoir organise des regates en dix 
huit cent quarante siz je crois, donc 5 ans avant euh Ia regate des Two 
Guinnies euh qui a qui a precede Ia vous connaissez ('histoire de 
oui oui oui 
de ('America's Cup. Bon euh Marseille a organise les premieres regates en 
1846, regates regates hein voila. Donc c'etait pratiquement, un 
des 
premiers... pays en Europe a organiser des regates formelles comme eile 
I'a fait. Donc yaya un savoir faire euh maritime, un savoir naviguer, et 
Marseille a aussi si vous voulez outre son histoire, sa culture, son savoir 
faire, on a aussi quand meme des clubs nautiques qui sont euh 
tres tres 
ancres tres developpes euh ('union nautique marseillaise, 
I'UNM etait lä je 
crois en 1882 quelque chose comme 4a, euh, euh 
Ia nautique en 1886 ou 
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87. Bon ya toute une tradition si vous voulez de, de regates euh de de de de grands euh d'a d'architecture aussi de de de, de la mer euh. Marseille a a vecu alors ya des periodes c'est tres curieux ya des periodes oü Marseille vit de la mer, et puls des pe des periodes oü MarseiBie tourne le dos a la mer. Et lä on sortait d'une periode oü Marseille avait tourne le dos 
a la mer avec les problemes de port, les problemes euh, on vivotait disons hein bon. Et lä avec I'arrivee de The Race, euh avec les Jeux Mondiaux de la Voile que j'ai organise euh qu'on accueillit accueillit en quatre vingt en 2002. En 2001 on a eu I'arrivee de, je suis arrivee en meme temps que The Race moi ici (rire). Donc si voulez, tout §a, euh moi je me suis dit 
mais attends, lä dedans ya quand meme une dynamique euh quand vous 
reunissez 150 mille ba 150 mille personnes a, a1 heure du matin pour 
accueillir un bateau, c'est qu'il se passe quelque chose. Bon, si vous 
voulez, quand on a eu les Jeux Mondiaux, on a monte les jeux mondiaux 
en 6 mois. Alors que parce que y avait une ville qui s'etait desistee et nous 
alors qu'il faut ils avaient travailler pendant euh je crois 2 ans, 2 ans ou 3 
ans pour les monter, bon. Je veux dire, tout Sa si vous voulez fait que euh 
ce savoir-faire, et ce savoir-etre aussi qu'on a c'est un savoir-etre euh ya 
yay avait un terrain propice hein et Marseille avait a renoue a la mer 
avec la mer avec toutes ces grandes competitions et euh la candidature de 
I'America's Cup d'ailleurs j'y ai pense en ecoutant les resultats, euh de la 
Louis Vuitton hein Sa ga m'est venu euh j'ai dit mais si les suisses gagnent 
ils ont pas d'eau salee bon. Nous on a des des, on a des des des endroits 
oü on peut les installer, que ce soit sur le Vieux Port, que ce soit a 
L'Estaque, euh on a quand meme des references, on a de grands on a de 
grands cou on a un pole France, on a un pole d'entrainement euh avec 
des des des on a ete champions de planche a voile, on a des gens qui 
sont aux Jeux Olympiques, on a on a moi j'embarque quand meme euh 
mes centres deja plus de 60 000 gosses par an, euh le le ('education 
nationale en fait autant, euh les clubs en font autant bon je veux dire ya 
y a... Y avait vraiment et puls surtout euh quand je quand j'ai vu si vous 
voulez sur place euh avecles etudes qui ont faites par euh les neo- 
zelandais sur les retombees, euh point de vue image, point de vue euh 
amenagement euh, point de vue euh emploi, au point de vue euh social, 
parce que tout le monde vous creez une, une dynamique et le le dossier je 
I'ai mene en gouvernance. C'est-ä-dire que toujours si vous voulez, on a 
sollicite les euh, jusqu'a un certain point puisqu'apres y avait les etudes 
techniques qu'on a delegue a des cabinets d'etudes parce qu'on n'avait 
pas les moyens nous de les faire. Mais on a toujours euh tous les clubs, 
tous les, toute le Port Autonome enfin les affaires maritimes, euh la 
marine nationale, tout le monde a contribue ! Et donc si voulez tout Sa 
c'est... et tous ces Bens travaillaient deja plus ou moins ensemble. Et 
les 
clubs ont pris vraiment conscience euh de la force qu'ils representaient 
dans le nautisme, de ce qu'ils pouvaient faire euh. Les maintenant 
les 
clubs travaillent ensemble euh, on organise de des je sais pas presque 
200 regates chaque annee, plus septembre en mer je veux 
dire, on refuse 
des regates parce que euh le plan d'eau on peut mettre 
deux deux 
regates, une clans le plan nord une ans le plan sud 
(rire) deux, mais ya 
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des week-ends on a trois regates. On... on est oblige de dire bon 
attendez... Voila. Et on ga va des regates je dirai les plus les plus simples, 
aux regates les plus euh les plus prestigieuses hein euh. La on va avoir les 
voiles du Vieux Port. Tenez, on a cree ga par exemple les Voiles du Vieux 
Port. Savez pourquoi je I'ai cree ? Parce que sans arret on me disait euh 
oui mais en Espagne ya les regate d'El Rey etc. Yai dit attendez, tres 
bien, on va en faire une ici. Donc c'est la troisieme annee qu'on I'a fait et 
ga et on a de plus en plus de bateaux de tradition qui viennent etc. Bon 
euh voyez. Mais mais parce que les clubs aussi ont joue le jeu en disant 
mais nous parce que tout toutes les manifestations sont supportees par 
les clubs... 
oui 
Hein voila. Donc euh par des associations nautiques donc euh les clubs 
ont dit ah ben oui. La lä on fait la route de I'Equateur, c'est une nouvelle 
course, les euh les personnes c'est les euh c'est quel pays c'est le... pas le 
Gabon le le... Pointe Noire c'est euh Josiane ! C'est quel pays la route de 
I'Equateur ? 
Le Congo. 
Le Congo ! Its sont venus nous trouves en disant on veut faire une grande 
course, etc au depart de Marseille. Yetais un peu sceptique. Ya quand 
meme 7 bateaux, des 50 pieds, des 60 pieds. 
D'accord. 
C'est pas mal 
Ben oui. 
C'est un debut. Its veulent la faire tous les deux ans. Alors on a tous les 
ministres qui viennent etc mais voyez, c'est interessant. Lä on fait du 
developpement durable. 
Oui. 
Its ont envie de de de et donc Marseille apporte un savoir-faire euh, 
savoir-titre. Lä j'arrive voyez j'etais au salon nautique de Shangai euh 
jusque du 8 au 11 avril, euh bon on a eu beaucoup de monde, les chinois 
sont venus me trouver d'abord on est en train de negocier avec la 
Federation Frangaise de la Voile euh un accord avec euh la Federation de 
Voile Chinoise euh pour peut-titre entrainer quand ils viennent en Europe, 
euh les les les voileux euh pour les Jeux Olympiques, sur le pole. Alors on 
les entrainent sur place. La France a envoye des entraineurs 
dejä. Mais ils 
vont venir aussi en Europe. Et c'est le rayonnement de Marseille ga. 
Ca 
veut dire qu'on est reconnu au niveau international. Bon euh 
lä on etait lä- 
bas ils vont avoir ('exposition universelle en 2010. Ben ils sont venus me 
trouver : Madame Gamerre, vous savez vous vous creez 
des poles 
nautiques, parce que moi je parle pas de port, je parle 
de pole nautique. 
Voyez, si vous faites votre these je peux vous donner ce concept. 
Un pole 
nautique c'est pas un port, hein. C'est pas un port 
de plaisance. C'est le 
port plus autre chose. C'est ce qu'on ce qu'on essaie 
de developper a 
Marseille. Hein euh c'est a la fois I'amenagement euh c'est 
le port, mais 
c'est aussi euh ce qui fait vivre un port. C'est ce qu'on essaie 
et ga cest Un 
pole, sur le plan sportif, economique, 
de loisirs de. Bon voila. Ya 
Ca 
pecheurs avec les plongeurs, avec les voileux avec 
les kayaks avec. 
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crest des poles nautiques. La difference pour moi eile est lä. Un port c'est un parking. Un pole crest autre chose. Donc euh les chinois me disent mais euh vows avez de vous titre en train de vous avez des poles nautiques tres actifs, ils savez tout : vous voulez en creer un dans la zone nord, enfin au port de I'Estaque, j'ai dit oui. Il dit mais nous on a le on a ('exposition universelle en 2010, on les fait sur les deux rives du grand Pour, on voudrait faire un pole nautique et on voudrait faire de ('animation 
entre les deux, les deux rives. Est-ce que vous pourriez nous conseiiler, votre maire va venir, le maire y est en ce moment, est-ce qu'il pourra parier au maire de Shanga*i etc. Yai fait en rentrant j'ai fait comme les Jeux Olympiques jai fait comme les, j'ai fait une note au maire et pugs je sais pas ii est la-bas it est en train de discuter. Voyez euh le rayonnement international alors pourquoi parce que le rayonnement international de 
Marseille c'est c'est important. Euh et pugs c'est c'est conforte aussi euh en Mediterranee mais au niveau international une une force parce que derriere une force nautique, it ya une force economique, ya une force technique, ya un savoir-faire, ya des universites, ya des laboratoires, ya beaucoup de choses je veux dire hein. Ya euh Eurocopter qui euh derriere peut traiter tout ce qui est carbone, tout ce qui est euh. II it it fallait tout ga pour la Coupe de L'America. Voila. Donc je pense que vous 
avez du etudier le dossier euh 
Oui un petit peu oui. 
Vous avez pris le gros, le petit, lequei vous avez eu de dossier ? 
J'ai eu... j'ai eu les dossiers de presse en fait. Que vous aviez 
Ah oui, vous n'avez pas eu le acces au dossier 
J'ai eu le petit euh dossier de presse 
Ah le petite oui crest le numero un. Vous n'avez pas eu le gros. 
Non. 
Non non (rire). Oh mais ga ga ga ne vous et puis it est anglais en plus. Ca 
aussi par exemple. Regardez euh ya pour les pre-regates on a eu les pre- 
regates, alors je voulais les premieres, je voulais ouvrir le euh premiere et 
derniere. Derniere les skippers ont refuse, euh les suisses auraient 
accepte, mais les skippers ont refuse parce que ils avaient ils auront leur 
nouveau bateau et ils veulent pas transporter les bateaux euh, ils veulent 
les faire a Valence enfin ils veulent les laisser sur place. Et euh euh qu'est- 
ce que je vous disais, je vous parlais de quoi lä attendez les pre-regates. 
Oui ! II fallait trouver des volontaires (... ) et it fallait trouver des 
volontaires qui pariaient anglais ou espagnol et I'espagnol si possible mais 
au moins anglais. On a quand meme trouve euh pres de 400 personnes 
qui volontaires qui connaissaient la mer donc. Et crest nous qui avons 
assume la securite et les suisses sont restes bluf bluffes. Ya pas eu un 
probleme avec les bateaux tout ga euh et c'est c'est c'est nous qui avons 
euh le shiff (??? ) eeait de chez nous je veux dire. Et tout ga ga parlait 
anglais, ga c'etait donc ga veut dire qu'y a un potentiel ä la fois technique 
mais aussi un potentiel en ressources humaines sur Marseille, concernant 
la mer, important. Et vous savez ce qu'on nous demande en ce moment ? 
On a regu une annonce de la part de de d'Alhinghi it voudrait que nos 
volontaires, ii recrute des volontaires pour suivre les pre-regates a Valence 
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euh en sue en Norvege je crois qu'ils vont, et Italie. Ils voudraient que les 
marseillais y aillent. (Rire) Je bois du petit lait (rire) 
Et bien oui (rire) 
Voila. Est-ce que j'ai repondu a votre question ? 
Oui. Oui oui. Euh (... ) donc alors euh sur euh le dossier en lui-meme, donc 
votre role vous c'etait quoi ? C'etait la parole politique du dossier ? 
Oui c'etait porter le po'Iitique dans le dossier enfin de le faire avancer, 
d'impulser les choses et et puls de de coordonner euh sur le plan je dirais 
politique ('ensemble des I'ensemble I'ensemble du dossier. Apres y avait le 
secretaire general qui portait sur le plan euh avec les avec les directeurs 
generaux. En fait on a travaille avec directement le secretaire general et 
les directeurs generaux hein euh 
D'accord. 
Et puis je vous dis, le port, les affaires maritimes, la marine euh. On a 
travaille avec le les les chues de Marseille parce que derriere il faut tout un 
un un ya beaucoup de choses derriere hein. Point de vue euh securite, la 
police nationale, enfin le... les douanes enfin je je voudrais pas en oublier 
mais tout ga etait implique dans le dossier. 
D'accord. 
On n'avait pas tout le monde en meme temps mais si vous voulez moi j'ai 
pratiquement suivi toutes les reunions. De temps en temps y avait des 
petits problemes, il fallait les resoudre, I'elu est la pour ga. Et puis 
attentive euh aux echeances, attentive a la mise en forme, attentive parce 
que finalement a la fin c'est le maire hein euh ou moi enfin la en 
l'occurence c'est le maire qui signait mais bon euh on a une responsabilite 
quand on engage la signature du maire (rire). 
Oui oui. Et euh qui faisait parti alors du comite de pilotage parce que 
justement dans la presse il parle du comite de pilotage assez euh 
restreint. 
Non. II y avait un comite de pilotage qui etait euh constitue qui etait assez 
large mais qui a la fin c'est vrai qu'on etait moins nombreux parce que 
apres c'etait des des dossiers d'ingenieurs hein. Mais le comite de pilotage 
etait euh ya eu plusieurs y avait y avait le comite si vous voulez y avait le 
comite de pilotage dans lequel y avait les ce que je vous ai 
enumerer la 
hein euh bon on l'a reuni quelque fois mais c'est vrai qu'apres on pouvait 
pas quand on travaillait avec les douanes on travaillait pas forcement y 
avait pas la police nationale y avait pas ou peut-etre eile y 
etait eile parce 
qu'elle etait concernee. Mais je veux dire y avait peut-etre pas 
le port 
autonome, y avait peut-etre pas les clubs, y avait peut-etre pas 
bon. On 
on a apres on a un petit peu reduit parce que plus le 
dossier avance plus il 
etait pointu, mais y avait un comite donc un comite de pilotage oü y avait 
tout ces tout ces membres, y avait un comite euh 
de soutien ou y avait 
des des personnalites des etc, et puis y avait euh un comite 
je crois euh je 
dirais euh comment on l'avait appele... Y avait 
le comite de soutien, y 
avait le comite de pilotage et puis le comite 
de euh je dirais un comite 
plus large. Ya eu les les entreprises marseillaises se sont regroupees 
en 
association. Voyez enfin c'etait un comite je j'appelerai ga c'etait 
Marseille 
qui qui portait ga. Voila. Et y avait y vait la chambre 
de commerce qui etait 
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impliquee dedans, qui etait dans le comite de pilotage. On etait vraiment tres tres large hein. Mais apres on a fait des comites si vous voulez on a fait un comite de personnalites euh y avait Zidane y avait enfin tout un tas de personnalites puls y avait puls apres ya eu le comite euh je dirais plus local euh mais qui en fait engageait pratiquement tout le monde hein. Et 
puls le comite de pilotage en fait ga a ete surtout dans les deux premieres 
phases du dossier euh il a fallu que les gens se connaissent. Apres les 
gens travaillaient meme entre eux, le Port Autonome travaillait avec les douanes, directement, ga revenait a la mairie voyez bon euh. Mais au debut il a fallu vraiment qu'on que les gens, les gens ne travaillaient pas 
entre eux. Ca a ete, ce mode de gouvernance a ete une experience pour 
beaucoup hein. Parce que vous savez combien le les administrations sont 
cloisonnees et la il a fallu echanger, il a fallu tirer dans le meme sens, il a 
fallu beaucoup de choses. 
D'accord. 
Voila. 
Et est-ce que aujourd'hui vous continuez justement a travailler de cette 
maniere-la ou... 
Alors on travaille voila tout a fait. On travaille plus du tout de la meme 
fagon, on se euh la meme fagon qu'avant. La cou la coupe de I'america a 
tout change en ce sens que, par exemple, les clubs nautiques euh la rive 
la rive nord euh I'Estaque etait tres, tres fermee... c'etait fermee, la rive 
sud etait fermee aussi, mais donc les les presidents par secteur 
geographique se on fait une sorte de de poule et se reunissent 
regulierement, la commission des presidents ou I'association des 
presidents je sais pas comment ils appellent ga, des grands clubs, par 
secteur nautique euh Y enfin YCPR pointe rouge euh euh... Vieux Port euh 
Estaque bon les grands ils se reunissent regulierement. Donc on a une 
bien meilleure coordination des choses, ils se repartissent les les les 
regates, les supports bon. Ca ga marche. Ca oui ga c'est quelque chose 
qu'on a... Bon et puis par exemple le Port Autonome. Euh moi je ne savais 
pas par exemple au Port Autonome, le Port de Marseille euh etait euh 
clans I'association des Eco-ports, et qu'ils faisaient beaucoup de choses 
pour I'environnement. (... ) Moi qui suis presidente d'un mouvement euh 
d'ecologie, je I'ignorais ! Cest en discutant avec le directeur general avec 
le president etc que j'ai appris ya eu une conference dernierement 
la- 
dessus, une conference europeenne, ou internationale 
a laquelle jai ete 
invitee. Donc si vous voulez, en fait euh alors chaque, chaque 
administration a certes ses problemes et c'est pas c'est pas 
de I'angelisme 
que je fais, mais je veux dire, les gens se sont connus et 
a partir de du 
moment oü les personnes les personnes se parlent, oü 
les personnes 
echangent, on facilite beaucoup de choses, hein. Doric euh quand 
il ya un 
probleme aux douanes, quand il ya un probleme aux affaires maritimes, 
bon je veux dire on prend le telephone, on s'appelle, on se parle, euh euh 
si j'ai un probleme sur les plages euh euh je vais appeler 
la prefecture, la 
prefecture quand meme etait impliquee egalement. 
Voyez, ga a permis de 
je dirais de euh ga a permis euh de mieux communiquer mais 
je crois que 
aussi, euh on a le fait de defendre c'est un challenge que 
Marseille s'est 
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imposee avec ('America's Cup, d'avoir un challenge commun, parce que finalement c'etait aussi bien le challenge des affaires maritimes que le challenge de la mairie, bon la mairie portait le dossier, mais c'etait aussi le 
challenge de lapolice nationale, c'etait aussi le challenge le challenge de la 
marine, chaque chacun voyait quelque chose qui le valorisait lä-dedans. Donc c'etait devenue le challenge de tous. Et quand on a un challenge 
commun, bon bien sür qu'il ya eu des tensions, it ya eu des moments difficiles etc, y avait ce que demandait les suisses que nous mairie on 
voulait et ce que les autres pouvaient donner. Mais tout ga a fait que euh it ya eu une dynamique que la mayonnaise a prise hein, ya eu une dynamique qui s'est creee et et je crois que la en tout cas en matiere de 
nautisme, en matiere maritime, les choses sont ne sont plus comme elles 
etaient avant. Et on a cette plate-forme qui est l'office de la mer, ou tout 
le monde continue a echanger a travers les commissions et pour moi c'est 
tres precieux parce que je regois des propositions, des conseils, des (coup 
de telephone) et et et et donc si vous voulez, tout ca est, est tres positif. 
Voila. 
D'accord. Est-ce que vous continuez justement euh a travailler un petit 
peu ensemble en terme de nouveaux projets ? 
Ah de ah on en a de de nouveaux projets. Oui oui; Bon d'abord on 
travaille ensemble pour toutes les nouvelles les regates et les nouvelles 
regates je veux dire bon. Puls les amenagements. Aussi bon euh 
I'amenagement euh du Frioul par exemple, moi je suis chargee de la terre 
et la communaute urbaine de la mer bon le la mer a communique, moi je 
vais commencer a communiquer sur le sur les, j'ai dejä communiquer pas 
mal jai fait plus de 34 reunions sur Natura 2000 bon mais. Mais c'est bien 
parce que ce que, ce qui avant n'aurait pas ete je dirais euh accepte, 
maintenant est ecoute, est integre, discute etc. Bien sür qu'on continue. Et 
puls on on a on a des projets euh euh lä on a une nouvelle course euh 
euh, on a des projets de euh mes bases nautiques... Je vais faire une 
conference de presse le le 23 juin. Si vous voulez venir d'ailieurs. Elle est 
prevue, j'espere que ga va pas changer, eile est prevue ä 14h30. Y aura le 
trophee Orma a ce moment-lä, je la feral sur le village d'Orma. Le 23 juin. 
D'accord. 
Euh it faudra telephoner a mon secretariat pour verifier. C'est la date qui 
est fixee actuellement voila. 
D'accord. 
Bon si vous voulez donc on a continue par exemple mes toutes toutes les 
les lä la je suis en train de construire euh des le pole le pole nautique, le 
pole France va titre tout euh tout reconstruit, bon la on est pratiquement 
on est on est en train de rediger les appels d'offre. Je je pense 
le 23 
annoncer 3 ou 4 appels d'offre. Euh je construis une base nautique 
a 
I'Estaque, hein au quaff de la Lave, de quillards, d'habitables euh et on y 
mettra le kayak de mer. Bon. Si euh bon. Ca les appels 
d'offre euh la les 
architectes sont choisis, maintenant on est en train 
de travailler euh sur le 
cahier des charges donc ga c'est des choses qui d'ici 
2007 seront toutes 
faites finies. La fin de mon mandat euh le nautisme aura change 
d'aspect 
a Marseille. Voila. Et et on travaille, et on travaille donc avec tous ces 
258 
APPENDIX 
partenaires que nous avons. Et puis chacun amene son... son idee hein euh. Donc on essaie de creer de de grande de continuer a creer de grands evenements mais un evenement est un evenement. En fait il faut aussi dev, continuer a developper euh un a mettre les marseillais j'ai une politique du nautisme, c'est de mettre plus de marseillais sur l'eau, de mutualiser un certain nombre de moyen et tout Sa est en marche. Avec les clubs dejä ga fonctionne hein oui oui. Euh on est ya vraiment une politique de developpement euh qui est de bien sür les evenements sont I'aboutissement mais ya des evenements parce que le reste fonctionne, je dirais qui est de de de pousser euh les clubs euh et et et nous euh dans les centres nautiques aa je dirais a attirer plus de personnes euh parce 
que vous savez plus la base de la pyramide est grande, plus on aura des 
medailles en haut. Donc moi j'essaie d'agrandir cette base, sur les plages 
on peut s'initier a la plongee, on peut s'initier au voilier etc tout Sa pour un 
euro cinquante la journee je veux dire. Bon voyez. Alors Sa c'est la base. 
Apres, quand ils ont fini cette base, bon ben ya des fois qui font faire des 
stages euh ou dans un club ou dans nos, dans nos centres nautiques bon 
euh et la on est on trace encore. Et puls apres ga leur plait bon ben soit ils 
rentrent dans le club, soit ils font des ils viennent regulierement 
s'entrainer sur euh sur une categorie etc. Et donc on monte la pyramide 
au fur a mesure. Et donc pour ga on on mutualise nos moyens avec les 
clubs moi je leur dis je suis une boite a outils hein voila. Euh on prete des 
bateaux toutes les manifestations la ville euh j'avais un journaliste qui 
m'appelait pour la la route de I'Equateur, il me dit oh mais la vile s'est pas 
assez investie. J'ai dit qu'est-ce que vous en savez euh la ville je mets a 
chaque a chaque regate je mets des bateaux pour les la securite euh a 
disposition avec du personnel, on donne des subventions euh on est on 
est a 400 a 400 presque 500 milles euros de subventions aux clubs, sans 
compter les grands evenements. Avec les grands evenements on est 
presque au million. Sans compter les plages. Rien que les plages c'est 1 
million 200 mille euh etc. Je veux dire ya un budget mais ya pas que 
I'argent. Ya aussi la presence, moi je suis beaucoup sur le terrain j'ai je 
j'apprends hein parce que je suis pas une specialiste, j'ai beaucoup appris. 
Ca a ete tres difficile au debut d'arriver j'etais universitaire donc euh 
d'arriver de se plonger dans ce milieu du nautisme euh oü pour la 
premiere fois ya une femme (rire). Et oui et puis je veux dire euh j'ai 
vaguement un permis bateau quelque part mais enfin bon je suis pas une 
specialiste hein bon. Donc tout ga euh euh a pris du temps mais le le 
dossier America's Cup si vous voulez a permis d'accelerer le phenomene. 
On a on a pu le faire parce qu'on avait deja des des des 
equipes, on avait 
deja un savoir faire, je dis toujours un savoir faire et un savoir 
etre mais, 
le dossier Coupe America aa fait plus, a resserre les liens, a permis de 
mieux se connaitre et puis surtout on a on a analyse euh chaque 
parametre si vous voulez, a travers ce dossier et 
donc on sait exactement 
ce qu'on veut et ce qu'on veut pas. Et on sait ce qu'on peut 
faire et ce 
ý' qu on peut pas faire. Hein parce qu ya 
des limites euh aussi euh 
geographiques, ya des limites je suis tres 
tres soucieuse de preserver 
l'environnement euh donc j'ai par ailleurs j'ai des programmes 
de recifs art 
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d'immersion de recif artificiel, jai fait un parc maritime au Frioul etc. Voyez, il faut garder comme je dis toujours il faut garder un equilibre euh 
il faut que je garde un equilibre entre tous les partenaires, quand on a des 
partenaires comme euh euh Bruno Peyron, qui se montre pas toujours 
aimable vis-a-vis de Marseille, euh mais moi les clubs me disent vous 
donnez lmillion 2a Bruno Peyron euh et il vient faire trois petits tours 
clans le Vieux Port. Bien sür il porte nos couleurs, bon euh mais nous on 
est lä toute I'annee, on a de grands on a de grands skippers, euh. Bon 
alors je dis mon souci c'est Bruno Peyron a comme je dis Bruno Peyron 
euh Marseille dolt beaucoup a Bruno Peyron mais Marseille a beaucoup 
donne a aussi a Bruno Peyron. Euh donc si vous voulez, ya des equilibres 
a garder. II faut de grands evenements avec de de euh des gens geniaux 
c'est un genie Peyron euh de de de du de la mer, mais il faut aussi euh 
avoir le souci de de developper la vile avec equilibre et de transmettre et 
de former euh. Et puis parallellement derriere de la la la mer amene toute 
une economie derriere. Donc il faut se soucier de cette economie mais il 
faut pas oublier euh d'investir les marseillais euh les frioulais quand il 
s'agit du Frioul etc hein euh voila. Bon et puls de preserver notre euh 
notre notre notre petite qui est la la qui est la rade hein euh. C'est c'est je 
dis toujours c'est notre pepite d'or la rade hein euh. Et donc ga il faut la 
preserver, il faut la soigner, il faut la lä je vais intervenir ya un congres 
pour le parc maritime des calanques je vais intervenir. Comment articuler 
la politique du de la mer enfin maritime avec un parc national etc. C'est 
c'est interessant tout ga. Puis derriere ya des problemes de securite, ya 
des problemes d'education, ya euh ga s'appelle le developpement durable 
(rire). 
Oui oui. Euh donc euh au niveau des euh des instances publiques, on va 
dire, etaient impliquees donc la mairie, la communaute urbaine, 
Oui. 
Euh 
Le port autonome 
Le port autonome 
Euh la marine nationale, la police nationale, tout ce qui est 
etat la 
prefecture, les affaires maritimes, je dois en oublier, les douanes, euh y en 
avait peut-titre d'autres hein. Euh la prefecture bien sir 
hein euh euh 
II y avait aussi le en terme de collectivites locales le Conseil 
General, le 
Conseil Regional 
Alors le Conseil General, ils Wont pas traite directement euh ils avaient 
vaguement dit qu'ils a qu'ils a qu'ils donneraient euh quelques 
dizaines de 
milliers d'euros si on I'avait. (... ) Ca ga nous a peut-titre un peu 
porter 
prejudice, hein euh. Its ont pas ete tres enthousiastes. 
Ca ga, quelque part 
ga les... d'ailleurs c'est amusant, au conseil municipal 
c etait moi le 
rapporteur du dossier, euh quand j'ai fait voter 
le le principe parce qu on a 
vote le principe de d'etre candidat, 
a l'unanimite. Quand on a commence 
apres, ä voter euh pour des subsides euh apres vous 
aviez r opposition qui 
s'est dit mais ga ga va leur Bonner 
des voies donc ils votaient contre 
chaque fois (rires). C'etait ridicule. 
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Et euh justement quels ont ete les euh est-ce qu'il ya eu des blocages du dossier a un moment donne ? Blocage politique, financier ? 
Oh le probleme on a on a on a ete on a eu enfin si vous voulez, euh au niveau de l'Etat, bon I'Etat nous avez euh d'abord euh c'etait c'etait quand meme un truc euh un gros dossier de plus de 300 millions, et on avait demande donc a I'Etat, un soutien. Parce que evidemment quand je dis ýa apportait a Marseille, il faut completer en disant que Sa apportait a toute la France aussi. Euh parce que ga rayonnait euh sur la cote, Sa rayonnait 
clans le langue clans le Languedoc-Roussillon, g rayonnait jusqu'ä Lyon, Sa 
rayonnait jusqu'ä Paris. Enfin tout I'axe euh Rhone et tout ce qui est d'ailieurs j'avais vu les maires euh euh de des autres villes en disant bien 
entendu on essaiera de de de que tout le monde profite du du du de 
I'evenement, hein d'une fagon ou d'une autre donc. Et euh I'Etat nous 
avait donc euh euh on a beaucoup sollicite le premier ministre et le 
president de la republique enfin le maire a... et euh il s'etait engage a hauteur de 40 mille d'euros, ce qui etait peanuts et euh puis 60 mille 
euros mais euh manifestement euh on n'a pas eu le le soutien qu'on 
attendait hein euh. Manifestement je pense que c'est je pense quelque 
part que ga a joue. Mais enfin c'est clair d'ailleurs. Le euh le roi a soutenu 
le dossier avec tellement de de de moyens, de moyens parce que 
finalement euh moi je suis allee voir la deuxieme pre-regate aa Valence, 
oü j'ai ete regue tres gentiment par Alcade qui est adorable on est 
devenue copines toutes les deux de temps en temps on s'appelle, bon. 
Mais euh euh le site est mille fois moins euh (... ) cent mille fois moins, le 
site nautique hein j'entends, est cent mille fois moins adapte a I'America's 
Cup. D'ailleurs, ya qu'ä parler avec les skippers hein euh je veux dire vous 
allez voir les les skippers, les marins, ils vous diront euh ils vous diront 
bon moi je les ai j'ai navigue donc pour les pre-regates, euh j'ai pu en voir 
qu'une parce que pendant trois jours je suis restee y avait pas de vent et 
puis le quatrieme jour y avait trop de vent. Bon j'ai pas pu euh j'ai pas pu 
naviguer, j'en ai vu une, et en fait vous sortez vous etes en haute mer ya 
rien et le le euh alors lä le port sera certainement amenage mais enfin moi 
quand je sortais c'etait entre des containers et du charbon enfin bon. Ca 
apres ya des amenagements, ils peuvent pas tout faire, mais le roi a 
enormement euh je dirais soutenu puisque il a donne plus de on dit on dit 
qu'il a donne euh on dit qu'ii a donne un milliard d'euros. Mais 
I'engagement clans le contrat etait de 500 millions d'euros, quand meme. 
Bon ben ya eu, ya eu un soutien. Euh euh on nous aurait dit vous avez 
500 millions, on aurait eu la coupe hein. Parce qu'on a vraiment euh tirer 
toujours sur euh sur on etait limite sur le plan euh monnaie hein euh. 
Donc ga je pense que le le manque d'enthousiasme disons, euh (... ) Sa ga 
Sa a dü jouer, ga a du jouer hein. Par contre a Marseille ya eu vraiment 
euh y avait y avait un engouement pour pour euh pour I'America's Cup 
hein euh. Ah ben c'etait important, pour la ville hein euh. Les choses 
auraient ete tellement plus rapide euh 
Y avait toute 
Et puis y aurait eu les moyens pour les faire aussi plus vite. Parce que euh 
euh faire le tramway ga prend du temps parce qu'on fait sur 2 mandats. 
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Euh si on avait eu I'argent, dans deux ans en 2007 c'etait termine je veux dire. Y avait deux lignes de deux lignes pas deux mais trois et c'etait fini. Je veux dire euh les amenagements de la Joliette etaient fait. Je veux dire c"est voila hein euh. Je pense qu'il ya pas eu suffisamment, alors c'est une des raisons bon et puis peut-etre euh euh sur d'autres points ils ont ete certainement euh meilleurs que nous, meme si tres gentiment les 
suisses nous disent que c'etait vraiment euh euh on etait tres serre mais bon. Euh mais on euh moi je considere que dejä en ayant travaille euh approfondi, euh vraiment euh euh fait des propositions euh originales 
comme comme on a fait dans le dossier, euh et en ayant eu les pre- 
regates, je je considere qu'on a dejä vraiment on a une reconnaissance internationale, on est dans le top 4, voila, disons hein. On a une 
reconnaissance internationale, sportive et puis d'organisateurs. Je veux dire quand on nous dit mais euh mais bon vous pouvez accueillir euh euh 
euh les Jeux Mondiaux, vous pouvez accueillir euh les chinois. Bon ga veut dire qu'y a une reconnaissance si vous voulez de notre savoir-faire, de 
notre capacite de, humaine derriere d'organisation euh , de competence de donc. Je pense que tout ga deja on est tres benef on a on a retire un 
grand benefice. Et sur le plan economique, par exemple, les pre-regates 
ont coüte de I'ordre de 850 mille euros a peu pres, dont 400 mille de 
d'equipements perennes hein mais on a on a fait suivre derriere le le les 
retombees, c'est multiplie par 6. 
D'accord. 
En une semaine. (... ) Ya eu 50 500 euh 50 euh 500 euh 50 millions je 
sais plus combien jai pas I'etude sous les yeux de benefices, par le par les 
par les commergants par les entreprises, bon par parce qu'ils ont achete 
des cordages, parce qu'ils ont achete bon parce qu'ils ont fait reparer des 
trucs euh et puis tous les hotels etaient pleins euh les restaurants etaient 
pleins, euh les taxis ont fonctionne, les marches ont fonctionne, les 
marchands de fleurs ont fonctionne, tout ga... tout ga on a quand meme 
en une semaine on a multiplie par 6 l'investissement. Donc c'est je 
considere qu'on a ete euh certes peut-etre pas autant qu'on aurait, qu'on 
I'aurait ete parce que c'etait de l'ordre du milliard les retombees hein euh 
economiques, en plus de tout le reste, en plus de I'acceleration. Mais je 
considere que euh ga a ete un bienfait pour Marseille que d'etre 
candidate, d'etre dans le top 4, euh en finale, euh d'avoir euh euh 
travailler avec toutes toutes tous les je dirais toutes toutes les... tous les 
tous les corps sociaux euh euh toutes les toutes les instances de de avec 
le monde de de de la voile et puis ga et puis ga a amene aussi des jeunes 
sur I'eau. Parce que ga leur a plu, ga leur a donne envie bon donc on a eu 
une recrudescence de stage, les les les clubs ont grandi, les gens se sont 
euh euh federes et on est passe sous une autre gouvernance de des 
affaires maritimes. Ca c'est bien. 
D'accord. Et au niveau des partenaires, quelle a ete le le la place et le role 
du secteur prive ? 
Alors le secteur prive a ete tres actif, euh en ce sens si vous voulez que 
euh les d'abord les les euh les grandes entreprises de la region s'etaient 
federees et etaient prets euh ont appele euh bien sür les suisses enfin ya 
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eu des tas de reseaux qui ont joue bien sür. Et ils etaient prets ä bon pas a mettre 300 millions hein mais its etaient prets a s'investir euh a nous a aider Ia ville bien sür. Ben en echange ils avaient une retombee bien sür mais its etaient its etaient vraiment investis hein euh. 
Et meme au niveau financier donc ils etaient prets a 
Ah ce ce ils etaient prets a investir bien sür 
D'accord. 
Bien sür oui oui. Ben c'etait interessant pour eux. Oui oui tout a fait. 
D'accord. Euh 
D'ailleurs ils s'investissent toujours clans nos regates hein euh. Vous avez Ia Ia Banque Populaire qui investit toujours beaucoup clans Ia voile euh, 
vous avez des des des assurances, vous allez avoir le trophee Orma, euh je veux dire ya des gens de de chez nous qui investissent hein euh euh. Y 
a des entreprises qui s'investissent euh qui qui et qui investissent qou 
enfin je dirais tous les dimanches clans les regates des clubs hein euh 
voila. On a quand meme des equipages de valeurs, des gens comme Marc 
Eymi, comme euh comment s'appelle-t-il euh Dimitri Deruel et d'autres je 
veux dire bon. (... ) Tout ga c'est des gens qui ont des sponsors. Lä on a 
fait j'ai fait une equipe feminine, vous etes au courant. 
Non. 
Ah vous savez pas. Pour le Tour de France Voile, on a notre equipe pro 
avec Dimitri Deruel euh Defi Defi Marseille, et euh cette annee euh euh je 
en partie, je sponsorise avec Eminence. La ville de Marseille et Eminence 
sponsorisent une equipe femme (rires). On a lance nos filles Iä. Ah ben 
elles ont pinaille un an ou deux elles se sentaient pas pretes et tout. Lä 
cette annee on leur a dit allez. Et elles marchent bien. Elles sont en 
Bretagne Iä elles font des regates, je devais aller les voir a Dunkerque au 
depart, je devais aller voir mes deux, mes deux, mes deux equipages Iä. 
Non mais c'est bien parce que ga motive des gens, ga amene vous 
comprenez. Apres c'est c'est ga ga ga fait monter l'interet pour le nautisme 
hein, ga met des gens sur I'eau, et puis ga ga Ia mer eduque. Derriere tout 
ga yayaya beaucoup de choses, Ia mer je veux dire euh, titre clans un 
equipage ga veut dire beaucoup de choses pour un jeune. On apprend 
beaucoup de choses a travers un equipage hein euh. C'est Ia vie. On 
apprend Ia vie finalement hein. Chacun est unique, chaun est 
irremplagable mais... si on fait pas le bon geste au bon moment euh Ia on 
en paie les consequences. Euh vous vous savez que je suis passee par 
dessus le bord ya pas longtemps ? Ah non, ga a ete trop rigolo. Pour le 
pour le match racing, euh y avait des des bon on etait en finale, et euh 
j'etais sur mon bateau qui est un ma cuve, j'appelle ga ma cuve euh avec 
mes secretaires enfin etc et passe des amis sur un des bateaux sur le Plus 
39, l'italien et qui qui ä toute pompe sur I'eau et qui me disent viens c'est 
un bateau de competition euh un J-80, viens viens alors j'appelle euh un 
zodiac, je saute sur le zodiac, du zodiac je vais je rejoins le voilier et pugs 
je vais faire euh cetait Dimitri qui qui Dimitri Deruel je vais faire un un 
virement de bord au large. On etait 5 sur le bateau. Y avait on 
etait 3 
debutants, et et 2 chevronnes. Y avait Deruel et Jean-Bernard Constant. 
Doric on revient, je dis j'aimerai bien quand meme voir un petit peu 
Ia 
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course. Bon donc on revient, et Dimitri je barrais et Dimitri enfin je barrais, it avait la barre entre les jambes mais enfin hein et euh on dit 
attention virement de bord et a ce moment-lä, les deux autres debutants, 
au lieu de renvoyer le genois euh changent de bord bon moi je je barre 
completement jenvoie la barre et je change mais ils renvoient pas la voile. L'arriere du bateau, ya pas y avait pas de filet c'etait un bateau de 
competition du match racing, I'arriere du bateau a derape, j'ai fait un saut 
peri'lleux, je suis tombee a ('eau, toute habillee, et le bateau, et l'eau etait a 10 degres. Dimitri a plonge, est venu me (... ) me soutenir, mais je 
pouvais pas alors heureusement qu'il y avait un chevronne dessus sinon 
on mourrait tous les deux, et euh ils sont alles faire un a'lors ya des 
gamins dans des dans des petits bateaux qui genaient enfin, ils sont 
revenus, et ils nous ont regu Dimitri est monte, mais on avait les jambes 
paralysees dejä par le froid. 4 minutes, 5 minutes, ouais ouais. Mais voila, 
voyez quand on fait 
C'est risque hein. 
Quand on fait un mauvais et oui non mais. 
Et oui oui 
C'est c'est je veux dire on apprend beaucoup. Vous preparez le 
professorat de de de sport de 
Euh non, enfin 
Qu'est-ce que vous faites vous ? 
Moi je suis en these, 
Oui mail en quoi ? 
En sociologie du sport. 
Ah sociologie du sport je je j'ai des gens qui viennent a ('office de la mer 
qui ont travailler lä dedans oui oui. 
Voila et donc moi je euh donc une fois que j'aurais passe ma these 
j'aimerai bien titre maitre de conference a I'universite. Voila. Et je j'ai fait 
un peu de voile 
Oui vows connaissez un peu. 
Un petit peu oui. Un tout petit peu pas beaucoup mais un petit peu. 
Oui ben moi moi je connaissais enfin je connaissais pas la voile n'y rien, 
j'ai pas le temps, tout tout le temps on me dit madame Gamerre venez je 
dis oui (... ) Je dis moi je suis skipper a terre. 
Oui. 
Voyez je je passe beaucoup de temps ici et pugs c'est c'est c'est tres 
comment dire, ya beaucoup de de dossier euh meme si j'ai des ingenieurs 
des services mais euh je j'ai un defaut d'universitaire, de de vouloir 
comprendre. C'est embetant ga. Ca embete beaucoup de gens. Bon euh 
(rire). Mais voyez bon en fait toutes les retom'bees de ('America's Cup c'est 
quand meme donc euh par exemple la la la federation des industries 
nautiques qui a organise le salon a Shangai nous a invite. C'etait marrant 
y avait la Rochelle et nous. On etait cote a cote. On s'est tire la 
bourre 
pendant tout le salon. Quand on quand ils voyaient arrivee 
les 
responsables de de de de de des J. O., ils nous regardaient, moi quand 
je 
voyais arriver je regardais aussi (rires) c'etait excellent (rire)Bon mais 
je 
veux dire c'est bien, c'est bien. Je suis allee voir ce qu'il 
faisait a La 
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Rochelle, a... je suis allee a la Rochelle, a la Trinite, a Brest. Yai pris plein d'idee au debut de mon mandat. Mes mes directeurs etaient jamais sortis de leur bureau, de leur bateau, je leur ai dit allez hop, je vous emmene 
huit jours en voyage. On est parti avec le chauffeur et pendant huit jours 
je leur ai fait voir des trucs. Alors ga les a un peu surpris parce que ga leur etait jamais arrive, et, moi jai appris mais eux aussi. Et on a trouve plein 
de choses interessantes a... a mettre en oeuvre. Its savent, ils font mieux 
que nous ils faisaient ils faisaient mieux que nous. Maintenant ils viennent 
voir ce qu'on fait ici (rire). Non mais si vous voulez c'est c'est c'est 
dynamiser les choses, c'est aussi les faire muter euh au 21eme siecle. On 
n'est plus dans le meme mode de gouvernance, on en tout cas moi j'y suis 
plus, euh euh euh on nest plus dans le ya des ya des problemes de de 
d'environnement euh en mer aussi qui faut tres serieux que que que, que 
je gere, que j'essaie de de, de mener euh euh si vous voulez de fagon 
croisee je dirai entre I'economique, le social, l'environnement, le sportif, 
tout ga il faut le il faut le croiser il faut il faut il faut garder euh une equite, 
une balance euh, et en meme temps euh c'est aussi un combat. Parce 
qu'y a d'autres villes qui sont, parce qu'il faut rester modeste, qui ont (... ) 
qui font aussi bien que nous sinon mieux. Donc euh il faut essayer de il 
faut rester lucide quand meme. Mais, mais ga a ete tres benefique a tous 
points de vue hein, cette euh America's Cup. Ca a ga a, ga a fini de re, ga 
a fini, parce que Marseille s'etait reveillee avec The Race, avec les Jeux 
Mondiaux, et la ga a fini de (rire) de nous reveiller. 
Et pour revenir au secteur prive, est-ce que ils faisaient partie du comite 
de pilotage ou ga a ete juste euh 
Y avait la Chambre de Commerce, qui etait la 
D'accord 
Puis apres puls apres y avait ce fam ce ce fameux groupement, je me 
rappelle plus comment on I'avait appele, euh oü y avait alors euh ben 
toutes les entreprises qui le voulaient hein, voila oui oui. Mais ya eu du 
monde hein qui etait la, on a on a fait de belles, de belles reunions. On 
avait fait des groupes de travail aussi, euh avec ce, apres dans ce grand 
comite donc qu'on a elargi disons, on avait fait y avait un groupe euh 
logistique, y avait un groupe sportif enfin je me je me rappelle, un groupe 
economie, et un groupe euh je je je I'ai plus dans la tete. 
Oui y avait tourisme 
Tourisme, eco euh economie, 
Nautisme 
Euh logistique et nautisme. Donc si vous voulez ce groupe donc a la la 
etait completement euh euh Alors le premier groupe ne 1'appelons pas 
comite di euh comite appe'lons-le comite directeur. C'est le premier groupe 
qu'on a cree, c'est un groupe de je sais pas 20 ou 30,30 personnes 
a peu 
pres. Et... et apres on est passe a ce groupe donc qui lui travaillait en com 
a travaille en commission, hein, et... et puls apres y avait 
le le, je dirais le 
soutien, le comite de soutien, oü y avait les... les personnalites. 
Voilä. 
Et quels etaient les missions justement de ces commissions 
?% 
Ben ces commissions elles ont defni un petit peu si vous voulez 
aa on 
leur a donne les quest parce qu'on avait des questionnaires 
de la part des 
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suisses, on leur a donne le le les pages qui les concernaient, les 
questionnaire, pas tout parce qu'y avait un machin euh les les, les points qui pouvaient les interesser, on leur a demande une reflexion, la dessus. D'accord. 
Voila. Mais, c'etait quand meme tres limite, il faut dire parce que c'etait 
parfois tellement technique, que ces commissions ne pouvaient que dire il faudrait faire une etude sur euh la capacite de la Region a traiter euh les fibres carbones etc. C'est pas la commission qui allait les traiter sivou 
voulez hein. Mais ga a fait prendre conscience aussi a enormement de 
gens de la de Ia, de la complexite du dossier, hein euh. Et puls ya eu ya 
eu des propositions euh aussi dans ces groupes de travail, des 
propositions tres interessantes. 
D'accord. 
Euh que nous on a utilise, qu'on a developpe apres. OUI oui. 
Et euh comment, comment ont ete choisi les membres de ces 
commissions, justement ? C'etait par rapport a leur expertise, par rapport 
a? 
Par rapport a leur expertise, par rapport a leur representativite, leur 
expertise, puls ya des gens qui sont venus euh spontanement, mais on 
pouvait pas euh mettre euh c'etait enfin je veux dire on pouvait pas avoir 
300 personnes dans une commission hein. Mais c'etait essentiellement des 
des, chaque euh je dirai les membres etaient representatifs de de de 
groupes disons, hein de reseaux voila hein. Oui oui, oui, oui. 
D'accord. 
Mais ya eu quelques quelques individuels qui sont venus aussi hein, mais 
euh on pouvait pas non plus avoir euh 500 000 mille personnes hein (rire) 
c'etait pas possible voila. Mais euh les clubs etaient representaient dans 
chaque commission, les enfin tout ce que je vous ai enumere et puis 
d'autres, je dois peut-etre en oublier hein euh. Euh les gens etaient 
vraiment euh je crois que c'etait vraiment representatif de, de notre ville 
hein. Et et aussi de ce que nous voulions faire. Oui oui, oui oui. 
(... ) 
Ce que je vous propose peut-etre, c'est que vous depotiez un peu tout ce 
que je vous ai dit, et puis, si vous le souhaitez, euh on peut on peut en 
reparler. Vous me telephonez ou 
Ah bien c'est gentil 
Mais vous m'avertissez hein. 
Oui oui. 
Vous en etes oü la, vous en etes oü la de votre these ? 
Dan sma these je suis, je devrais la soutenir normalement en decembre. 
Ah ! Oui ! (interruption). Oui euh donc euh si vous souhaitez, parce que 
peut-etre c'est un peut en vrac tout ga, 
J'ai juste une derriere question, a laquelle j'avais pense, c'est euh qu'est- 
ce que qu'est-ce que vous retravailleriez maintenant au jour d'aujourd'hui, 
sur le dossier ? 
Ce que je retravaillerais aujourd'hui sur le dossier... 
Oui. Quels regrets vous pouvez avoir sur le sur le sur le dossier ? 
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(.;. ) Je pourrais pas vous repondre comme ga, parce que ga demande une 
reflexion quand meme de (... ) Ce que je retravaillerais ce que j'aurai pu 
plus developper peut-etre ? 
Oui. Selon selon vous, ce qui vous vient a I'esprit si on vous dit euh euh ben pour la prochaine Coupe de I'America 
(rire) je je j'ai garde un petit machin quelque part (rires) vous savez (rires) 
J'imagine, j'imagine. Sur quels points est-ce que vous essaieriez 
d'ameliorer les choses ? 
Je crois que euh ce que peut-etre euh ce qui me vient a 1'esprit, euh et qui 
a ete conteste par certains marseillais, je pense qu'ils avaient pas tout a 
fait tort, euh on a on n'avait pas suffisamment travailler euh si vous voulez 
la... il fallait agrandir la plate-forme du 34, et je pense que sur le plan 
technique, euh alors c'est c'est le port autonome qui avait traite ga, euh ils 
etaient sur le I'enracinement dune digue avec un un avant-port etc. Voila. 
Et je, je pense qu'on aurait du' travailler non pas sur de I'enracinement 
parce que ga retrecissait le l'entree du port etc, mais qu'on aurait dü 
travailler sur du sur des digues flottantes, et que peut-etre techniquement, 
on n'avait pas assez euh si vous voulez, parce qu'on etait pris par le temps 
aussi, mais on aurait peut-etre, on uarait peut-etre pu travailler 
d'avantage, je euh l'implantation euh je dirais I'extension euh euh du 34 
euh, la rendre peut-etre plus provisoire quelle n'etait avec des 
enracinements, euh euh euh lourds je dirais, et qui ont un impact sur 
I'environnement et sur le cadre, et la je pense qu'il y avait un travail peut- 
etre ä qu'on a pas suffisamment approfondi, euh parce qu'on a ete pris 
euh dans le par le temps je dirais hein. Parce que tout necessite des 
etudes assez complexes hein de de courants, de vents, de, c'etait 
vraiment tres tres. Et on a peut-etre pas eu le temps de (... ) d'approfondir 
suffisamment euh I'implantation je dirais euh des bases, enfin la lo le 
support d'implantation des bases voila. Euh peut-etre il aurait fallu euh tre 
d'avantage travailler ga. C'est ce qui m'est venu euh quand vous euh 
j'etais en train de reflechir je crois que ga c'est un point qui a qui a ete 
euh important, qu'on n'a pas peut-etre pas suffisamment par faute de 
temps, euh parce qu'aussi peut-etre le port a une tradition euh d'ancrage 
plus lourd, c'est eux qui ont fait les etudes, euh et peut-etre aussi 
techniquement ce que je dis est une betise hein euh faut aussi euh mais 
pour moi enfin mon (... ) mon analyse pas vraiment un sentiment, mon 
analyse c'est qu'on aurait dü aussi mener parallelement une analyse euh 
d'un dun avant-port euh flottant euh une digue flottante et non pas et 
non pas avec un enracinement. Mais bon finalement on I'a pas fait et on 
est passe sur autre chose mais je pense que la y avait y avait une y avait 
quelque chose qu'on aurait dü peut-etre apporter. 
Oui. 
Ya peut-etre d'autres choses, en reflechissant peut-etre ga me reviendrait 
mais cette une chose qui ma quand meme (... ) qui a ete un peu lourde. 
Sinon on a fait on a on a vraiment euh les collaborateurs, les directeurs 
generaux, le secretaire general, tout ga on a vraiment je crois ils ont men' 
le dossier bien, bien, bien bien. Mais ga c'est quelque chose peut-etre 
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qu'on aurait dü d'avantage approfondir. Mais (... ) je veux dire c'est la faute a personne. Euh c'est parce que bon euh il fallait euh toujours y 
avait des dead line et c'etait euh y avait des etudes, y avait des dead line, 
il fallait, enfin il fallait avancer etc et euh on pouvait pas toujours euh. 
Mais Sa je pense que c'est quelque chose qu'iI faudrait revoir. Ouais tout a 
fa it. 
D'accord. Euh et bien ecoutez je crois que pour I'instant... 
C'est pas I'implantation des bases hein, c'est la structure hein de 
d'implantation. C'est-ä-dire euh I'avant-port 
Oui oui. Jai vu le les photos sur 
Qui avait ete 
Dans le presse 
Voila, qui avait ete conteste et euh en fait il fallait faire une avancee mais 
je pense qu'il aurait fallu travailler sur du sur du provi enfin sur sur du 
provisoire. En plus une digue flottante apres on peut I'amener ailleurs. On 
aurait pu I'amener par exemple agrandir celle des il fallait aussi agrandir 
celle des Catalans. On aurait pü I'agrandir encore plus, voyez enfin on 
pouvait euh avoir quelque chose mais de plus complet. Et utiliser ce qu'on 
faisait le reutiliser ailleurs. Mais bon, je pense qu'on a eu un manque de 
temps euh flagrant hein parce que c'etait vraiment tres le questionnaire 
etait etait long dur hein. 
Et oui et puls la candidature s'est finalement etalee sur 9 mois ou quelque 
chose ga. 
AH oui oui, a peine 
C'est rien du tout pour des 
Ah oui j'ai pas pris de vacances on a travaille tout I'ete. Oui oui. On est 
parti peut-etre 8 jours les uns enfin du 1er au 15 aoüt les uns les autres 
mais on a cravache hein, je peux vous le dire hein euh. Non mais c'est 
bien hein c'est c'est une belle chose et puls ga continue hein ya plein de 
choses ici. 
Et donc vous avez vous avez une idee de si la coupe de I'america est 
gagne par les suisses 
Non il faut voir bon par les suisses, on verra hein parce que le contrat 
stipulait pour les 4 que pas forcement on ils retourneraient au meme 
endroit. D'abord ca, et puis la deuxieme chose Sa Sa peut titre I'accueil de 
la coupe America mais ca peut titre aussi un equipage, un jour. Euh moi 
j'ai j'ai clans ma tete j'ai un peu ca mail il faut trouver beaucoup d'argent, 
les hommes ont les auraient je pense, mais je serai tres fiere de laisser en 
2000 en 2000 en 2008 quand je Wen vais un bateau euh Marseille pour 
2010. Mais il faut trouver des sponsors, il faut trouver on n'a pas trouve 
pour Lok Peyron et pour euh Bertrand Passe hein euh. C'est les 
francais 
ne sont pas euh c'est c'est difficile parce que financer euh quelque chose 
a 
8-10 millions c'est une chose mais financer euh euh un bateau une 
equipe 
c'est si on veut titre si on veut bien se placer il faut au moins 40 millions 
d'euros au bas mot hein euh. On peut faire avec moins mais bon euh vous 
me direz le tout c'est de participer (rire) mais on enverra pas 
la barquette 
marseillaise (rire) 
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(Rire) D'accord. Euh (... ) et bien ecoutez pour moi c'est bon. Est-ce que 
euh vous auriez euh des personnes euh 
A vous conseiller ? 
Oui, a contacter par rapport au dossier coupe de ('America. 
Ben je pense que vous pourriez contacter le secretaire general de la ville 
Monsieur Gondard ? 
Monsieur Gondard. Euh je pense que celui qui a mene le dossier euh avec 
beaucoup de maestria de bout en bout euh c'est euh Latl d'Albertas. Vous 
en avez entendu parler ? 
Oui, oui oui. 
Voila. Euh si vous voulez on a ete les trois a piloter le dossier, enfin a 
coordonner le dossier. Euh (... ) pfff, apres c'est, apres on descend a c'est 
moins global apres si vous voulez. Euh apres ben vous avez euh 
differentes euh euh les affaires maritimes ont joue un role important parce 
que c'est quand meme monsieur Dujardin et son equipe qui etait qui etait 
present qui donnait qui transmettait enfin y avait tout un tas d'autorisation 
a avoir en permanence voila. Ya eu des engagements ecrits de tous hein, 
dans le dossier tout etait y avait les affaires maritimes qu'est-ce qui avait 
encore (... ) la communication. Parce que ya eu enormement de 
communication lä-dessus, le directeur general c'est Guy Philippe, ii est pas 
la it est a Shanga'i la en ce moment. 
D'accord. 
bon ben c'est dejä pas mal hein 
Oui oui. 
Vous avez quelques points de (rire) de chute. Voila. 
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